Erkenntnistheorie 7 Immanuel Kant II

The goal is to develop a philosophy

that does justice to both the tradition of

rationalism and the

tradition of alpinism, thus

attempting a synthesis between these two

directions.

He does this with his argument that

synthetic judgments exist a priori. These

judgments are necessary and not

theological, and they contain a predicate that

already includes a subject

or the object in the position of... He

believes that with this judgment structure,

he says that there are not only

synthetic judgments and not

only a priori judgments, but that

synthetic judgments exist a priori. He

believes that with this judgment

structure, unity must be refuted.

As you may recall, youth said that all

our experience is contingent, what

gives us stability today, struggle tomorrow will be

different, and he said no,

not everything is contingent because we can relate to the external world in

a non-contingent structure of

experience.

In this sense,

he claims that we can actually

recognize objectifiable facts in the world, since all reason and...

Rational beings would encounter each other in

the fundamental structure of this

synthetic judgment structural quality

as if in a collective experiential space,

because, as I said, the

contingent would be the experience, the experiential space

for our contingent. They would

n't encounter us here, but there must be

something that unites us so that they

understand my words and we can more or

less develop a shared path in life

with all possible languages,

explanatory models from art to

faith to natural science,

and can say a lot about

why he is so close to you. In the

conditions shown, from the real world to the outside world

and shared formal conditions, we

share the same experiential space.

We may then

have different justifications, but we assume

that with our justifications we can

convince other people precisely because they have the

same

categories of country and reason. On the other hand,

youth skepticism can also take a

step towards it.

Youth remembers this radical boundary between

the mental realm and the auditory realm itself.

The outside world was found, but then

youth comes along. Skepticism,

taking a step towards it, asserts that

the realm of our objectifiable

experiences is merely a phenomenon

because we live only in

phenomena, and these phenomena are

limited by a thing-in-itself. Now,

why is this so far-reaching? The limits of

intellect and reason, and the

incorporation of a true

reality, whatever that may be—

an absolute totality of what

exists—are not old. We are never

in the grotto's perspective, but

always only in our own limited

schema of knowledge, or as it is

expressed, this shows us to what extent

objective knowledge exists only within

a phenomenal reality characterized

by ontological

incompleteness. What does

ontological incomprehensibility mean? That it does

not fully

establish itself as true reality,

but only as a reality

of phenomenal appearance.

Thus, one can take into account

that we

make mistakes, that we

can write knowledge about it, that there is such a thing

as progress in

science. If this progress has

n't been asked, we've always been involved with

things, whereas without the difference

between the act of cognition and the

object of cognition, we can't make any progress at all

because we would already have penetrated the

objects. So, in

this sense, there's

a certain gap in Kant's theory, namely, that in

a classical two-

worlds doctrine, the phantasm of a

view gives its reality. How do

we get out of this? Through the level

limitation of our cognition through the

world, it then points

to the following, which is another success:

he said that my

perception, for example, color perception, cannot

simply be true or false because it has

n't yet been judged

what it is. Judgments, on the other hand, can be true

or false. These judgments about the external world could already be true or false,

and perceptions of, for example, "the pants

are blue" or "they are red," and so on.

But if I only have a blue perception, purely

in my head,

of course, one could call it

a kind of mental game, then it cannot

yet be true or false in that sense

because it is, so to speak, subjective.

Doubt just as they cannot

doubt, do I have

pain now or do I not have pain,

known to that, so a simple

perception, just like a,

they can also doubt their women, they can, they can,

they can wonder about

what the dream is playing out, but

they can, they reflect themselves

on a meta-level, do I have pain,

or namely, that was, but that

is, that is immediately present, in that

they can, a perception,

be neither true nor false, but a judgment

can be bar or, if, in that I say it

is blue, perception, as, the judgment loses,

great blue.de, they, false notes,

colorblind, this red, about my

colorblindness, that it is

completely irrelevant for the building permit, it is

only about the pure, the mental

perception, just like with pain, we cannot,

the difficult, do I have

pain right now, media, very painful, immediately, there, they

are, the, fast, but they are

not the judgment,

the routes, the rose is blue,

but may, occur to, they, a judgment

about an outside world, and knew, just, in

our realization, so these

two strands come together, something, I take,

something was, and then I try to

objectify that, and for that, in the

formal structure, that is, subjective

impressions then flow together in the judgment in such a way

that we can then make something

objectifiable out of it. I can

say to someone else, "The roses are

blue," and they can say no. This is then possible. They can give

other justifications. The

wavelength could be, they could then have to

say, "Here, the wavelength of blue is completely

different. You are still

colorblind."

The wavelength of red, so Andy can

objectify that again.

Okay, I can get back to that point. What I want

to say is that he, that our reality, the truth, doesn't simply consist of the fact that we are here, outside, the view is a reality, but rather it was only ever a structure of perception. We can... It would be naive to say, yes,

reality is as you

show yourself to me. Take a three-month-old or

a three-year-old child, we would

also say, "You don't recognize

reality." You recognize

reality as it

seems necessary now, as a three-year-old

child. You had no idea. You

can still speak the language. You don't

control it, you don't know what kind of

political form you live in, you live in it, it

only learns everything from your limits, on the limits of

its experience,

structure of this time, a three-year-old child

turns,

there he shows once again that the mind doesn't simply copy the outside world one-to-one, but that it recognizes something in the ever more complex differentiation, in whose basic price something can be recognized, in that sense it can be directed against the natural conscious and natural consciousness says, reaches the outside world and here I am and then

I recognize of course the earth is a

disc, because how could it not be a disc,

because if it were a reversible sphere

then we would

fall under it, that would be the natural

consciousness then at its most primitive level,

so that which recognizes is as

we believe it to be, but it turns out that there are

completely different

objective forms of government that show us how

things might be more

objective than what the

natural consciousness believes on a

first primitive level, permanently

delivering

or take Donald Trump is a good

example of a primitive consciousness

that constantly believes the world revolves around what it does, what it

qualifies as. Okay, but let's look at the

interplay that Kant points to. So,

you have, in the upper left, our father, so to speak.

You perceive consciousness, so all

three moments, like remembering, are what

we call the semantic triangle. All three

moments shape our consciousness and

subconscious. It doesn't just start somewhere

or ideally bring about some point where we

perceive me as father. Consciousness

immediately enters an

experiential structure. Even the

newborn child enters an

experiential structure. Then, in the upper

left, we have

consciousness, which, according to Kant, would be something like

sensory intuition. Then there are

attempts with our intention,

ali T, to orient

ourselves towards the outside world. Then

we perceive something that exists, and

sensory intuition, that is imposed on us.

I don't choose my

sensory acquisition; it

simply comes. We are already there. The

newborn child doesn't first choose a

world as it would like, but continues for a week,

which is also in structure, and

then a The process of abstraction

and classification allows us

Australians to develop

increasingly formal structures based on particular sensory perception,

which then give us the possibility

to objectify and define the external world.

These formal structures are

always already prior to our understanding as the

possibility of asking, as the condition of

possibility, so to speak. These

formal structures also arise from

experience, which can be small, but does

n't have to be presupposed.

[Applause]

One could therefore

polish this again here as a diagram, which

means that this is the

consequence in the asset class that the

experience, the recessive experience,

that we develop and from

which the world then slowly

unfolds generically for us. In

school, in kindergarten, in

university, I am currently trying to

integrate an explanatory model into this, like a computer program, to give it into concepts with which we can

understand these processes. In this way, in a certain sense, a realm of

experience is expanded,

now of course on a purely On a

theoretical level,

you see what it's about:

a permanent cycle of

feedback or reactive experience

loops. From these positive

experiences, maturity builds up over the

world. And again, the world is

n't simply there; it

only designs itself into the world we experience in this cycle.

I live, and once again,

perception demonstrates that the

object is constructed on sensory and

mental components. Okay,

we've covered that extensively again and again. In this process, perception

learns to incorporate

its own perspective,

even though it actually believes that its

perspective develops automatically through perception.

That is to say, what

can we also point out?

Simultaneously with this entire experience

cycle, our "I

know" is also formed. It is accepted as

the core in which these experiences are

reactivated. Therefore, we draw the

distinction between a small child

who doesn't yet

know what the world

looks like and experienced people who have

trained us. This distinction is made directly in front of the loops

from these various

religious groups.

But we recognize certain

senses, not the regional leadership, because...

Actually, one can only recognize from the meter

reflection that the critique of pure reason

reveals a meta-reflection

in which one looks at what

components must be present for us to have

experiences. Okay,

I'll skip that for now. By the way, there are

two prominent

accusations against him, and I want to

briefly mention them again.

The

objection is already being raised against him that he does justice to modern

natural science because

these postulated entities, such as

in particle strings or

multiple universes, are things that we cannot

simply naively locate in space and time.

We

also extrapolate theories of various entities, and in that respect,

we are talking about things of which

we do not have direct sensory

perception. But if,

as it were, the creation of new objects and

experiences must always be given a

sensory dimension, then

one could say, yes, then his

philosophy seems not to be able to

withstand modern natural science

because there is sensory

perception, which is always theoretical and

extrapolated. As I said, we do

n't simply see elementary particles in a

fog chamber that consist of an atom or

a molecule. It has been extracted,

or when we talk about elementary particles

and then say that waves and

particles are involved, these are

only allegories meant to help

us understand

how elementary particles are actually to be

understood. But elementary particles

are not simply waves and

particles. So, the accusation here is that

if we can, the realm of

experience doesn't have to be

visualized, as it is part of

the fundamental structures

of natural science with its

findings. But I would say

it can't be quite as

naive as this accusation suggests.

Currently, if you can observe sensitively,

the findings in a

fog and cloud chamber for

verifying traces of particle

energy would certainly be considered a phenomenon. Of course,

the apparatus with which we

have a sensory perception is important. Why?

Because here, even if supported by

theory-saturated precision machines, we

quite obviously have a

sensory perception. This is true

in virtually every laboratory. The fact that this

sensory perception is theory-laden

cannot be disruptive,

and even if we assume purely fictitious

entities... The multiple in

multiple universes—that's how it works, at least in

part, an explanatory framework that relies on sensory

perception, namely the

perception of our universe, and

then examines how far we can go. We can then

perhaps discuss other motives within the universe.

I mention this only to make it

clear that this can very well

justify entities that are initially

only postulated theoretically.

Because, although we always say, "Well, at the beginning, like

the fixation through

sensory perception," we have

the theoretical framework. The market

remains in the realm of

synthetic a priori judgments. So, in that respect,

it wasn't an argument

against it at all, but rather an argument for

it. Because they go into the laboratory with hypotheses—

the entities are theoretically postulated—

and try to

find sensory perception to determine whether they can be justified

or not. And if this

perception is largely absent, then

the theory remains just that: a theory.

Think, for example, of the

recently discovered gravitational waves that

Einstein described at the beginning of the 20th century. They were

discussed in the 19th century,

I believe, and were verified about a

year or a year and a half ago,

but only by a huge

precision machine, so to speak.

In this sense, we then have machines

that filter out a very small area of

reality for us, and yet, by

filtering out this small area, they can still, of course, provide

sensory perception

and verify our theories.

But what's also interesting is that they ca

n't simultaneously

try to

establish, for example, human freedom, the existence of God, or

the legitimacy of a norm, and then at the same time

detect gravitational waves. Well,

because these are all very

different questions that are used in

very different coordinate systems.

That is, they can't

simultaneously analyze gravity and

examine neural pathways and see how the data

travels in my brain while

investigating gravitational waves. With this,

I just want to make it clear that the way

we verify our

theories based on sensory perception is

always highly dependent on...

Specializations go where

we have to exclude very specific questions,

ask other questions,

always already have hypotheses about the

possible answers, and acknowledge that it's

cold, like the way

science progresses.

Then there's a second accusation,

another accusation against "can," which concerns

the argument that "can"

philosophy is practically very homogeneous.

Let yourself be led astray by a philosophy that is

solely oriented towards the cognitive power of

man, the

human mind. And then the

accusation would be that "can" understands the external world as a

purely intellectual and rational

internal perspective, as a

reconstruction of the human mind,

and therefore no longer recognizes that

the world is also independent of

this human mind. Thus, Kant,

and this seems to be their original argument,

interprets everything through the power of human understanding. Then it

seems they somehow attach the psychological "must" to it,

meaning that the

selected one is actually only a

structure imagined by us, but not just

an independent identity. But

this accusation is also somehow absolute; it presupposes that it

was. Can I

recognize to what extent the coordination,

condition, and power of man are certainly

always in conflict? Ul derives from the outside, from

the external realm of a reality

that is never easily accessible to us.

That's why he says, in a certain sense, that

sensory perception exists.

We quantify through sensory

perception only according to our categories,

but we don't create sensory

perception. We take Java, in that

sense. You can't say that

we

simply construct the world that guarantees it. No, we

experience it, we grasp it objectively according to the

conditions of our intellect and reason. But that the

objective world out there isn't even a question; rather,

we don't add to ourselves any conditions for

knowledge. We can also relate to this external world,

and then I could constantly say, "I'm just going through

this wall now,"

because I want to say, "Yes, sensory

perception always gives something that

can simply walk through this wall in that way."

I didn't know it was so crazy, where

he says that the whole world is just

our construct. He says we probably have the

edges that make up the world. The

Kraus Theater is a world that we can't

Quantifying in its totality, but

that doesn't mean the

world is just a district for us, shaped by

how

we try to make it be. Rather,

we recognize the world internally,

naturally also in conflict

with our theories, which also conflict with

our political designs. In

this sense, the

entire standard of objectivity in

natural science can

be maintained, as we try to

penetrate objects further and further

according to our capabilities. That means there

is a world, but it doesn't mean that we

construct this world, which we

objectify, within the framework of the

possibilities that our minds offer.

Yes, exactly, but just once more, just once more,

to make it clear to you... There's

the accusation that, if we recognize the

external world, we interpret it as a construct,

but that's

not the case. This is because the external world is always

depicted against a negative backdrop, from which it is perceived,

and only then do we

attempt to penetrate this openness.

But, as I've said a thousand times already, the point is that

reality isn't simply as

we believe it to be.

The boundary between subject

and object is a

structure of objectification that we

then, according to our understanding, perceive. But the

fact that the subject-

object boundary exists within us or in our minds does

n't mean that we

simply construct or create the external world,

or that we create the object

we recognize. Are there any questions about this?

Yes, please. So, the

thing itself is, for you, the

negative boundary of our experience from the

internal perspective of our experience. A

good argument. In a certain sense,

we can't do that, or it remains a bicycle

because, essentially, a thing in itself must be something

he says. What

he has to say is not a

phenomenon, but we, but what he

simultaneously has to say because we

know the new phenomena, I have to

assume a negative aspect of the phenomenon, and

therefore extra politics, but they are

absolutely right, it is practically a

known paradox in which he says the thing-in-

itself is part of the phenomenal world,

but it is clearly determinable as nominally defined,

but it is also not

simply something else positive

beyond the world of experience. Both have why there

can be no access,

but how he has to accept this paradox

in order to take account of the qualification of our

cognitive power, and

in that sense, Jung is right, of course,

we do not recognize the

totality of reality in its

entirety, but only within the limits of

our reason. But they

completely agree that an earlier accusation, which

Jacobi made, I also wanted to address,

Jacobi made by

saying that the thing-in-itself, as soon as I think about it, breaks down,

the theory breaks down because I cannot

think about things-in-themselves. I can

think about so many phenomena, not just men,

when But if I do it out of love, I

actually can, then I have, because then

I really blame myself

psychologically, because then the

outside world is just pure fantasy,

and I can't accept that either. They

can say that out there there's

a negative foil from which

we build our world of appearances and experiences,

but precisely that which arises

as a limiting concept, I

ultimately can't legitimize with my theory,

only postulate.

I have to make my leap, no

question.

I'll play a short

commentary from John Searle before him, who goes into

this problem in great detail.

Now I'll make a small leap. So, otherwise,

I believe this lecture, like several others I gave a year or

two ago, was for

a

new book, I think he

presented there, namely USB-A, and he

polemicizes extremely, but extremely amusingly,

against a philosophy of presentation that prefers to call

knowledge.

And he does it so sympathetically, so

amusingly, and so polemically that we should

listen to it. So, he rejects, he says,

somehow, that these authors attract young people,

can double their... The reality in which

they say out there is a

totalitarian life, I reject that because we

experience things almost as if they are present, so directly and not

representatively, whereby he believes and

Kant would be of the opinion that the cans

have a kind of inner cinema of the

outside world, but I tried to

explain to you that this can be addressed,

but precisely so that the little ones

get a taste of how no one can

misunderstand it like that.

[Music] [

Laughter] [Music] [Music] [Music] [

Music]

[Music]

Here it should be made clear by, of

course, on the one hand, pointing out

what she just pointed out

with her question, which meant thinking about the thing in itself at

all,

and he seems to know in that sense that it can be,

believes that with this area,

the area of ​​the thing in itself is

described as a positive other area, as she

remembered, so when I

quoted six more to you, she pointed it out again, indicating

that this

can, although the piano takes on this negative foil

from which we

are applied through the effectiveness out there, but that at the same time,

that the thing

in itself marks not a positive

area of ​​experience, but the thing-in-

itself alone marks only the

boundary of the phenomenal experience that we have,

and already it should lie,

but as if one could say as if it could

really, quite naively,

double the world. So there is

the area of ​​the

inner world, and then

beyond that there is the area of ​​the thing-in-itself. This may be clarified by the

following slide by Lochner.

Take the

area of ​​appearances; one could

say the thing-in-itself, that is, the

further area, which is also the

outer area, in any case, our

possibility of experience, is a

self-contained positive already, and

so John Searle interprets Kant by

saying, yes, the thing-in-itself, what is this

doubling supposed to mean? I recognize the world in

accordance with my experience, although it is present,

it is not represented. Layer, I do

not construct it from my

will apparatus, but can say

that the cantata, take the

second slide, that the thing-in-itself does not

postulate an area of ​​waste, but that the

inner boundaries of our Phenomenal II is active,

so I'll mention this again because what

John Searle says about this understanding

makes it very clear what one can get from Kant

if one thinks that

the positive realm is inherent in itself, distinct from

the positive realm of our

experience. But that's not the case

if one interprets it that way,

and of course, one has every right

to be polemical in one's own way if

one then thinks, "Why do I need

this doubling of the world? I recognize

the world quite normally in

the phenomena that surround me,"

he says, of course, but precisely because of this

internal gap of our phenomenal I,

which shows that our

form of knowledge cannot fully

represent the objects of knowledge, but rather

the form of knowledge is limited by a

negative negativity. And that's why

we keep having new

experiences; that's why we don't recognize

the whole of reality godlike in

its totality.

I've tried to

put this somewhat politically in a more

allegorical way. You

might know the smallest little

bottle; it's similar to the

Möbius strip. There is an outside that

the outside reverses into the

inside and vice versa;

they have virtually no Kainrath, no

chance of transition from inside to inside, and the car,

so to speak, the form. The outer form is also

simultaneously adept at win-win, and

that is in the animal form that then

gives the content.

One could say that you can do that, as well as

possibly, and this kind of knowledge

conditions apparently. So, in the case of the

small bottle, the form does not border on

a content or encompass the content. The content

is the

form folded in on itself.

Take the Möbius strip; if we

have a bench, and then tip the

result together,

then you have two more, but virtually

one side, because if an

ant were to walk on a Möbius strip,

it would be infinite in one

stretch. But it goes all the time from

one side of the change to

the other side of the man. That is

the idea of ​​the possible strip: the outside

transitions into the inside and makes

the small bottle just as it is. As for mentioning

this example, I had the impression that

Kant and how we just through This in

production, the thing itself as the

internal boundaries, phenomena, song points to

how far we are always trapped in this, in

this, in the limit of our

knowledge, which, however, at the same time, of

course, offers us the possible,

the possibility of the experiential report,

because, as it were, the boundary to the

outside world in its view is, indeed, the

negative form, the

phenomenal, as well as the limit with

the smallest bottle because it itself

falls into its own form, or as well as the fact that a

bank, as possible, is turned inside out, these are the

outside of the

inside, as friendly as possible,

is only a symbol. I think I have

explained the offers as it is, but that

seems to me like the pre-harvest and the

modernity at being able to be paid for, then

also the idealists according to Kant, and as we

say, we cannot be

satisfied with that, we want to have some kind of

metaphysics that does

not release us into such an apparent second

doctrine where we say they

only recognize a very limited area and,

but not clearly, they do not recognize reality

in its entirety. Are there even

two more questions? Minutes, or exactly one minute,

the boundary is shiftable, right? So

the boundary can always be extended further.

But that doesn't mean that the

negative form of the boundary, of drawing the boundary, is

thereby dissolved. But otherwise,

they could be completely right. He had the idea that

we can continue to gain experience,

as we can always expand our

criteria of objectivity.

But we are always

bound by what we can achieve with our

intellectual capacity.

So, beyond the limits of our

reason or our understanding, they

cannot appear to us.

Exactly. Well,

one could say that soon, when he

introduces the concept of appearance, he

naturally has a problem because then

the question arises: appearance, where women... and

then he says that which

cannot be explained, that which cannot be

conceptually captured,

but that is, of course,

very ingenious at first, in that he said it

is no longer recognizing anything.

We do recognize something

objectifiable, but precisely in the

distinction from that which we cannot

say exactly what it is. We must say, however, that there is

something out there that applies to us, even if we are

not from Our understanding

can rise in space,

that's a bit like the idea of ​​the

small bottle, so they remain in

a form of immanence, of course,

practitioners who enlarge, but they

remain in a form that is always called,

and all videos or the German

philosophers of idealism will

strive to surpass it, so to speak,

but that's not part of the

lectures they heard, they will

postulate something like a

concept or the spirit or a

genesis of the spirit that transcends the limits,

possibly after about, thank you very much for your

patience and perhaps with a contract