Amazonía en Guerra Peru Colombia 1932 PARTE 1

In August 1932,

while Bolivia and Paraguay were

rushing to start a conflict over

Pokerón in the Chaco, Colombia and Peru were

preparing for an armed clash over

Leticia in the Amazon region. After the

first confrontation in Malzonía over

the quarry in 1911, the enmity between

these two nations seemed to have

gradually dissipated. The

fragile diplomatic barriers

contained a new conflict, and these failed to

withstand the tensions that the

Great Depression caused in

Latin America.

In 1922, Peru and Colombia signed the

Salomón Lozano treaty to establish their

borders, but its approval was slow

and highly controversial, especially in

Peru, where opposition from Iquitos almost

blocked it. To understand the

territorial issue on this side, the

Salomón Lozano treaty makes an exchange of

territories. Peru cedes the

Leticia trapezoid to Colombia, and Colombia cedes the

Sucumbíos enclave. This fact

generated outrage in Ecuador at the time,

which perceived that this treaty was made

at the expense of this country, showing maps

like these where

this entire area of ​​territory should correspond, since

the borders between Peru and Ecuador were

resolved many years later amidst

disputes and conflicts. There is much to

add on this side, but we

will focus on the border situation

between Peru and Colombia. Dictator

Augusto Leguía forced its ratification in

1927 to secure the north of the country

while he negotiated with Chile for Tacna and

Arica, thus avoiding a war and

recovering Tacna. However, the treaty

ceded the Leticia trapezoid to Colombia,

which caused great discontent in the

Peruvian Amazon. Although

diplomatically it strengthened Peru

against Chile and Ecuador, the population

considered the agreement a betrayal,

which weakened Guía's government and, together

with the economic crisis, led to his fall

in 1930.

After his overthrow,

political instability and resentment over the

loss of Leticia kept

tensions alive.

While Colombia attempted to consolidate its

control of the territory with a

military garrison, the local population

remained hostile, creating a climate conducive

to a future armed conflict. The

imposition of an export tax

on brown sugar produced in the

Leticia trapezoid ruined many

Peruvians who depended on that trade

with Iquitos, generating resentment

towards Colombia. It became clear that the country

needed a strong military presence

to maintain control of the territory.

While the War Ministry requested

at least one well-armed company, the

Foreign and

Finance Ministries objected. Finally, only

a small platoon and 20

police officers were sent in 1930.

Parallel to the border conflict, Julio

César Arana, a Peruvian

rubber entrepreneur, exploited extensive areas of the

Putumayo River, in whose rubber plantations

serious abuses and massacres were committed

against indigenous peoples, which

unleashed the international scandal of the

Putumayo. Although Colombia initially did nothing

to protect the indigenous people and

maintain good relations with the

Arana family, it later used these accusations

to attack Peru and claim the area

as its own. The rubber disaster

weakened Peru's position in the eyes of the

international community and favored

Colombia in the territorial dispute, even though

similar abuses were committed in Colombian rubber plantations. So

this scandal was used in part

as one of the causes of the conflict.

In 1932, the Colombian commander in the

Amazon, Colonel Amadeo Rodríguez,

considered his troops insufficient and adopted

a provocative attitude, patrolling the

rivers and displaying his power to the

Peruvians of Aiquitos.

Although his conduct earned him

local respect, he was harshly criticized by the

government in Bogotá, which ordered his withdrawal

despite the opposition of the Ministry of

War. The high cost of maintaining a

garrison in Leticia led the

Colombian government to withdraw it. The

economic contracts that the garrison maintained

with the local Peronists had been

vital to their livelihood, and their termination

caused unemployment and growing

resentment towards Colombia. Taking advantage of

the discontent, Peruvian reservist

Óscar Ordóñez, with the support of merchants

and some military personnel from Aiquitos,

organized a small force of 22

men to retake Leticia after

obtaining detailed information about the

weak Colombian defense reduced to eight

poorly armed police officers. On

September 1, 1932, Ordóñez launched a

surprise attack, taking the town without

casualties or significant resistance and

then freeing the

Colombian prisoners in Brazil. Leticia's capture

took the

governments of Peru and Colombia by surprise, and they were

immediately forced to define

their position on the unexpected incident.

Bogotá trusted that Lima would expel

the invaders, but faced with the inaction of the

Peruvian government, it began preparing to

send troops. In Peru, President

Luis Sánchez Cerro, newly elected and

aware of the country's military and

economic weakness, tried to maintain

calm, but was overwhelmed by

events.

On September 12, 1932,

officers in Quito staged a

local coup. Colonel Ugarte was dismissed

and Lieutenant Colonel

Isauro Calderón was appointed as the new commander,

proclaiming that Leticia should remain

in Peruvian hands.

Popular demonstrations in

Iquitos, driven by

nationalist fervor, pressured the

central government to support the annexation.

Despite his fear of provoking a

civil war or an international conflict,

Sánchez Cerro, under

patriotic pressure and also driven by his

personal ambition, decided to go to

war with Colombia. On September 6,

this decision was sealed, while Bogotá,

still hoping for a diplomatic solution,

refused to accept that the

confrontation was now inevitable.

Reports from Peruvian military attaché

Sarate revealed that the

Colombian army lacked

modern artillery, aviation, ammunition, and a

professional structure. These

perceptions led Lima to believe that

Colombia would accept the loss of the

territory without a fight. However,

Colombian President Enrique Olaya

Herrera surprised everyone by deciding to send a

military expedition to the Amazon,

confirming his willingness to retake

Leticia. In response, Peru adopted a "

touch" strategy: maintain the

Leticia trapezoid and make the Putumayo River

the border, but prepare to

advance to the Caquetá River if Colombia

insisted on using force. Inspired

by the actions of the War of the

Pacific, the Peruvian military

sought a victory that would allow them to

expand their borders, although they preferred

that Colombia start the conflict so as

not to be seen as the aggressor.

The Peruvian officers were confident of an

easy victory over the heterogeneous

Colombian force made up of

intellectuals, poets, philosophers,

historians, and writers. While the

Peruvian army, armed with pre-

World War I weaponry, underestimated

its enemy, Colombia

frantically modernized its forces through

purchases in Europe and the United States,

acquiring state-of-the-art weapons and

building a flotilla of

destroyers, gunboats, and ships,

some of them merchant vessels equipped with

anti-aircraft weaponry, which alarmed the

Peruvian command in Iquitos.

Despite urging the capital to send the

cruiser Lima to the front, all warnings

were ignored and no ship was sent.

At the same time, Colombian aviation

expanded rapidly thanks to the

enthusiasm of wealthy young people

passionate about flying and

German volunteer pilots, allowing

Colombia to achieve air supremacy in

the Amazon. The loss of Leticia

sparked an unprecedented nationalist fervor

. The population mobilized

massively, donating money, jewelry, and

wedding rings to support the cause. The

national reaction in Colombia united

all social classes for the first time

in a common goal. The press

and radio fueled

public interest in the war, disseminating

details of the strategy: advancing up

the Putumayo River, reinforcing roads and

air bases, and sending troops and

supplies to quickly defeat

the Peruvian forces. In contrast, in

Peru the response was weak. Only Iquito

celebrated the capture of Leticia, but it

lacked the resources and population to

sustain a war. Peruvians,

familiar with ammonia,

associated it with misery and disease.

They showed little enthusiasm for donating or

fighting. Simultaneously, Colombia

was planning a naval expedition up the

Amazon to coordinate an attack from

the north and south, trapping the

Peruvians in crossfire and isolating

Leticia from Iquitos. This strategy,

supported by the freedom of navigation

agreed with Brazil, sought to ensure a

decisive victory and the occupation of all

the territory north of the Amazon. The

appointment of General Alfredo Vázquez

Cobo as commander of the

Colombian expedition through the Amazon in October

1932 generated the first doubts about

Colombia's ambitious war plans.

Although his appointment seemed logical given

his diplomatic experience in France and

his role in the purchase at the time, his

military knowledge was outdated and his

disdain for aviation demonstrated his

unsuitability for modern warfare.

Vaquezcobo showed little

strategic judgment by initially requesting

only 200 soldiers and accepting without

objection the 700 sent by the

Ministry of War. After organizing his

force in Manaus, he departed on January 7,

1933, bound for Leticia instead

of Putumayo, as ordered by Bogotá.

Confident in the power of his fleet and

motivated by personal ambitions for

glory and presidential aspirations.

However, attacking the heavily

defended Etia, with artillery, mines, and a

garrison of over 1000 soldiers,

represented a huge risk, as

any impact or Peruvian air attack

could destroy the expedition. Leticia

turned out to be a trap that would have

precipitated the Colombian defeat,

so General Vázquez Cobo abandoned

his plan to attack it and in a telegram

Bogotá falsely claimed that he

had always planned to go to

Tarapacá first.

The War Ministry accepted the change

and the expedition was diverted towards the

Putumayo River.

Upon reaching the border area, the

Tarapacá hill, a strategic point

due to its elevation and location, was chosen

as the objective. The Colombian fleet

prepared the attack using seaplanes

for reconnaissance and building a

temporary airstrip in the jungle. In

February 1933, the presence

of a small and weakened

Peruvian garrison of 94 men under the command of

Lieutenant Gonzalo Díaz Rojas was confirmed, with

outdated weapons and deteriorated projectiles.

After receiving the Colombian ultimatum and

verifying the size of the

enemy expedition, Díaz concluded that

resistance was impossible and organized an

evacuation. On the morning of

February 4, a Peruvian squadron of three

B Corsale aircraft began the first air attack

of the conflict. They tried unsuccessfully to bomb

the expedition, where only one

bomb managed to hit the Cordoba, but it is

not there. Three Colombian Curtis Hawk helicopters

intercepted the attackers. Francisco

Secada Vigneta stayed behind to cover the

retreat and, according to the Peruvian version,

managed to demolish a Colombian house.

Anticipating an imminent air attack,

Díaz ordered his men to retreat

towards the Cotué River behind

Tarapacá Hill. During the evacuation, Second

Lieutenant Antonio Cavero, determined to

defend national honor, forced his

detachment to resist, opening fire

with an old machine gun that barely

affected the Colombian troops. which

turned out to be islands. Their shots revealed

the Peruvian position, allowing

the Colombians to launch air

and naval bombardments that destroyed trenches and

homes, completely demoralizing

the defenders. Some managed to

evacuate with Lieutenant Díaz, while

others, fearing they would be hit

by Colombian planes aboard

the boats, gave up and escaped on

foot through the jungle, where many died

of hunger or disease.

The few who reached Leticia were

in deplorable condition and never

returned to service. The defeat

shocked Iquitos and Lieutenant Díaz

was unjustly blamed, imprisoned and

died ill, although he was later

exonerated posthumously. The

Peruvian army's inability to adapt to the

Amazonian war foreshadowed further

defeats.

In contrast, General Vázquez Cobo

celebrated the victory excessively,

describing Tarapacá as a

Gibraltar and claiming to have captured

six or seven cannons when in reality there

were only two. His triumphant telegram

reflected more tropical delusions than

military reality. When Bogotá learned that there

were no Colombian casualties in Tarapacá,

General Vázquez Escobo's prestige

plummeted, and rumors circulated in the capital

that the battle had been a

political farce. However, the

Peruvian defeat was real and in response, the

Peruvians tried to bomb the

Colombian expedition with the few

planes they had left. Although the

air raids caused no

material damage, they had a strong

psychological impact on Vascos Escobo, who, after

experiencing the bombings for the first time

, went from despising

aviation to becoming a fervent

defender of air power, demanding that

all of Colombia's aircraft be concentrated

in his area. His sudden change of

stance exhausted the patience of the

War Ministry, which began to

relieve him of command and redistribute its

forces. He eventually returned to Bogotá and

was replaced by other commanders

as the Colombian offensive

continued to advance successfully up the

Putumayo River, fulfilling the strategy

of expelling the Peronists from the

Amazon region. This concludes

the first part of this

conflict. In the next video we will see

the Colombian advance up to the final

encounters, the end of

hostilities and the

geographical delimitation in both countries.