Full Transcript

·YouTLDR

CHINA IS THE REAL WINNER OF THE IRAN CRISIS – w/ Brandon Weichert

36:471,024 summary words · ~5 min readEnglishBy Mario NawfalTranscribed Jul 1, 2026
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Summary

China has emerged as the ultimate strategic winner of the US-led Middle East conflict, successfully using it as a stress-test to prove that its robust strategic reserves and diversified green energy infrastructure can easily insulate its economy from global supply shocks.

This shift signals the arrival of a post-American multipolar world where the West's primary economic and military levers of containment are proving ineffective against Beijing's long-term planning.

Section summaries

0:00-1:00

Proxy Fronts and Regional Instability

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The speakers introduce the concept of modern conflicts expanding across multiple proxy fronts. They focus on the Red Sea and Somaliland as flashpoints that are actively escalating. They reflect on the progressive destabilization of the Middle East relative to the calmer geopolitical climate of the mid-1990s.

  • Global warfare is rapidly transitioning from direct conflicts to complex, localized proxy struggles.
  • Crucial maritime trade pathways like the Red Sea remain highly vulnerable to sudden asymmetric disruptions.

This section is primarily an introductory discussion and personal exchange before the main thesis begins.

1:00-6:00

China's Proof of Concept and Energy Resilience

watch

The discussion shifts to a Guardian report identifying China as the primary winner of the US-Iran crisis. Weichert details how China insulated its economy from oil shocks by relying on its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) and domestic energy alternatives. He debunks Western predictions of a Chinese collapse, specifically pointing out that the massive Three Gorges Dam remains stable and productive.

  • China proved it can temporarily decouple from global oil markets to survive a geopolitical crisis.
  • Western media and military analysts consistently suffer from confirmation bias when predicting China's imminent economic collapse.

It presents the core arguments and data illustrating how China successfully weathered the energy crisis.

6:00-11:00

Alternative Energy Mastery vs. Western Policy Failure

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Weichert highlights China's rapid dominance in clean tech exports, including solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles. He contrasts China's focus on scaling practical alternative technologies with the West's regulatory policies and failed government-subsidized projects like Solyndra. He also explains the Chinese 'floodplane mentality'—a cultural focus on maximizing prosperity during good times to survive the bad.

  • China scaled its clean energy sector to support heavy industry rather than penalizing producers with taxes.
  • The Chinese 'floodplane mentality' drives systematic, state-level resource hoarding and technological scaling.

It explains the cultural and policy differences behind China's rapid rise in industrial manufacturing.

11:00-17:00

Peripheral Stability and the Helium Reserve Blunder

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The host and speaker discuss the strategic limitations of Chinese ambition, noting that Beijing fears domestic instability caused by external chaos. Weichert contrasts China's technocratic leadership with the lawyer-lobbyist class of the US, which lacks long-term strategy. He points to a critical US security failure: the Biden administration's sale of the national helium reserve to a company with deep CCP ties.

  • Despite enjoying relative gains, China values regional stability to prevent threats to CCP rule.
  • The US recently compromised its advanced semiconductor manufacturing supply chain by selling off its strategic helium reserves.

This segment exposes critical regulatory and strategic vulnerabilities within the US defense manufacturing supply chain.

17:00-25:00

Post-American Multipolarity and CCP Succession

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The conversation shifts to the emergence of a post-American multipolar world system. Weichert describes a future tributary world order orbiting Beijing. He also analyzes the political survival of the CCP after Xi Jinping, predicting a transition away from a single strongman back to a collective, corporate-style board of directors.

  • A post-American order is emerging where nations orbit a Chinese-led financial and tributary system.
  • The eventual succession of Xi Jinping is likely to result in a stable, technocratic triumvirate or committee structure.

It provides deep, nuanced insights into the long-term political structure of America's primary competitor.

25:00-30:00

Military Overmatch and the Threat to Japan

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Weichert analyzes the likelihood of war between the US and China, asserting that Beijing has already achieved anti-access military dominance in the First Island Chain. He argues that a direct conflict over Taiwan is less likely than a strike on Japan. A potential trigger would be Japan pursuing independent nuclear weapons as the US defense alliance deteriorates.

  • China's anti-access area denial (A2AD) systems can effectively keep US Navy aircraft carriers at bay.
  • A nuclear-armed Japan represents a severe, underreported red line that could trigger pre-emptive Chinese strikes.

It delivers critical, non-consensus military analysis on regional security triggers in the Pacific.

30:00-36:00

North Korea's Pivot and the 'Fortress Americas' Defense

watch

The interview concludes with a breakdown of North Korea's geopolitical balancing act, explaining how Kim Jong-un plays China, Russia, and the US against each other to preserve his independence. Weichert previews his upcoming book, 'Fortress Americas,' advocating for a shift from global interventionism to a hemispheric security model.

  • North Korea actively resists Chinese puppet status by forging strategic alliances with Moscow.
  • The US must transition to a 'Fortress Americas' defense strategy to secure its own hemisphere.

It summarizes Weichert's primary policy recommendation and connects global hotspots to a unified US strategy.

Key points

  • Stress-Tested Energy Independence — China effectively used the US-Iran conflict as a real-world proof of concept, relying on its massive strategic petroleum reserves and diversified domestic renewables (nuclear, hydro, and geothermal) to completely bypass Middle East oil shocks.
  • Technocratic Planning vs. Short-Term Governance — China's ruling class consists primarily of math and engineering graduates focused on multi-decade resource securing, while US policy is led by lawyers and lobbyists operating on short-term political cycles.
  • Military Overmatch in the First Island Chain — Beijing has successfully established anti-access area denial (A2AD) supremacy near its coast using advanced hypersonics like the DF-17, effectively pricing US carrier strike groups out of a localized conflict.
  • Post-Xi Technocratic Stabilization — Although Xi Jinping operates as an autocratic strongman, the historical precedent of the CCP is collective, committee-based governance (a 'board of directors' model) which will likely return after his tenure.
China really, it looked to me and sounded like their leaders were using this war as a proof of concept to see if they could really weather a real geopolitical crisis involving the United States. Brandon Weichert
Everybody assumed that the United States and the West were going to come out ahead because China is so dependent on Middle East oil... That has not proven to be true as we're now seeing the United States is the one that's now over a barrel. Brandon Weichert

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:00

And I've been saying recently that the

0:02

war is going to be moving fronts and

0:04

it's going to become more I don't know

0:05

if we did we talk about it yesterday how

0:07

I believe it's going to become more of a

0:08

war of proxies.

0:09

>> I think you mentioned it either to me or

0:12

I watch your show so I I think I've

0:14

heard you say it but just you know

0:15

everyone should go and see what I was

0:18

saying back in March 9th. I was saying

0:21

that Somali land and you know there was

0:23

the the that side that kind of red sea

0:26

area was going to pop next. And uh I

0:29

think that's accurate. Yes, we did talk

0:32

about it. Actually, we did talk about it

0:34

because we were talking about proxy

0:35

escalation. So yeah, we did talk about

0:37

it.

0:38

>> Everyone should go also see what I said

0:40

in in February 2nd, 1996.

0:44

I said there's going to be more

0:45

instability in the region. Everyone

0:47

should go check that out. Well, you

0:48

would have been you would have been a a

0:50

prophet if you had said that because

0:52

back then back then 96 those were good

0:56

times, man, for everybody for the most

0:58

part.

0:58

>> Not not the Middle East, man.

0:59

>> Not in the Well, yeah, but you know,

1:01

it's all relative in the Middle East.

1:02

>> Better than True. True. Better than now.

1:04

Well, let's talk. I know China is an

1:06

area I understand really well. And the

1:07

Guardian put out a really interesting

1:09

piece today. I just got a summary of it

1:11

here. Um so the guiding reports uh on an

1:15

on an Asian group analysis uh that says

1:17

that China emerged as the biggest

1:20

strategic winner from the or in Asia at

1:23

least from the US Israeli war against

1:26

Iran. Uh number one, China weathered the

1:28

energy shock better than expected thanks

1:30

to large strategic oil reserves and

1:32

years of investment in renewable energy

1:34

making it less vulnerable than many

1:37

Asian economies. Before we go, there's

1:38

four points in there. Before we go to

1:40

the second one, pretty clear, and you've

1:42

talked about this already, that China

1:44

was really wellprepared for this, wasn't

1:46

it?

1:46

>> Yeah. In fact, like I I think I said it

1:48

to you or Tucker in the last two weeks,

1:50

China really, it looked to me and

1:52

sounded like their leaders were using

1:55

this war as a proof of concept to see if

1:58

they could really weather a real

2:01

geopolitical crisis involving the United

2:04

States. and they just proved they could

2:07

uh they proved to the world that not

2:09

only could they but they actually come

2:11

out looking much better. You'll remember

2:13

also by the way this is not the first

2:15

time China has been in the middle of a

2:18

major major crisis and they've actually

2:21

come out ahead co which of course

2:24

originated in China and I know there's

2:26

some argument about the real origins but

2:28

physically it came out of China whatever

2:30

the origins were I think it was man-made

2:33

um but it came out of China and the

2:35

Chinese actually if you look at the

2:38

first quarter after COVID when

2:40

everything started to reopen

2:42

China's GDP actually did better than the

2:45

West and you know they were ground zero

2:47

of it and it's because the Chinese were

2:49

able to prepare and they were able to

2:52

weather the storm better uh than we and

2:55

the West were and here again now you see

2:58

this playing out with the Iran war.

3:00

Everybody assumed that the United States

3:03

and the West were going to come out

3:04

ahead because China is so dependent on

3:08

Middle East oil and Iranian energy in

3:10

particular. That has not proven to be

3:13

true as we're now seeing the United

3:15

States is the one that's now over a

3:17

barrel. Uh you know, we're all waiting

3:20

for the the bottom to fall out because

3:22

we're so exposed to the disruptions.

3:25

China has not been. In fact, as we

3:27

talked about last time, much of the rest

3:29

of the world looked to China to help

3:31

them during this crisis. And how did

3:33

China do it? One of the things they did

3:35

was voluntary, excuse me, voluntarily

3:38

remove themselves uh from the global

3:42

market for the last two months, relying

3:44

exclusively on that SPR that they built

3:46

up. So, Mario, China's looking pretty.

3:49

And also it was a proof of concept to

3:51

prove to the world that their renewable

3:53

sector is truly truly robust. And it is

3:57

it is not just wind that they have. It

4:00

is not just solar. China has nuclear

4:02

power. China has a uh you know

4:04

geothermal power. China uses hydro

4:07

power. Uh that's what the three gorgeous

4:09

dam was about. And I remember six years

4:11

ago being on a panel uh in Washington DC

4:15

at a closed event and all of the

4:17

panelists and these were very well-known

4:19

people and because it was a closed event

4:21

I will not say their names but these are

4:23

very well-known people who are seen on

4:25

Fox and MSNBC and CNN and they were all

4:28

piling on me cuz I disagreed with them

4:31

when they said that the three gorgeous

4:33

dam was going to collapse and that was

4:36

going to become the the loss of

4:38

Xihinping's mandate of heaven. and that

4:40

that would lead to the collapse of

4:42

China. Never happened. Was not going to

4:44

happen. It was all a bunch of

4:45

gobbledegook.

4:47

>> Sorry. What is the What is that?

4:49

>> So, the three gorgeous dam the three

4:51

gorgeous dam is, I believe, the largest

4:54

dam in the world. Um, it it they China

4:58

built it to help to not only dam up the

5:02

river, but they also use it for massive

5:05

hydroelect electrical power generation.

5:08

and they forced a lot of Chinese

5:10

homeowners out of that area so they

5:12

could basically dam it up and you know

5:14

change the geography and it was a big

5:17

controversy and a lot of people in the

5:18

west were using that as another example

5:20

of Chinese government going too far not

5:24

being fair to their people blah blah

5:26

blah there was concerns that there was

5:29

engineering instability with the

5:31

construction of the three gorgeous dam

5:33

it was so big and massive that they

5:36

didn't build it right was the argument

5:38

and that it was basically starting to

5:40

bend and buckle uh and whatnot. It never

5:43

never turned to be true. It it was a

5:45

complete intelligence, you know,

5:48

misunderstanding

5:50

uh for from the west. And the bottom

5:52

line is people in 2020 when this story

5:54

was going around, including very

5:56

well-known people who should know

5:58

better, uh were running around telling

6:00

the US military, telling the US

6:02

government, well, between that and co

6:04

gee's coming to an end. It's not

6:07

happened. Uh, you know, the the Chinese

6:09

is a nearly a what is it? Over 4,000y

6:12

old country. They're a civilization

6:14

state. They're not going anywhere, guys.

6:18

Uh, until the 1400s, in many respects,

6:21

China was actually more advanced than

6:22

the Europeans, and it flipped in the

6:25

mid400s when the Ming Emperor died. But

6:28

now, it's flipping again. And I think

6:30

that it's very clear that whatever

6:32

happens with the Chinese current

6:34

government, China is not going away as a

6:37

great power. They're a competitor. They

6:39

have a lot of durability clearly and

6:41

they're only getting stronger. And I'll

6:43

just add one other thing, Mario. I have

6:46

a dear friend, uh, two people that I

6:47

know, but one one I'm close with was Dan

6:50

Collins. There's another one named Mitch

6:51

Presnik. And these are really really

6:54

brilliant. And Brendan O'Reilly as well

6:56

who wrote Everyone Is Wrong About China.

6:58

These are three brilliant China hands

7:00

that I routinely talk to. They all speak

7:02

Mandarin. Dan and Mitch started major

7:05

businesses and Dan still has businesses

7:08

in China and and Brendan is a former

7:11

intelligence analyst who lived in China

7:12

for a decade. All three of them tell me

7:16

that um there's a sort of mentality

7:18

among the Chinese. It's a floodplane

7:20

mentality. Basically, right now the

7:23

times are good. So the Chinese want

7:25

their government and want themselves to

7:27

maximize the good times because you

7:29

never know when the floods are going to

7:31

come back and they'll be weak again. And

7:33

that is why China is maximizing. They

7:35

are uh you know leveling up if you will

7:38

even when the west is saying oh no no

7:40

they're about to fall. They are not

7:41

about to fall. And they're benefiting

7:43

now from the geopolitical instability in

7:45

ways that Washington never well

7:48

Washington didn't predict. People like

7:50

me I was not alone in this by the way.

7:52

Other people were saying this as well,

7:54

but people like me were warning

7:56

Washington, this is not going to go the

7:58

way you think it will, but here we are.

8:02

Um, so the other point in the um in the

8:05

piece, the crisis accelerated demand for

8:07

Chinese clean energy exports. So,

8:09

China's exporting not only for internal

8:12

consumption, but they're exporting solar

8:14

panels, batteries, electric vehicles.

8:16

>> Um, so that's another way they're

8:18

benefiting.

8:19

>> It's another way they're benefiting. And

8:20

they're also sticking an eye a needle in

8:22

the eye of the west. Right? Remember I

8:25

remember in 2010 I remember everybody

8:28

talking about how dirty and polluted

8:31

China is. And China has a lot of you

8:33

know they're a large country that

8:36

rapidly industrialized. So they went

8:38

through a really heightened period of of

8:40

industrial degradation or or or

8:42

environmental degradation. But China

8:44

also is the country that committed to

8:47

reducing that over time. And one of the

8:49

ways they reduced it was through the

8:51

creation and the investment and the

8:53

scaling of workable alternative

8:56

energies. Whereas in the west we talk a

9:00

lot we talk a big game and we tax the

9:02

hell out of industries to make them

9:04

sustainable. China said we're not going

9:06

to do any of that. We're just going to

9:08

create alternative technological routes

9:10

that will inevitably mature and will

9:12

inevitably replace the quote unquote

9:15

dirty energy production that we go

9:17

through today. And that is what you are

9:19

seeing in real time happening. They

9:21

didn't punish industry in China. They

9:23

didn't go after the producers. They just

9:25

created alternative means. They scaled

9:28

it. They made it marketable. And now

9:30

here you have China is again running

9:32

circles around the west in a very

9:35

interesting and dynamic new field. In

9:37

the west we talk about Celindra which

9:40

was a massive government project that

9:42

failed miserably. Uh it was just it was

9:44

a symbol of graft and corruption in

9:46

2012. In China they don't have cylindra

9:50

was a was a it was during the Obama

9:52

administration. This was a big political

9:54

issue during Obama's re-election

9:55

campaign. Basically, a bunch of Obama

9:58

allies, a bunch of Democratic Party

10:00

allies got subsidies from the Obama

10:03

administration to create Yeah. And it

10:06

didn't go well. And the Chinese, on the

10:08

other hand, don't have this problem.

10:09

>> The renewable renewable energy subsidies

10:11

were renewable energy companies.

10:13

Correct.

10:13

>> There was a renewable energy company

10:15

that received subsidies from the Obama

10:17

administration to jumpstart solar

10:20

industry in the United States or to

10:21

scale it. They couldn't do it. They

10:23

couldn't compete with China, it turns

10:24

out. uh and the American taxpayer ended

10:27

up basically footing the bill for that

10:28

failure. In China, because they have

10:31

scale, because they have mass

10:32

production, because they have a very

10:34

talented human capital pool, many of

10:36

whom we trained, by the way, and didn't

10:38

retain here. Um the Chinese have been

10:41

able to now become not just competitive,

10:44

but dominant in alternative energy. And

10:46

alternative energy is not just wind, you

10:49

know, that's not all it is. It's hydro,

10:51

it's geothermal, it's nuclear. China, my

10:54

understanding is they have the hottest

10:56

burning Takamac nuclear fusion reactor

10:58

right now that's more advanced than

11:00

anything in the west. South Korea is the

11:01

next one. Uh and I think Japan is right

11:04

behind them. But China's leading the way

11:06

now in nuclear fusion R&D. So, you know,

11:09

China has they've already surpassed us

11:12

in so many respects and uh the war is

11:16

not helping to slow them down. It's

11:18

actually it's actually, you know,

11:19

supercharging them.

11:22

The Iran war. The Iran war. Yeah.

11:24

>> Yeah. So, so, but doesn't that mean

11:26

strategically speaking, they have an

11:27

incentive for the war to continue?

11:29

>> Yeah. So, this is an interesting thing,

11:31

and we kind of touched on this before.

11:34

Yes. The Chinese are benefiting, but you

11:37

have to remember this is a more than

11:38

4,000 year old culture. The kind of

11:42

preferences and proclivities that have

11:44

become ingrained over the course of that

11:46

time still dominate the thinking even of

11:50

so-called communist leaders. These guys

11:52

are not really communists. They're state

11:53

capitalists. There's a difference. Um

11:55

but the the and the the preference and

11:58

the proclivity culturally for China

12:01

historically has been we want to

12:04

maintain st as much stability along our

12:06

periphery because otherwise instability

12:10

along the periphery will feed into

12:12

instability and disruption and rebellion

12:14

in the center of the country which then

12:17

leads to the decapitation of regimes,

12:20

leads to civil war, leads to famine,

12:22

leads to the overthrow of dynasties. And

12:24

you have to really you have to really

12:26

view notably Xihinping, but you really

12:28

have to view the entire Chinese um

12:31

Communist Party of China as just another

12:34

of several dynasties that has ruled

12:37

China. And when you put it into that

12:39

perspective, particularly now, you start

12:41

to understand the patterns that are at

12:43

play and why the Chinese certainly don't

12:46

want the US to run the world anymore,

12:49

but the Chinese government also doesn't

12:51

want to see this kind of protracted

12:53

instability because they just don't like

12:55

that.

12:56

>> That's a good point. So it's like a thin

12:58

line where they do want to see a weaker

13:00

the U a weaker US where in relative

13:02

terms they do benefit but if they do

13:04

don't benefit in absolute terms and you

13:06

know using their strategic reserves

13:07

having higher inflation whatever it is

13:09

oil shortages even though even if they

13:12

weather the issues better than the rest

13:14

of the world so in relative terms

13:16

they're doing better they still worry if

13:18

they push it too far

13:20

>> then having it could lead to instability

13:22

back home. So it's kind of they're

13:23

treading a very very thin line.

13:25

>> That's right. And you have to remember

13:26

also the Chinese elite, the people

13:29

leading the country, these are mostly

13:31

people with engineering and other kind

13:33

of mathy hard science backgrounds.

13:36

Whereas in the United States, the people

13:39

leading our country tend to be lawyers,

13:41

lobbyists, liberal arts majors. These

13:44

are not people who really think uh in

13:46

sort of the grand kind of strategic

13:48

terms. Uh notably the civilian

13:51

leadership, they don't think like this.

13:52

Uh it's all very sort of not

13:55

technocratic. It's not competent. Uh

13:58

it's very ideological and it's very self

14:01

negating. And our system does not allow

14:04

really anymore for long-term strategic

14:06

planning. It just does not. I mean I I I

14:09

point to a recent piece of, you know,

14:11

work that I did where I analyzed why did

14:15

the Biden administration, I think in

14:17

2021 or 2022, sell off the US helium

14:21

reserve. We had a strategic helium

14:23

reserve that we had been building since

14:27

1920s

14:29

and we sold it during the Biden

14:31

administration to a German company that

14:34

had direct and significant linkages

14:37

according to the United States Congress

14:40

uh when they did an investigation after

14:41

the fact it had significant ties to the

14:44

Chinese Communist Party. Um so now in a

14:46

way indirectly China is owning our

14:50

strategic helium reserve and they've

14:52

since drained it. The helium reserve has

14:54

been drastically reduced. Um and helium

14:57

of course is a very critical supply for

14:59

multiple industrial inputs. Uh notably

15:02

the production of semiconductors. So my

15:04

point here is why did we do that? Well

15:06

some people say it's because Biden was

15:08

corrupt and I think that's probably part

15:10

of it. But part of it is also because

15:12

the US government wasn't thinking. It

15:14

wasn't thinking that, hey, we might need

15:16

this and we don't we don't want to get

15:18

rid of it. Even if there's a chance we

15:20

could maybe make some money uh off of

15:22

it, we don't want to get rid of that.

15:23

But that's not the thinking. That's not

15:25

the thinking.

15:27

>> The Chinese do think like that.

15:32

>> It's the uh it's the three little

15:34

piggies. Remember the three little

15:36

piggies? Uh the one that built their

15:38

house with brick. uh you know just just

15:41

you know maybe I'm getting

15:43

>> so how the hell the German company have

15:45

ties to the CCP and why did by the

15:47

what's your analysis why did

15:48

>> eventually so so basically the company

15:51

in question had business ties in China

15:54

and I'm going off memory now because

15:55

it's been a while since I've thought

15:57

I've had to talk about it but but

15:58

basically the company in question the

16:00

the United States Congress they

16:02

investigated it after the fact this was

16:04

a cifhious failure the United States

16:06

Congress determined that this German

16:08

firm was able to purchase it um because

16:12

they did not present themselves as

16:14

having a lot of contact connectivity

16:16

with China. They just said, "Hey, we're

16:17

a German company." And the Biden

16:19

administration signed off on it. And the

16:22

twist was after the fact, turns out that

16:25

company has a massive presence in China.

16:28

They do massive amounts of business with

16:30

Chinese-owned ent military entities. And

16:34

there is a fear among Congress that

16:38

notably the Republicans in Congress that

16:41

this sale was actually or this purchase

16:43

was actually orchestrated on behalf of

16:46

the Chinese government which wanted more

16:47

access to helium because of course China

16:49

is you know building their own massive

16:51

semiconductive production capability.

16:56

The third point's an interesting one.

16:58

Let me know if you agree with this one.

16:59

The report argues the conflict

17:01

reinforced China's narrative that the US

17:03

is a destabilizing force in the Middle

17:05

East and even the world, but in the

17:07

Middle East in this case. While China

17:08

presents itself as a more stable

17:09

long-term partner, China's been trying

17:11

to create that image for itself for a

17:13

while now, for years.

17:14

>> And it seems that Iran, the Iran war

17:16

played into that hand really well.

17:18

>> 100% 100%. This this at every level this

17:23

conflict in with Iran in the Middle East

17:26

has been a strategic disaster for the

17:28

United States. There is no win here. The

17:32

only upside, as I have said before, is

17:35

indirect in that if it forces us to

17:38

permanently be out militarily of the

17:40

Middle East and forces us to rep

17:42

prioritize our own hemisphere, that's a

17:45

win then. But it isn't by design. I can

17:47

assure you of that. None of this is by

17:49

design. Um the the the Chinese are the

17:53

real benefactor or beneficiaries rather

17:55

of this conflict. And from here on out,

17:59

we talked previously in one of our

18:00

episodes, Mario, of a post-american

18:02

Middle East. This is clearly a

18:05

postamerican multipolar world system

18:08

that's being birthed before our eyes. It

18:10

is one in which America is, yes, a great

18:12

power. It's not the superpower, though,

18:15

and it is in relative decline. We are in

18:18

we are officially there's no question

18:20

now that this country is in relative

18:22

decline compared to other great powers

18:26

rising powers like China and it will be

18:29

I think a China oriented maybe not China

18:32

run because there's there's still some

18:34

question as to whether Beijing actually

18:36

really wants to fully replace the United

18:38

States as sort of the world policeman.

18:40

Who would want that responsibility by

18:42

the way? Uh only the idiots in

18:44

Washington want that. Um but China

18:46

definitely will it will be a

18:48

Chineseoriented or Chinese orbiting

18:51

world system not unlike the concentric

18:54

circles of China's tributary system that

18:57

ruled their imperial order when the

18:59

emperor sat at the middle and everything

19:01

else orbited around him in that

19:03

tributary system. I think that's where

19:05

it's leading to. Do you not worry that

19:08

if an autocracy becomes a world

19:10

superpower and replaces a democracy, an

19:13

imperfect democracy?

19:15

What don't you worry about massive

19:17

centralization of power on a global

19:19

level?

19:21

I mean, so generally it's a concern.

19:24

Yeah. Uh if you had asked me that 10

19:26

years ago, I would have been much more

19:28

gung-ho in my answer saying yes,

19:29

absolutely. But I look at the United

19:32

States after the last 10 to 12 years. I

19:35

look at the West, the so-called West in

19:38

general, the so-called developed world,

19:41

and I I I see a lot of autocracy here. I

19:44

see a lot of centralization here, and

19:47

it's all

19:47

>> still a lot a lot less than the CCP.

19:50

>> Uh, admittedly, so I'm not saying that

19:52

this the CCP call the president an

19:55

right now.

19:56

>> Yeah. Yeah. No, I I get that. Well,

19:58

well, yeah,

19:59

>> try that. Try that. Yeah, you can.

20:01

>> I I Yeah. Yeah. I I I get it. I get it.

20:03

But what my point is my point is is that

20:05

we are trending more closer to the China

20:08

model on our own than China is trending

20:11

closer to our model. And so really it's

20:15

a question of gradation. Um and and

20:18

again I don't know if China wants to run

20:22

the world

20:24

so much as be the center of it. And

20:28

there is a slight difference there. Um

20:31

the Americans, the British before um the

20:34

Romans, they ran the world as they knew

20:37

it. Um the Chinese, I it's definitely

20:41

not something that's going to be good

20:42

for America on a political and military

20:45

and kind of national security level. Do

20:48

I think the Chinese want to invade

20:49

America and conquer us? No. No. No.

20:52

Well, don't say of course because I mean

20:53

historically empires do that and

20:56

America's been doing that now a lot in

20:58

the Middle East. Uh we don't call it

21:00

that, but that's what we've been doing.

21:02

Um so, you know, I don't want China to

21:05

run the world, to be clear. I don't want

21:06

to see them the number one. I want us to

21:08

be number one, the United States. But,

21:11

you know, I do I do I get into that kind

21:14

of ideological game anymore? No. I think

21:15

that's a holdover from the Cold War. I

21:18

think the real question is what system

21:21

does more for most people? And I think

21:25

still the American system has had a comm

21:28

c commulatively more positive impact

21:31

even with all the covert action and

21:32

whatnot. Um but you know I don't think

21:36

that's really even relevant here because

21:38

it's a question of who has the juice,

21:40

who has the power. And uh right now it

21:43

looks to me like that power and that

21:45

momentum and that leverage is

21:47

increasingly Beijing's to lose whereas

21:50

the Americans have already given theirs

21:51

away. We have already lost the mantle of

21:54

if you want to say empire. We've already

21:56

lost that.

22:00

>> Do you not worry what happens when she

22:02

dies?

22:04

>> I worry about what happens when American

22:07

presidents, you know, change over. Um,

22:10

>> no. Less so, less so. Come on. when when

22:12

it

22:13

>> doesn't really doesn't really have

22:16

>> look look G's an interesting figure in

22:18

China's system because he is the closest

22:22

>> to Mao they've had whereas Mao had like

22:25

it was all on him and he led them and he

22:28

did the after Mao died you'll remember

22:30

they had Dong Xiaoing they had you know

22:32

they they had Jang Jim they had Hu

22:35

Juntowa um and those three guys ruled

22:39

much more like a cadre and less like a

22:43

cult of personality. I'm not saying X's

22:45

a cult of personality, but he's

22:46

definitely more toward that end of the

22:48

spectrum. Um I think if you look at and

22:51

I think Xi therefore if you look at the

22:53

last what five total Chinese communist

22:56

rule rulers again communist in

22:58

quotations um three of the five have not

23:01

been this sort of cultish strongman

23:04

type. They've very much led by executive

23:06

committee and the you know they've run

23:09

it more like a board of directors for a

23:11

corporation than they have as like a

23:13

dictatorship as we understand it. It

23:15

wasn't Stalinist um or Mauist. Um, Xi, I

23:19

think when he does eventually go, and he

23:22

is old, uh, when he does eventually go,

23:25

I suspect it will be he will be replaced

23:29

by a more technocratic, less cult of

23:33

personality type leader and it might

23:36

actually end up stabilizing the

23:38

political system beyond what it is at

23:41

right now because China's political

23:43

system is h, you know, it their economic

23:46

model works. those purges and recent

23:50

purges and stuff.

23:51

>> Yeah. Yeah. And so what he's doing

23:52

though also under the the the impromoder

23:55

of anti-corruption is he's getting rid

23:57

of any potential impediment to his

23:59

direct reign. Um that is in Chinese

24:03

culture especially that is a that that

24:06

gives him more power for sure. It allows

24:08

him to maximize what he wants to do as

24:11

quickly as possible. But that also means

24:13

it's more responsibility. And if things

24:15

go pear-shaped on him, that means he's

24:18

going to get burned and held accountable

24:20

by the other members of the cadre uh far

24:23

more than he would have been if he had

24:25

governed more like Deng Xiaoing or more

24:27

like uh uh Hu Jin Tao. So, and with his

24:31

age and with these, you know, there's

24:33

there is a reckoning coming within the

24:34

political system of China, but I think

24:37

that the transition will probably be

24:41

less toward another Xihinping like

24:43

leader and more toward more of a

24:45

committee, more toward that kind of

24:47

board of directors style, uh maybe even

24:51

a triumpvirate possibly. um which

24:54

actually would probably lend itself to

24:55

greater levels of stability within

24:57

China's political system.

25:00

>> I know you worry a lot about a war

25:02

between um a continuation of the Iran US

25:05

war. How worried are you about a

25:07

conflict a direct conflict when it comes

25:09

to China and uh and the US and how

25:11

worrying is Taiwan for you? What do you

25:13

think will happen with Taiwan

25:14

eventually? So this is this is actually

25:17

the thing that does keep me up more

25:19

because um I think under ordinary

25:23

circumstances

25:24

I think the the if you look at things as

25:28

like a gravitational pole I think the

25:31

gravitational pole or center of the

25:34

world system is clearly in China's favor

25:37

slowly naturally pulling the world

25:40

system at least the developing world the

25:42

global south pulling them firmly within

25:46

China's orbit within that sort of

25:47

Chinese-led bricks potential order. Um I

25:51

think China doesn't have to do anything

25:54

and it will naturally reorganize itself

25:57

around the center the new center which

26:00

is China

26:02

but Xihinping is kind of a wild card and

26:07

because it's not that committee-led

26:09

system they had under the last three

26:11

leaders it's more like Mao Xihinping

26:15

could potentially overstep miscalculate

26:18

say I'm riding high right now I'm going

26:20

to I'm going to go even farther now. Um

26:23

and that could destabilize the whole

26:26

system and trigger a regional and later

26:28

world war.

26:30

But so far it looks to me like Xi has

26:34

also come to the conclusion that he does

26:38

nothing and still wins as the meme says.

26:40

So I don't yet see and believe me I I

26:43

used to think this was coming. So far

26:45

though, I don't yet see China making the

26:48

moves to initiate or to force a a

26:52

situation where their military could

26:54

possibly flip the script on the

26:57

Americans. They don't have to. They've

26:59

already achieved overmatch militarily in

27:03

the First Island chain. News flash to

27:05

Washington. And I warned them. I warned

27:07

them. There's a there's a speech I gave

27:09

in 2016 where you can find it, I'm sure.

27:11

I warned them that this was coming that

27:14

in 10 years time in 10 years time the uh

27:18

the United States was going to be if we

27:21

didn't change our ways the United States

27:22

was going to lose out um the the first

27:26

island chain to the Chinese. That time

27:27

has come and they've already outmatched

27:30

us. And if you go under my wret brief

27:31

substack, I have an article up there

27:33

today uh demonstrating how with the DF17

27:36

hypersonic glide vehicle, demonstrating

27:39

how with the uh with what they're doing

27:40

in counter space capabilities, with what

27:43

they're doing with their anti-access

27:44

area denial A2AD capacities, um they

27:47

have already achieved overmatch. They

27:49

don't really have to do much. They've

27:52

already kept the American military at

27:54

bay because the American military, the

27:56

only way we can fight them is with the

27:58

Navy and the Air Force. Well, they've

27:59

ranged our air bases in the region uh

28:02

with the DF-17 and these other weapons,

28:04

and the Chinese can keep our carriers

28:06

over the horizon with their DF-21,

28:09

DF17s.

28:11

Um, we can't afford to lose our ships.

28:14

The Chinese can. The Chinese have

28:16

missiles in abundance and drones. And

28:18

that's something the Iranian war, the

28:19

Iran war has taught them as well. The

28:21

Americans will keep their ships out of a

28:23

contested hot uh combat zone. And so the

28:27

question is does China really have to go

28:29

to war uh to already achieve their grand

28:32

plan of becoming the new number one? I

28:36

think a rational actor would say no. But

28:38

again because Xi has aggregated so much

28:41

power toward himself and there are

28:42

inputs you and I aren't privy to in that

28:45

closed political system. It's possible

28:48

also X says to survive I got to trigger

28:50

a war now and red rededicate and

28:53

redirect my people away from whatever

28:56

they don't like in my regime to you know

28:58

fighting a foreign foe. Do I think it'll

29:00

be Taiwan? It's possible. That's the

29:03

likeliest or that's the most obvious.

29:06

But G and everybody who runs Beijing

29:09

understands beyond the complexities of

29:12

launching an amphibious attack. They

29:14

also understand many Chinese view

29:17

Taiwanese as fellow Chinese. And most

29:20

Chinese people do not want to send their

29:22

sons to go fight and possibly die

29:25

killing other Chinese. They would much

29:27

rather um do something against Japan.

29:31

And I that is the unspoken story here.

29:33

I'm I think I'm the only one who's been

29:35

writing about this at my Substack uh

29:37

about the actual threat to Japan,

29:40

particularly now that they have this new

29:41

government there where the the I think

29:44

her name is um I'm forgetting her name,

29:45

Tagachi or Tea. The new the new woman

29:48

running Japan is extremely militant on

29:51

China. China has scale. They have

29:54

overmatch. They don't even have to

29:56

invade Japan to do damage. They can do

29:59

what Hezbollah does to Israel. They can

30:01

do what Iran is doing to the Middle

30:03

East. They can just overwhelm Japanese

30:05

defenses with missiles and drones. What

30:08

would be the trigger? Um Brendan

30:11

O'Reilly, who my my buddy who wrote uh

30:13

Everyone Is Wrong About China, the

30:15

trigger would probably be if Japan

30:17

decided we're going to get nukes, which

30:19

is not impossible at this point given

30:21

the breakdown of the US alliance system.

30:23

>> I I don't know. I think I think China

30:25

would be

30:28

more open to Japan having nukes and I

30:30

don't think it would be that big of an

30:31

issue for China. Um

30:33

>> I don't I don't think you know

30:37

it is an emotional issue.

30:39

>> Yeah, but true. But that goes against if

30:41

they if they find that to be an issue

30:42

that goes against their

30:43

non-interventionist strategy and why

30:46

suddenly different for Japan.

30:47

>> No, it's that's different. That's

30:48

different. We're talking

30:49

>> country. It's a southern North Korea has

30:51

a has a nuclear weapon.

30:52

>> Yeah. North Korea. Yeah, but North Korea

30:55

is a cat's paw for for Beijing. Um, in

30:58

fact, this was one of the reasons the

31:00

one of the the hidden stories, the

31:02

backstories behind the Trump uh Kim

31:05

Jong-un uh meetings in the first term

31:08

was because the Chinese tried to have

31:11

Kim Jong-il or Kim Jong-un rather

31:13

whacked and replace him with his halfb

31:15

brotherther who they could control more

31:17

and

31:19

>> the Chinese tried to I think tried to

31:21

kill Kim Jong-un because Kim Jong-un

31:24

came into power replacing his father Kim

31:26

Jong-

31:27

Kim Jong-un came into power and he was

31:29

very independent-minded and the Chinese

31:32

were concerned. He the first thing he

31:33

did was kill his uncle, which his uncle

31:36

was China's man in the royal court of

31:38

North Korea. And and Kim Jong-un did

31:41

that very pointedly to send a message to

31:44

Beijing, I'm my own man. Uh then he uh

31:46

he went about killing all and and

31:48

excommunicating all the people in the

31:51

elite who were very close to China in in

31:53

his first several years in power which

31:55

led to his brother I think being eyed by

32:00

China to replace Kim Jong-un. And Kim

32:04

Jong-un famously had or infamously had

32:06

his brother whacked. I think it was in

32:08

the Thailand airport. Who were the

32:10

bodyguards around

32:11

>> South Korea?

32:12

No, I'm pretty sure it was like Malaysia

32:14

or Thailand. Um, who who was the who

32:17

were the group that was supposed to be

32:19

protecting the half brother

32:22

>> were Chinese? Uh, they were Chinese. It

32:25

was the chi they were Chinese military

32:27

trained.

32:28

>> Yeah. And uh and and that to me pointed

32:30

to the fact that that was a hit on his

32:33

own brother because Kim Jong-un was

32:35

convinced the Chinese were going to try

32:36

to whack him and replace him with their

32:40

agent. uh his half brother. So he

32:42

preempted it and then he started getting

32:45

cozy with Trump because he didn't want

32:47

to be Kim Jong-un didn't want to be too

32:49

close to the Chinese knowing that they

32:50

were coming at him. And I think that is

32:52

what reset everything when Trump and him

32:55

got along and started doing some really

32:57

momentous stuff together at the

32:59

diplomatic level. It's a shame that

33:01

Trump didn't continue as president. Um

33:04

but but that kind of

33:06

>> remember when he crossed into North

33:07

Korea yesterday?

33:07

>> It was amazing. It was it was I mean

33:09

that was like that was iconic. That was

33:12

Trump at his finest. Um and it was

33:15

beautiful actually to see. And um you

33:19

know what happened then was uh Trump got

33:21

out of office. He lost and Biden came

33:25

in. Biden was um a lot I think uh less

33:29

open to Kim Jong-un. And Kim Jong-un

33:32

then had to pivot. And who did he pivot

33:33

to though? Who did he pivot to? He

33:35

pivoted to Putin. Uh Kim Jong-un pivoted

33:38

to Putin to play China off of China

33:41

because for Kim he knows China tries to

33:45

use him as a cat's paw. But ultimately

33:48

does China not want to see North Korea

33:51

have nukes? China doesn't really care.

33:53

They don't care about that. But they do

33:55

care. They do care if Japan gets nukes.

33:58

You can bet your bottom dollar on that.

34:00

And they will do something militarily if

34:03

it looks like uh Japan is going to going

34:05

to get nukes. And Japan, by the way, is

34:07

looking at what happened in the Middle

34:09

East and they're looking at what's going

34:11

on in Europe and they're saying, "We

34:13

can't trust the American security

34:15

umbrella." Remember at the start of this

34:17

year, Mario, they were having this this

34:19

antagonistic round of of of back and

34:22

forth between Tokyo and Beijing. And it

34:25

and in fact, um what was it? The

34:27

Japanese war plananes actually buzzed

34:30

the Chinese carrier. I think it was in

34:32

the um the Sea of Japan while the

34:34

Chinese carrier was doing these

34:36

provocative military exercises near

34:38

Japanese territory and Trump got on the

34:41

phone in December or January and told

34:44

the Japanese leader, "Knock it off." And

34:46

I think at that point,

34:47

>> yeah, it was also when the Japanese

34:49

leader was saying Japan will get

34:50

involved if China makes a move on

34:51

Taiwan.

34:53

>> Yes. which is also when I spoke to the

34:55

guys at Joint Base McCord several years

34:57

ago, I warned the leadership there that

35:00

the real issue with Taiwan is not a

35:02

China Taiwan scenario because I don't

35:05

believe any American leader would

35:06

actually intervene militarily to stop it

35:08

at this rate. But the mutual defense

35:11

treaty with Japan, if Japan got

35:13

involved, they might try to rope us in

35:15

like NATO's trying to rope us in against

35:17

Russia

35:19

>> and like Israel's trying to rope us in

35:20

even more with Iran.

35:23

Everyone's trying to rope you guys in.

35:25

>> I know. That's why my new book coming

35:28

out. We don't yet know. It's probably

35:30

going to be around.

35:31

>> The title is Stop Roping Us in

35:34

everybody.

35:34

>> That's actually not bad, Mario. That's

35:36

not bad. No.

35:37

>> Leave us the heck alone.

35:38

>> That That's not bad. Get off my lawn.

35:40

No. Uh, no. That's the title. The title

35:43

is Fortress Americas, and it is uh it is

35:46

about Western Hemispheric Defense. And

35:48

uh

35:48

>> Can't wait for it to come out.

35:50

>> Yeah, I'll send you a copy. I'm I'm

35:52

almost done. I'm I'm about 20,000 words

35:55

away and I'm trucking along at about

35:57

1,500 to 2,000 words a day. So, I'll be

36:01

done soon.

36:02

>> Yeah.

36:02

>> All right, man.

36:04

>> Thanks for jumping on. I think next next

36:06

time we chat next time we chat, um I

36:08

want to talk about Ukraine developments

36:09

there with the assassination attempt in

36:12

Monaco as well.

36:12

>> Just be on the lookout for Yes. be on

36:15

the lookout for Ukraine possibly getting

36:17

a nuke. And I'll just leave it at that.

36:20

>> Right. All right. He gave us the title

36:21

for the next interview that me and

36:23

Brandon were doing. Why' you guys take

36:24

him off so early? I usually say bye to

36:26

him, guys. Why' they kick him out so

36:28

quickly? What the hell, guys? All right,

36:31

guys. I'll see you guys I'll see you in

36:33

um in 15 minutes with a new guest uh

36:37

with

36:39

uh Tom Luongo and followed by Muhammad

36:41

Faridi and then Larry Johnson. See you

36:43

guys in 15. Bye.

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