Full Transcript

·YouTLDR

Frege, Russell, & Modern Logic - A. J. Ayer & Bryan Magee (1987)

42:071,937 summary words · ~10 min readEnglishBy Philosophy OverdoseTranscribed Jun 30, 2026
Analyze another video with Pro30-day money-back guarantee
Summary

Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell revolutionized 20th-century philosophy by shifting its primary focus from traditional epistemology to the logic of language and meaning, laying the groundwork for analytic philosophy despite the tragic paradoxes that undermined their quest to reduce mathematics entirely to logic.

Understanding the shift from psychologistic 'laws of thought' to objective logical structures reveals how modern philosophy of language serves as the ultimate arbiter of truth, science, and metaphysics.

Section summaries

0:00-3:12

Introduction and Biographical Portraits of Frege and Russell

watch

Bryan Magee introduces Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell as the dual, independent founders of modern mathematical logic, whose collaborative and individual work shaped the course of 20th-century analytic philosophy and Wittgenstein's early ideas. Magee contrasts their personal lives: Frege lived in comparative obscurity as a mathematics professor at the University of Jena, publishing seminal works like the Begriffsschrift and Foundations of Arithmetic that were largely ignored during his lifetime. In stark contrast, Bertrand Russell was a prominent public intellectual, aristocrat, and prolific popular writer who championed social causes, though his true academic legacy remains rooted in his highly technical contributions to logicism.

  • Frege and Russell independently laid the mathematical foundations that diverted philosophy from traditional idealism to logical analysis.
  • Frege's work remained obscure until Russell drew attention to it in 1903.
  • Russell balanced high-level technical logic with highly influential popular journalism and political activism.

Essential for understanding the historical context and contrasting personalities of the two central figures.

3:12-5:20

Frege's Logicist Project and the Definition of Number

watch

A. J. Ayer explains Frege's initial motivation: correcting the lack of precision and logical rigor in contemporary mathematics and proofs, including Euclid's unstated assumptions. Frege and Russell both embarked on 'logicism,' the philosophical project of defining mathematical concepts using purely logical terms and proving that arithmetic is deducible from logical axioms. Ayer illustrates how Frege achieved this by defining numbers through set theory, where the number two is defined as the set of all sets containing couples (such as Tom and Jerry). While Kurt Gödel later proved that arithmetic cannot be completely axiomatized, Frege created the blueprint for modern symbolic logical deduction.

  • Logicism aims to reduce all arithmetic to pure logical premises and definitions.
  • Numbers can be defined logically as sets of sets (e.g., two is the set of all couples).
  • Gödel's incompleteness theorems later proved that this reductionist project could never be fully completed.

Lays the technical groundwork for how logicism attempted to redefine the foundations of mathematics.

5:20-7:28

The Critique of Psychologism and German Idealism

watch

Ayer details one of Frege's most revolutionary moves: separating logic from psychology. Prior to Frege, many European philosophers, including Edmund Husserl in his early works and various German Idealists, treated logical laws as 'laws of thought' or psychological descriptions of how the human mind functions. Frege fiercely attacked this view, establishing that logical laws and mathematical sets are entirely objective truths that exist independently of human cognition. This de-psychologizing of philosophy shifted the focus to finding impersonal, objective structures that validate proofs regardless of subjective mental acts.

  • Frege aggressively rejected psychologism, asserting that logic is objective and independent of human thinking.
  • Logical truths are grasped by the mind but do not depend on the mind for their validity.
  • This anti-psychological stance directly challenged the dominant German Idealist tradition of the 19th century.

Crucial for viewers interested in continental-analytic dividing lines, showing Frege's direct opposition to idealist and early phenomenological trends.

7:28-10:40

Frege's Semantics: Sense and Reference (Sinn und Bedeutung)

watch

Ayer introduces Frege's most famous semantic distinction between 'sense' (Sinn) and 'reference' (Bedeutung), which became a cornerstone of modern philosophy of language. The reference of a term is the actual object it denotes (for instance, the person Bryan Magee), while its sense is the mode of presentation or the way the speaker identifies that object. Ayer uses Frege's famous example of the Morning Star and the Evening Star to show that while both terms share the same reference (the planet Venus), they have different senses. Without this distinction, the statement 'the Morning Star is the Evening Star' would be a trivial tautology ('Venus is Venus') rather than an empirical astronomical discovery.

  • Reference is the actual object denoted, while sense is the conceptual way we identify or point to that reference.
  • The distinction explains how identity statements can be informative rather than merely tautological.
  • Some terms, like 'the present King of France', possess a clear sense but lack any physical reference.

This is the most famous and influential philosophical concept introduced in the video.

10:40-13:52

The Linguistic Turn and Epistemology

optional

Ayer and Magee discuss how Frege's focus on logic and language fundamentally shifted the center of gravity in philosophy. For three centuries following Descartes, epistemology (the theory of knowledge) reigned supreme, focusing on what we can know and how we justify our beliefs. Michael Dummett argues that Frege initiated a new era by replacing epistemology with the philosophy of language as the foundation of philosophy. While Ayer agrees that a significant shift occurred, he cautions that epistemology and the theory of meaning remain deeply intertwined, as analyzing meaning still requires examining truth conditions and the evidence we have for those truths.

  • Frege's work helped shift the main focus of Anglo-American philosophy from epistemology to the philosophy of language.
  • Michael Dummett claims Frege single-handedly ended the 300-year Cartesian era of epistemology-first philosophy.
  • Ayer argues that this break is exaggerated because theories of meaning are still tethered to epistemological questions of truth and verification.

Provides valuable meta-philosophical context about the analytic linguistic turn but is less conceptually dense.

13:52-19:12

Russell's Paradox and Principia Mathematica

watch

Ayer narrates the tragic turning point in Frege's life when Bertrand Russell discovered a fatal logical paradox in Frege's set-theoretical axioms (the paradox of the set of all sets that do not contain themselves). Frege's devastating realization led him to abandon the third volume of his life's work, entering a period of deep philosophical paralysis. Russell attempted to resolve this structural crisis by introducing his complex 'theory of types' and collaborated with Alfred North Whitehead on the monumental Principia Mathematica. This three-volume work sought to successfully execute the logicist derivation of mathematics, popularizing symbolic logic globally and shifting its trajectory toward mathematical systems.

  • Russell's Paradox exposed a self-defeating contradiction at the core of Frege's set-based foundation of mathematics.
  • The shock of this discovery effectively ended Frege's productive career in mathematical logic.
  • Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica popularized these concepts worldwide, though it led to logic becoming increasingly mathematical and divorced from general philosophy.

Essential for understanding the limits of logicism and the dramatic personal history between Frege and Russell.

19:12-22:24

Russell's Theory of Descriptions and Empiricist Roots

watch

Ayer explains how Russell applied logical analysis to broader philosophical problems, most notably through his famous 'Theory of Descriptions.' This theory addressed the problem of non-referring terms, demonstrating that a sentence like 'the present King of France is bald' does not require us to invent imaginary 'subsistent' entities to maintain meaning; instead, it can be logically translated into a set of existential statements that are simply false. Ayer then transitions to Russell's general philosophy, pointing out that Russell's 1912 book The Problems of Philosophy bypassed his technical logical machinery to return to the British empiricist tradition of John Locke and George Berkeley, focusing on how physical objects are constructed from basic sense data.

  • The Theory of Descriptions eliminates the need to assume the existence of imaginary entities by logically translating sentences into existential claims.
  • Grammatical structure often masks the true underlying logical structure of a statement.
  • Russell's general philosophy was deeply empiricist, seeking to construct physical objects out of raw 'sense data'.

Explains Russell's single most famous contribution to the philosophy of language and its connection to empiricism.

22:24-30:56

Russell's Epistemological Shifts and the Demise of Metaphysics

watch

Ayer outlines the dramatic evolution of Russell's epistemology as he sought to scientifically justify human knowledge. Driven by a childhood obsession with demanding absolute proofs for axioms, Russell oscillated between phenomenalism (reducing scientific claims to logical constructions of sense data) and the causal theory of perception (viewing physical objects as external, unobservable causes of our sensory experiences). Under the influence of William James, Russell briefly adopted 'neutral monism,' viewing both mind and matter as arrangements of a single neutral stuff. Ayer points out that despite these shifts, Russell remained committed to scientific validation, heavily influencing the Vienna Circle's total rejection of transcendent metaphysics and struggles with the problem of induction.

  • Russell constantly oscillated between phenomenalism (the world as constructed from sense data) and causal realism (the world as the unobservable cause of sensations).
  • Russell briefly adopted neutral monism, arguing that mind and matter are merely different arrangements of the same fundamental 'neutral stuff'.
  • His demand for empirical justification fueled the Vienna Circle's total rejection of metaphysics, even though Russell admitted that scientific induction requires assumptions accepted on faith.

Offers a deep dive into Russell's complex epistemological trajectory and his relationship with scientific verification.

30:56-40:32

Russell's Legacy vs. Wittgenstein and the Frege Revival

watch

The dialogue shifts to Russell's direct philosophical influence and how it contrasted sharply with Ludwig Wittgenstein. While Wittgenstein viewed philosophy as a therapeutic exercise to untangle linguistic confusion (showing the fly the way out of the fly bottle), Russell firmly believed that philosophical problems had real, discoverable answers concerning the justification of our beliefs. Ayer shares how Russell personally influenced his own commitment to Humean empiricism, anti-metaphysics, and clear English prose. Finally, Ayer and Magee examine the post-war decline of Russell's influence in Oxford due to ordinary language philosophy, and the simultaneous mid-century revival of Frege's semantic work in America and Britain through Alonzo Church, Michael Dummett, and new translations.

  • Russell viewed philosophy as an active pursuit of objective answers to foundational questions, contrasting with Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as therapy.
  • Ayer credits Russell with shaping his own empiricism, rejection of metaphysics, and clear, straightforward writing style.
  • The post-war era saw a major revival of Frege's semantic work, transforming modern philosophy of logic through rigorous studies on meaning and truth.

Synthesizes the long-term impact of both thinkers, clarifying the divide between Russell's analytical realism and Wittgenstein's linguistic therapy.

Key points

  • The Objective Nature of Logic (Anti-Psychologism) — Frege decoupled logic from psychology, arguing that logical laws are objective truths independent of human mental processes, which directly challenged the dominant German Idealist and psychologistic views of his era.
  • Sense vs. Reference (Sinn und Bedeutung) — Frege's distinction between an expression's 'sense' (the mode of presentation or how we identify an object) and its 'reference' (the actual object denoted) solved the puzzle of how identity statements (like 'The Morning Star is the Evening Star') can contain informative, non-tautological knowledge.
  • Russell's Paradox and the Tragic Limit of Logicism — Russell's discovery of a fundamental self-referential paradox in Frege's set theory proved that arithmetic could not be effortlessly reduced to pure logic, demonstrating that even the most rigorous logical frameworks can harbor latent, self-defeating contradictions.
  • The Theory of Descriptions — Russell's resolution of non-referring terms (such as 'the present King of France') showed how logical analysis can translate misleading grammatical structures into clear existential claims, removing the need to posit imaginary 'subsistent' entities.
  • Philosophy as Clarification and Justification — Unlike Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as therapy to escape conceptual muddles, Russell and Ayer championed philosophy as a rigorous, science-aligned discipline aimed at finding actual answers to questions of justification and the limits of human knowledge.
Frege insisted [logic] was entirely objective and nothing to do with psychological processes... these were objective truths which of course the mind is capable of grasping, they didn't depend upon features of thinking. A. J. Ayer
The science of logic which had remained virtually static for over 2,000 years since Aristotle suddenly exploded... mainly through Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. Bryan Magee

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:00

a great deal of the philosophy that's

0:01

going on today in the English-speaking

0:03

World in fact probably most of it can be

0:06

traced back through intermediate

0:07

developments to the work of two men got

0:10

lob Fraga and Burton Russell working for

0:13

the most part independently of each

0:14

other they laid the foundations of

0:16

modern logic but more than that although

0:19

the work on which they began concerned

0:21

chiefly the principles of mathematics

0:23

and the relationship between mathematics

0:25

and logic its implications went so wide

0:28

that in the course of time it came to

0:30

have a profound influence on philosophy

0:32

in general

0:33

exactly the same happened with the

0:35

philosopher who most obviously and

0:37

directly followed on from them named

0:39

Wittgenstein Wittgenstein started by

0:42

developing Russells and fraga's work in

0:44

mathematical logic but he ended up

0:46

acquiring an influence at large on 20th

0:49

century philosophy which is second to

0:50

nobody's

0:52

in this program without going into any

0:54

of the technicalities of mathematics or

0:56

logic I want to give some indication of

0:58

how Freda and Russell came to have this

1:01

enormous influence on 20th century

1:03

thought and to say a little about some

1:05

of the more recent individuals and

1:07

groups who've come under that influence

1:09

first a word about the individuals

1:12

themselves Freda a German was born in

1:15

1848 and spent his entire working life

1:18

in comparative obscurity in the

1:20

mathematics Department of the University

1:21

of yena not until after his death did

1:24

his name become known at all widely even

1:26

among philosophers

1:28

his first major work published in 1879

1:31

was called the griefshrift and I'm

1:34

afraid even the English translation

1:36

keeps the German title because there's

1:38

no satisfactory English for it it means

1:41

something like the putting of Concepts

1:43

into notation and we'll begin to see

1:45

later what that's about

1:47

his next major work published in 1884 is

1:51

called in English the foundations of

1:53

arithmetic he went on producing

1:55

important and original work most notably

1:58

in 1893 and 1903 two volumes of the

2:01

projected larger work called in English

2:04

the basic laws of arithmetic

2:06

but it was all of such depth and

2:09

difficulty that his work in general

2:11

remained very largely unknown until

2:13

Bertrand rustled her attention to it in

2:16

1903.

2:18

Russell was a totally different sort of

2:20

person grandson of a British prime

2:22

minister from whom he was later by his

2:25

elder brother to inherit an eldom he was

2:27

always prominent on the political and

2:29

social scene as well as in philosophy in

2:32

fact a famous public figure all his life

2:34

he did a tremendous amount of popular

2:37

writing and journalism and broadcasting

2:39

which influenced social attitudes among

2:42

successive generations of British people

2:44

I think this is obscured for many the

2:47

fact that the true foundations of his

2:48

Fame as a philosopher lie in

2:50

contributions to mathematical logic of a

2:53

highly professional and Technical

2:55

character

2:56

he was born in 1872 and lived till 1970

3:00

and was politically active almost to the

3:02

end though the great bulk of his

3:04

philosophical work was done by the 1920s

3:07

here to discuss the work of these two

3:09

men and some of its influences down to

3:12

our own day is one of the most famous

3:14

philosophers of our time AJ air who has

3:17

written a great deal about Russell

3:19

including the best short introductory

3:21

book on Russell's work

3:22

Professor let's start with freygar as

3:25

being the earlier figure when he began

3:27

what was it he was trying to do well he

3:30

was trying to

3:32

um

3:33

make up what he thought well the

3:35

deficiencies in arithmetic he thought

3:38

that mathematical statements as they

3:40

were expressing his day were not

3:43

sufficiently precise and the

3:45

mathematical proofs were not

3:46

sufficiently rigorous and so he began by

3:49

trying to develop a notation the

3:51

progressive to referred to in which you

3:53

become in which this would be remedied

3:55

annotations to show exactly what

3:59

mathematical statement stated and

4:02

exactly what their proofs consisted in

4:03

it was supposed to make it obvious how

4:05

one step in a proof succeeded another

4:07

and this was it was a deficiency in

4:10

mathematics in his time applying even to

4:12

Euclid where there were assumptions not

4:15

made explicit which are required for the

4:17

proofs to be valid wasn't one of the

4:18

points involved that every argument

4:20

including a mathematical proof has to

4:22

have premises and what those premises

4:25

are often creates problems and he tried

4:28

to show that all mathematics was

4:30

ultimately derived from Pure principles

4:33

of logic exactly

4:35

both he and Russell did this and this

4:38

involved two Enterprises first of all

4:40

defining mathematical Concepts in pure

4:43

logical one and secondly showing that

4:45

mathematics were arithmetic anyhow not

4:48

all mathematics but arithmetic were

4:50

deducible from probably The Logical

4:52

premises and this has achieved the first

4:56

part was achieved fairly simply I think

4:58

fairly simple illustration will show how

5:01

it was done if you take let's say any

5:04

couple let's take

5:05

um Tom and Jerry then you could Define

5:08

them as a couple by saying that they are

5:11

both members of the set and anything

5:14

which is a member of is identical with

5:16

one or other of them they will Define

5:18

the number two as a set of of such sets

5:21

a set of couples and you do this for all

5:23

numbers there are certain complications

5:25

about Infinity but in this way you can

5:27

define a cardinal number in purely

5:30

logical terms is what he did and then

5:33

also so by generalizing logic which

5:37

hadn't been done are still in logic

5:40

which had prevailed from ancient times

5:43

until 19th century was not holy General

5:46

he was able to State premises from which

5:52

most terrific it was deducible it was

5:54

shown later by somebody by another

5:57

logician Augustine girdle that in fact

6:00

this couldn't be completely done the

6:02

derivative day couldn't be completed but

6:04

that in so far as it could be completed

6:05

freyr shared a method of doing it

6:07

wouldn't it also be true to say that

6:09

before Fraga the laws of logic had been

6:12

regarded as laws of thought that's to

6:14

say has something to do with human

6:15

mental processes but Fraga realized that

6:19

that this couldn't be so that the

6:21

validity of a proof couldn't depend on

6:24

our psychology oh yes this was very

6:26

important this is one of one of the most

6:28

important things that Fraga did and he

6:30

began by one of his early work was an

6:33

attack on a book of honorific German

6:36

philosopher called whose cell in which

6:39

logic was represented as a theory of

6:41

judgment and this was it was ruled by

6:44

the German idealists and fragrant

6:47

insisted he was entirely objective and

6:49

nothing to do with with psychological

6:51

processes but the the sets in which you

6:54

reduce numbers were entirely objective

6:56

things and that logic was quite

6:59

independent of uh wasn't about

7:02

psychology at all these were objective

7:04

truths which of course the mind is

7:07

capable of gospeling they didn't depend

7:09

upon features of thinking so the search

7:12

then becomes in a mathematical proof for

7:15

what it is that the proof conveys from

7:18

step to step that's right that

7:19

impersonally validates the conclusion

7:22

regardless of how we think and this in a

7:25

way accounts for Fraga having a

7:27

philosophical interests Beyond this

7:29

probably mathematical work because he

7:31

also developed a theory of of meaning

7:35

of meaning which would show how

7:39

mathematics could be objectively valid

7:41

and he talked of of the he tied up the

7:46

meaning of mathematical statements but

7:49

this could be extended to statements in

7:50

general with

7:52

truth Traditions with with the features

7:55

in them that made them candidates for

7:57

truth or falsehood I suppose the most uh

8:00

historically influential distinction

8:02

that he introduced was the distinction

8:03

between sense and reference which has to

8:07

do with his theory of meaning and one

8:08

still hears people constantly referring

8:10

to this can you explain it yes it's it's

8:12

fairly it's fairly complicated the tool

8:15

German expressions are Zin which are

8:17

generally translated since and bedok

8:19

which is translated well it is in fact

8:22

the German word for meaning but by

8:25

philosophers usually translated as I

8:27

have a reference or denotation and the

8:31

denotation of a name is the object to

8:35

which it uh which it names I mean the

8:38

irritation of brown McGee is is you the

8:42

actual person

8:44

whereas the sense of of the name is the

8:49

contribution that it makes

8:52

to the meaning and say if if I uh just

8:57

say Tom you have to say to me who's Tom

8:59

and then I say well Tom his son says

9:02

brother and or the person who invented

9:05

such and such or all the first person

9:07

that kind of the mountain and in this

9:09

way I give you a sense and in this way I

9:11

enable you to identify him now this

9:14

distinction becomes important in certain

9:17

contexts generally what you care about

9:20

in the case of a name is what the name

9:22

stands for and but there are certain

9:25

cases where it's important to make a

9:28

distinction between uh sense and

9:31

denotation and one good example would be

9:34

statements of identity the phrase

9:37

favorite example was that of the evening

9:40

star and The Morning Star both of which

9:43

as you know uh uh

9:46

Venus and but if someone says the

9:51

evening Stars I don't this is where the

9:53

Morning Star a man takes the reference

9:55

of these two expressions to be in the

9:58

denotation then he's simply saying Venus

10:01

is Venus which is the tautology and of

10:03

no interest whereas in fact the morning

10:04

star in the evening star is a

10:06

mathematical Discovery and therefore in

10:08

this usage well the Expressions referred

10:11

to is not 30 notation not the object not

10:13

their senses

10:15

so in other words he he analyzed meaning

10:17

into two different components that's

10:19

right sense and reference yes and a

10:21

statement may have a sense but not have

10:23

a reference well this happens in two

10:25

ways and uh uh there could be names

10:29

or or nominal expressions like uh

10:33

president King of France for example

10:35

which has a sense but no reference

10:37

because nobody

10:39

corresponds to it and also there is the

10:43

complicated case of Expressions which

10:46

have a function in in a sentence as

10:49

contributing to its making it capable of

10:53

being true or false

10:55

um but don't you know anything like

10:56

periodicus is is is good is bad is the

11:00

answer which themselves are what he

11:02

called incomplete Expressions namely

11:04

don't themselves have a reference but

11:07

contribute to giving the sentence a

11:10

sense and through its sense of reference

11:12

and these distinctions that he

11:14

introduced and his theory of meaning had

11:17

in fact had a very widespread influence

11:19

in philosophy haven't they they've

11:21

become very fashionable in recent years

11:22

that's and and there's been a a change

11:26

in the anyhow in England and perhaps to

11:30

go to well in the United States to some

11:32

extent and uh a change in sort of main

11:35

concern of philosophy for a very long

11:37

time the theory of knowledge was

11:39

dominant ever since stick out in in

11:42

these in 2017 Century the main concern

11:46

has been the theory of knowledge uh what

11:48

we what we can know and how we can know

11:51

it and how we are justified in hurting

11:52

the beliefs we do and in recent years

11:55

this has given way to what's sometimes

11:57

called the philosophy of logic which is

11:59

mainly concerned with questions about

12:02

meaning and here fragrance coming to get

12:05

prominence and for instance my successor

12:07

as Professor logic Oxford and Michael

12:08

damit has voted nearly I mean certainly

12:12

two large books uh two fragrance worked

12:15

and is concerned with exploring the

12:17

implications of fragrance distinctions

12:19

for a theory of meaning well Michael

12:22

dummett who I suppose is must be called

12:23

the leading living commentator on frago

12:26

makes enormously large claims for him

12:28

doesn't he he says that he's introduced

12:30

a whole new era in philosophy that he

12:32

has

12:33

de-psychologized philosophy that in the

12:36

way you just explained he dethroned the

12:38

theory of Knowledge from the center of

12:40

philosophy and replaced it with logic

12:42

and this has changed 300 years of

12:45

philosophical development well I think

12:46

there has been a different emphasis but

12:49

I think that Michael exaggerates in two

12:51

ways first of all philosopher's always

12:53

been concerned with meaning ever since

12:55

Socrates went about saying what is

12:58

knowledge what is what is goodness and

13:00

so on which is a way of asking what what

13:03

the what the Greek equivalence of these

13:05

terms meant so there's always an

13:06

interest in in meaning in in philosophy

13:10

and secondly I don't seek interest in

13:12

the theory of knowledge has totally

13:14

disappeared I think I think that that

13:17

there are still people who are connected

13:19

with with concerned with this and

13:22

insofar as even in metal damage own work

13:25

uh the theory of meaning is very much uh

13:28

bound up with uh questions about truth

13:32

and falsehood this also doesn't entirely

13:34

take us away from the idea of knowledge

13:36

because after all of that I'm always

13:37

concerned with what reason we have to

13:38

suppose that certain statements

13:40

propositions are true or false so I

13:43

think that that there has been a shift

13:44

of emphasis but not the the great break

13:47

the damage insists on before we continue

13:50

with the more recent applications of

13:52

fraga's work I want to turn to Russell

13:54

for a moment when I introduced this

13:57

discussion I emphasized the fact that

13:58

Fraga worked in isolation throughout

14:00

almost the whole of his life and this

14:02

becomes very important when one starts

14:04

to consider Russell because poor Russell

14:06

spent the first several years of his

14:09

life reinvent work that fragr had

14:11

already done without realizing that he'd

14:13

done it didn't he uh cat so that should

14:16

make it rather easy for you to explain

14:18

to us something about the importance of

14:20

Russell's very early work quite know how

14:23

to say poor Russell because it is quite

14:26

true that Russell did a lot of work that

14:29

Fraga had done before him but Russell

14:32

also exposed a fatal deficiency in

14:36

fraga's system he showed that fraga's

14:39

system of logic actually contained a

14:41

paradox it's like the famous old

14:43

contradiction of epimenity as the

14:45

Christian who said that all creations

14:46

were Lars it follows and it it it comes

14:50

into the category of self-defeating

14:52

propositions and also although on the

14:54

surface it seems to be trivial it's not

14:55

trivial because it shows that the

14:57

underlying argumentation has something

14:59

wrong with it it does it shows that one

15:01

of one of uh flag is essential

15:04

assumptions led to contradiction and

15:07

when and Russell in 19 I think it was in

15:09

1903 uh conveyed this in a letter to

15:12

Fraga and fraga's first reaction was not

15:15

oh I'm wrong you've seen the Arrogant to

15:18

reply the whole of mathematics has been

15:20

shown to be worthless

15:21

then he thought this is going too far

15:24

and he then

15:27

managed to put together some sort of

15:31

answer to Russell's objection but then

15:34

it was shown only after faker's death in

15:37

fact by a polished Edition that fraga's

15:40

answer also was untenable it led the

15:44

foundation and Frank himself never

15:45

recalled from this player after he

15:48

received after the publication of the

15:50

great shift you see of the bishop the

15:52

yes

15:56

um you yourself said earlier he never

15:58

wrote the third volume and he simply

16:00

came up from 1903 to 1925 his death he

16:03

never did anything and this was the

16:04

result he thought his life's work has

16:07

been abolished yes so that in fact

16:09

um

16:10

it's a very sad story yes and and a

16:14

tragic story and Russell then went on to

16:17

meet this Paradox in his own way some

16:19

complicated thing called the theory of

16:21

types it remains true I had ought to

16:23

press this point that an enormous amount

16:25

of the of the work that Russell had done

16:28

and spent years over Fraga had already

16:30

done and Russell didn't know yes that is

16:32

true but it's also true that although

16:34

Fraga did it first and some experts

16:37

today think that Fraga did most of it

16:39

better it was through Russell that the

16:42

ideas actually became famous in

16:43

philosophy and influential in philosophy

16:45

that is true I don't know why it was

16:47

that frago's work was so uh neglected

16:50

and partly because the third reason that

16:55

um interest in the new developments of

16:58

logic was very much an English thing

16:59

because therefore frago's work wasn't

17:02

taken up in Germany

17:03

uh because in Germany the psychological

17:06

mistaken psychological view of logic

17:08

still prevailed yeah and wasn't taken

17:10

I'm in England simply because of English

17:12

instrumentality and and in incompetence

17:15

in foreign languages and it was left but

17:17

Russell who had been brought up by

17:18

German governesses and German nurses but

17:22

even Russell only got indirect clear

17:23

what happened was the Russell and his

17:25

collaborator Whitehead went to a

17:27

congress in Paris in 1903 I met an

17:30

Italian logician called piano and it was

17:33

through piano

17:35

whose work enormously impressed them and

17:37

was working in the same direction with a

17:39

less efficient system and fragrance that

17:41

they got to hear a Fraga and then

17:43

Russell redfagger had once realized how

17:45

how important that it was and the result

17:47

of all this was that the science of

17:49

logic which had remained virtually

17:50

static for over 2 000 years since

17:53

Aristotle suddenly exploded a whole new

17:57

and enormously through Russ mainly

18:00

through Russell and Whitehead's

18:02

principle of Mathematica which took them

18:04

together about ten oh ten years well

18:07

Russell wrote the principles of

18:08

mathematics in 1903 where he does

18:11

recognize with the freak I think in the

18:13

previous and in the opinion he does yes

18:15

and then then he went on with his with

18:18

his tutor uh Trinity Cambridge Whitehead

18:21

to write a three volume worked called

18:24

principal Mathematica in which he

18:25

actually tried to do the work of

18:28

deducing mathematics from logic and it's

18:31

full of formulas and and it is it is a

18:34

stupendous work although as you rightly

18:36

said it doesn't uh quite achieve the

18:39

standards of logical rigor that freyja

18:41

achieved before it but this was the one

18:43

that really uh popularized the subject

18:46

we had all sorts of people took it up

18:47

but it man it took from there on it has

18:49

preceded by Leaps and Bounds and it's

18:52

now so to speak a major field of

18:53

intellectual Endeavor throughout the

18:55

Western World in every University but

18:57

it's interesting I think also should be

18:58

mentioned that one of the effects has

19:01

been not so much to subdue mathematics

19:05

to logic which is what Fraga and Russell

19:07

wanted but to subdue logic to

19:08

mathematics and that the the in recent

19:11

years

19:12

mathematical logic has become more and

19:15

more mathematical yes and less and has

19:17

had less and less to do with philosophy

19:20

in general and even a disciple Fraga

19:24

like Michael damit is more interested in

19:27

the semantic side of it the theory of

19:29

meaning that he has his friend himself

19:30

to be in the purely mathematical side

19:32

well unlike Fraga Russell actually made

19:35

the explicit step after he'd done all

19:36

this work to General philosophy really

19:39

not until he was 40 years old but then

19:41

he did and he started producing General

19:43

works of philosophy can you give us some

19:46

indication of of of what position well

19:49

it's very hard how little the two were

19:51

connected they

19:54

um

19:54

the one place where I suppose they are

19:57

connected is something that Russell

19:58

called the theory of uh descriptions

20:02

there was a puzzle about the meaning of

20:06

of statements like the president King of

20:09

France which didn't denote anything what

20:11

did you say the president King of France

20:12

is bald exactly there is no king of

20:14

France therefore I didn't know anything

20:16

and therefore there was a question how

20:18

it could be meaningful and there had

20:20

been philosophers a notable example is a

20:23

German called Minong who then thought

20:26

that that these things not everybody

20:28

called subsistent entities and Russell

20:31

thoughts was rubbish and he he shared a

20:34

way of translating out such Expressions

20:36

by saying that they in fact contained

20:40

covert existence

20:41

claims okay was translated into there is

20:46

one thing that now rules over France and

20:50

whatever it is France is born roughly

20:52

and this got rid of of the of the

20:55

apparent Paradox and so in that way his

20:58

logical work had a result of implication

21:00

but in the main he simply went off from

21:03

another attack his first purely

21:05

philosophical book came out in 1912 it's

21:09

called the problems of philosophy it's a

21:11

home University library books and in my

21:13

view still all the best introduction to

21:15

philosophers there is because Russell

21:17

says a marvelous writer although it's a

21:19

little bit old-fashioned and there he

21:21

really takes no account with logical

21:23

work at all he simply continues the

21:25

British imperative tradition this is a

21:27

book that follows straight on from

21:31

and it starts off with the theory of our

21:34

perception it's very like Barclay there

21:36

it says that what we perceive are not

21:37

tables and chairs and things but what

21:40

Berkeley what luck called Simple ideas

21:42

what uh Russell following his friend

21:45

were called sense data and then deals

21:48

with the old traditional philosophical

21:49

question how on the basis of being

21:52

presented with these sense impressions

21:54

we arrive at physical objects and then

21:56

he deals with a set of traditional

21:58

philosophical problems in in that sort

22:01

of way and

22:03

he more or less gave up logic after uh

22:08

Mathematica he himself said that

22:12

um this wore him out

22:14

um

22:15

he collaborated in the book on the book

22:17

with Whitehead but Whitehead was

22:19

teaching mathematics at Cambridge and

22:22

mainly occupied with that Russell at

22:24

that time was living independently had a

22:27

lecture ship but came into 1915 but in

22:30

the first decade of the century he was

22:32

living on his independent income and so

22:34

he had that the actual work of writing

22:36

out all his proofs and he said that this

22:39

really

22:40

um

22:41

incapacitated him but ever doing any

22:43

detailed work in future and this is some

22:45

extent true all his network is full of

22:48

brilliant ideas they never he never

22:50

fully works out it's a certain point he

22:52

gets born he says oh yes it goes on like

22:53

this he just bought through to dot the

22:55

eyes and and cross the t's and this is

22:58

true of what it's there to work I think

22:59

that I see one very important continuing

23:02

concern in the later work I'd be

23:04

interested to know if you agree with

23:05

this or not you've just said I'm sure

23:07

rightly that that Russell was a a

23:09

radical empiricist in a direct tradition

23:11

of Lark and human uh it seems to me that

23:14

Russell was always concerned to validate

23:16

the Natural Sciences in terms of sense

23:20

data that he always wanted to show that

23:23

the whole Corpus of our scientific

23:24

knowledge could be derived from and was

23:27

derived from nothing but observations

23:30

and our Reflections on our observations

23:32

not always uh I think you make one very

23:36

important important Point here and one

23:39

in fact that I overlooked when I was uh

23:41

to ask you a few moments ago and that is

23:43

that from the very beginning

23:45

Russell's approaches philosophy was an

23:48

interest in justification there's a

23:50

quite an amusing story that uh when he

23:53

was about 12 his elder brother who said

23:55

to school Russell was taught at home the

23:57

elder brother Frank was said to school

23:58

taught Russell geometry and Russell

24:02

refused to accept the axioms he wanted

24:04

to have them proved and his brother said

24:06

that they couldn't get on unless they

24:08

give us accepted the accidents they

24:10

agreed to provisionally but he always

24:12

wanted just to have everything Justified

24:14

and this was common both in his approach

24:17

to logical mathematics and his approach

24:19

to other branches of knowledge and as

24:21

you say also in his opposed to science

24:23

he wanted to have a basis for our belief

24:26

in science and but here his views varied

24:30

in the um

24:33

uh mentioned the problems of philosophy

24:36

it's quite true that he wanted to start

24:38

with sense data but he didn't think that

24:40

all scientific or even all common sense

24:43

statements statements like out of the

24:44

table can be could be reduced to sensory

24:46

statements he adopted a causal theory

24:49

that you could

24:51

um assume the existence of the physical

24:53

world as the best explanation for our

24:56

sensory experiences then he changed his

24:59

View and in the next important book he

25:02

published on the theory of knowledge

25:04

which was a knowledge of the external

25:06

World which came out in 1914 he did take

25:11

the view you just you just referred to

25:14

namely he thought you could actually

25:15

reduce

25:16

every not only every Common Sense

25:19

statement but every scientific statement

25:21

two statements about our actual and

25:24

possible hypothetical sense experiences

25:27

and this this put this view which is

25:30

technically known as phenomenalism and

25:32

was the view of of uh Barclay if you rob

25:36

Barkley of God and also the viewer of

25:39

John Stuart Mill who was incidentally

25:41

Russell's Godfather lay Godfather

25:43

because because

25:48

they Godfather

25:50

um this phenomenalistic view was

25:53

developed in Arnold's external world and

25:55

also in some important essays that

25:57

Russell wrote in a book called mysticism

26:00

and logic which he produced during the

26:02

first world war an essay called

26:04

something like sense later and physics

26:06

is the most important one

26:08

and he continued this

26:11

um in another important book called The

26:13

analysis of mind which came out I think

26:16

in 1921 and he adopted a theory which

26:20

had been Advanced before him by the

26:22

pragmatist William James Henry James's

26:25

um elder brother in which both mind and

26:28

matter were composed of what James

26:31

called neutral stuff and which were

26:34

where in fact since data and images and

26:37

and they differed only in being

26:40

different Arrangements this fundamental

26:41

data but then Russell gave this up and

26:44

in 1925 we'll identifies the Curious

26:47

book that is the matter where he well

26:50

the traces of this view still remaining

26:52

but he mainly went back to the causal

26:54

theory that that he'd held in 1912 and

26:58

when he revived his interest in

27:00

philosophy in the 1940s and any news

27:04

final or his next last philosophical

27:08

book uh human knowledge and scope and

27:10

limits he goes back to a causal theory

27:13

he always he always thought that the

27:14

basis of our knowledge uh was laying in

27:19

in in science experience but he varied

27:23

uh in uh in the next step I mean he it

27:28

was only during one period of his work

27:30

that he thought that the whole thing

27:31

could be uh reduced to sensory terms uh

27:36

more often and certainly in the LA at

27:38

the end of his life irreverently he he

27:40

adhered to the causal Theory which put

27:43

the physical world beyond all the veil

27:46

observation one thing that is constant

27:48

with Russell

27:49

um is the attempt to bring a wholly new

27:51

rigor to bear in philosophy not only of

27:55

a logical kind but one's tempted to say

27:57

the scientific kind he was always very

28:00

concerned for example that our beliefs

28:02

should relate to the evidence for them

28:04

this is something he reiterated over and

28:06

over again isn't it and it's something

28:08

which if taken seriously sweeps aside a

28:11

great deal of traditional philosophizing

28:13

and traditional thinking oh yes that I

28:15

think is true and I think that this you

28:18

already mentioned that uh Russell and

28:22

inflambikistan indeed wickenstein was

28:24

Russell's uh

28:27

and uh as you know wittenstein and also

28:32

that group of philosophers in Vienna

28:34

called the Vienna Circle condemned what

28:36

they call metaphysics and metaphysics in

28:39

their view was existed at least partly

28:42

in any attempt to describe the world in

28:45

non-scientific terms they thought that

28:48

this was the only World there is and

28:51

that science was a matter of forming

28:54

theories about it which were verified by

28:56

observation and any assumption that was

29:00

Superior world a world inhabited by gods

29:03

or anything of that thought was

29:04

nonsensical and Russell certainly all

29:07

the time held this there and was always

29:09

concerned to just write sounds and was

29:12

always worried by the fact he thought

29:14

the justification for science was

29:16

extremely problematic yeah I mean and it

29:18

remained problematic to the end to the

29:19

end I mean and in the interesting in in

29:21

the last book that he wrote a human

29:24

knowledge the one I referred to he then

29:26

sets out what he thinks uh the set of

29:30

assumptions that required to be made if

29:32

belief in scientific theories is to be

29:36

justified and makes it quite clear do

29:38

you think this is these assumptions must

29:41

as well be taken on faith yes and he

29:44

tried to work out what we call a theory

29:46

of induction but was never entirely

29:49

satisfied with it and and more or less

29:51

said well I remember what he said he

29:53

said that we really can't be sure that

29:56

science is true but it has a greater

29:58

chance of being true than anything else

30:00

that could be surrounded its rival yes

30:03

that he still couldn't validate it in

30:04

the way he couldn't validate in the way

30:06

he would like to like to have done

30:08

that's just talk now in an orderly way

30:10

about the influence of Russell because

30:12

he and Wittgenstein I suppose must be

30:15

the two most influential philosophers in

30:17

the 20th century at least in the

30:18

English-speaking world now I suppose

30:21

Russell's first great influence was on

30:23

his immediate contemporaries and indeed

30:25

older uh contemporaries like Whitehead

30:28

and MOA in the in the Cambridge of his

30:31

young day

30:32

um let us put it this way in in the

30:35

purely

30:37

logical work in which Russell Almighty

30:40

had collaborated it was I think Russell

30:42

who had the monitoring ideas I mean I

30:45

think the theory of types they have

30:47

descriptions uh came from Russell but

30:50

when it came to trying to apply that

30:52

sort of technique to philosophy which is

30:54

what saint Russell did in knowledge of

30:56

the external world for example in trying

30:59

to reduce abstract

31:02

Concepts like concepts of points and

31:05

instance to observational terms then it

31:08

Whitehead who took the lead and Russell

31:10

got his ideas of Whitehead and did they

31:12

quarreled over this because Russell

31:14

didn't pay Whitehead sufficient

31:16

acknowledgment you'll find that they are

31:17

developed in two books of writing that

31:19

came out after the war the principles of

31:21

natural knowledge and the concept of

31:22

Nature and Russell at one time

31:26

was influenced by McTaggart who was the

31:29

disciple of Hegel and got Russell to be

31:32

both Russell Moore to begin to be

31:34

idealists and more first of all rebelled

31:37

against this the interests of Common

31:39

Sense more was great defender of Common

31:40

Sense and the influence Russell to the

31:43

extent that he that he cured Russell

31:46

very belief in idealism so the infant

31:48

the influence went that way also it with

31:51

respect to ethics which was never

31:53

greatly interested he accepted like all

31:55

Bloom's prayer he accepted Morris

31:57

principal ethical he believed that good

31:58

was a non-natural indefinable uh concept

32:03

but then Russell had a very big

32:06

influence on the later for my generation

32:10

of philosophers in as much as he

32:12

convinced us that since science was

32:16

Sovereign in the description of the

32:18

world or philosophy could do was he

32:21

elucidated analyze and so Russell can be

32:23

regarded I think as the father of

32:25

analysis but here he differs profoundly

32:28

from Wittgenstein I don't want to go to

32:31

too deeply to wickenstein but well I'd

32:34

rather you didn't because we're going to

32:35

devote the whole of the next program to

32:37

be but one thing it will come out in our

32:38

next program it's the biggest I thought

32:40

that philosophy was largely a matter of

32:42

people being getting into a model and

32:44

The Business of people like because I

32:46

must do as in his own famous phrase show

32:50

the fly the way out of the fly bottle to

32:51

kill people of these models well Russell

32:54

always thought that philosophical

32:55

problems had a solution and that was why

32:58

he was so very hostile to the purely

33:01

linguistic philosophy a little bit of

33:03

Oxford after the war under the

33:05

leadership of of Austin because

33:08

the mere explanation of language for its

33:10

own sake the the the exploration of the

33:14

implications of English usage was

33:16

trivial and Russell really thought there

33:19

were questions about justification of

33:21

our beliefs that

33:23

um it was this is a philosophy to answer

33:25

and these questions were answerable he

33:28

thought that the answers could be

33:29

discovered if you worked at it hard

33:31

enough otherwise you didn't think

33:32

philosophy was worth doing I'm not here

33:33

I agree with it yes I was going to say I

33:35

want to put a personal question to you

33:36

because you own your life you have

33:38

acknowledged that you yourself have been

33:40

enormously influenced so we wrestled and

33:42

you make that very clear and always have

33:44

so you you can tell us what it's like

33:46

from the inside as it were to have been

33:48

influenced by Russell what has its

33:51

influence been on you on me uh it's been

33:54

first of all that unlike most of my

33:57

contemporaries I still think one should

33:59

start with what Russell called sends

34:01

data what I now political since qualia

34:05

that is a technical difference whether

34:07

you begin with the particulars or or or

34:11

something more General

34:14

um but for our present purposes it comes

34:16

to the same thing so that on the whole I

34:18

I share his um uh certainly the starting

34:23

point of views on perception I share

34:26

them I also agree with the importance

34:28

the Primacy he attaches to the theory of

34:30

knowledge I

34:33

M until I've always been a thorough

34:36

going empiricist I agree with the view

34:40

that Russell derived from Hume there's

34:42

no necessity of The Logical necessity

34:44

and so that there's not such thing as

34:46

causal tests they cause it was just a

34:48

matter

34:49

about whom originally said it was namely

34:53

constant conjunction and something

34:55

purely contingent I agree with Russell

34:58

in rejecting any form of theology or

35:00

anyhow Transcendent Theology and

35:02

injecting metaphysics and I also most

35:04

importantly agree with Russell the

35:06

philosophy wouldn't be worth doing

35:08

unless it posed questions to which we

35:10

could find the answers perhaps not he

35:12

perhaps not I but cleverer persons than

35:14

I will eventually find them and all

35:16

these are examples not just of your

35:18

agreeing with him but of him having

35:19

influence oh yes are they all of them

35:21

quite directly yes quite directly quite

35:23

directly and I think you've even been

35:25

influenced by him in the way you write

35:26

haven't you that appears what I do

35:28

regard him as a master of English

35:29

prayers and I think I'm not in the same

35:32

class as

35:33

but I do think that I do write English

35:36

reasonably well and I do think and again

35:38

partly under his influence

35:40

yes I think there is affiliation there

35:42

both the ideas and of style

35:45

from Hume through Mill

35:48

to Russell and coming down the stage to

35:51

me yeah now the the philosophers that

35:54

we're discussing here Fraga and Russell

35:57

have enormous effect on the living

35:59

yourself included now I now want to talk

36:01

about the Revival of interest in Fraga

36:04

after the second world war so that the

36:06

interest in Fraga and the interest in

36:08

Russell for the first time proceeds side

36:11

by side into the age that we now live in

36:14

it's very difficult to account for

36:17

historical events particularly in such

36:19

short perspective and the I think the in

36:23

the there certainly was in immediately

36:26

after the war a decline in Russell's

36:28

influence in here in England and this is

36:30

I think not due to a Revival of interest

36:33

in Fraga but to uh

36:37

an increased importance attached to the

36:40

work of Wittgenstein and Moore in most

36:42

cases that I enormously liked and

36:44

respect him as a man I think

36:45

philosophically it was excessive and I

36:48

think this was to be responsible for

36:50

this but partly not so much Ryle who

36:53

respected Russell but mainly Austin who

36:55

uh was the linguistic philosopher and

36:58

narrowest possible sense and had a great

37:00

respect for more as as someone who

37:04

attached great importance to ordering

37:05

his users into common sense and so on

37:07

Common Sense was said by Russell is that

37:09

it'll be the metaphysics of savages and

37:11

I think it was the upgrading of more

37:14

that was responsible for at that time

37:16

for the downgrading of Russell and this

37:18

is a train that's now been reversed I'm

37:19

glad to say I I think you go a bit too

37:22

far in saying Russell was downgraded

37:23

because if one thinks back to those

37:25

post-war years and thinks about who were

37:27

the major philosophers in the

37:28

English-speaking world the shortest of

37:31

shortlists would have to include apart

37:33

from Russell himself vittgenstein Karl

37:35

Popper Quine Gilbert rail yourself and

37:39

all of you were massively influenced by

37:41

Russell yes Perhaps Perhaps I'm I

37:45

uh I mean yes so you would know better

37:47

than I because you after our upper talks

37:49

in in in the 50s when I had already

37:52

departed um uh for for London but my

37:56

certainly the impression reaching Us in

37:58

London was that wrestlers began that

38:01

means you're taking an oxford-based View

38:03

and I think that's what's mistaken about

38:04

the view right I think there were other

38:06

people around then who disparaged

38:08

Russell it's perfectly true yes but

38:10

their work and their influences I'm very

38:13

glad he had to hear this yeah and I

38:16

certainly Russell has has recovered he

38:19

himself yeah the fact that he himself

38:21

thought this yeah because I was seeing

38:23

great idea we believe him at the time I

38:25

I organized the group in LA in London

38:28

that he attended and he was certainly uh

38:31

miffed his perhaps too mild but he

38:34

thought that that he that he wasn't

38:36

getting his due and all floss is a

38:38

slightly vein and and he this certainly

38:41

caused him pain but we agree in any case

38:43

that that he's come back he's come back

38:45

yes now um the Revival of freyja is

38:49

something that I really I think I'm

38:52

can't explain I don't even know exactly

38:55

how it happened probably

38:58

it started in America uh with the

39:01

development of our school of logicians

39:04

led by a man called Alonso Church who

39:07

insisted on very great rigor in logical

39:09

mathematics and found it in Fraga and

39:11

didn't find it in in Russell and

39:13

Whitehead of course they did find it

39:15

elsewhere they found it for example in

39:16

Hilbert they disagree with Hilbert for

39:18

other reasons and in England it seems to

39:21

have been

39:23

the first evidence I can find of it is

39:26

in a book published or fairly late about

39:28

1960 I think by William and Martha Neal

39:31

which is a very uh impressive history of

39:35

logic in which which very great

39:37

importance is given to Freda he's put on

39:39

a level with Aristotle these are two

39:41

great names

39:44

suddenly remind me there was a

39:46

translation in the early 50s 1950 itself

39:49

950 itself made by Austin

39:53

of fraga's grundlagen and then there was

39:57

also a translation made two or three

40:00

years later by uh Max black an

40:04

Englishman living working in America and

40:06

by Peter geech

40:08

of two of fragras very obscure but

40:11

important semantic essays one of them

40:13

called sense and reference and the other

40:16

called functional concept and so there

40:19

was in the early 50s this sudden

40:20

interest in Prego but I'm not quite

40:22

certain what led to it or indeed what

40:25

conference is it had well a lot of very

40:27

bright younger people took it up didn't

40:30

they and were influenced by it whether

40:32

that'll last a lot I don't know but it

40:34

certainly seems to me to have been going

40:35

on recently I find very little influence

40:38

of fragrant current philosophical work

40:40

apart from the work of damit if you if

40:42

you look at the example I think now

40:44

perhaps some of the most interesting

40:47

work being done has been done in America

40:49

and if we look at the work of people

40:50

like Quine and and Putnam and and Thomas

40:54

Nagel and uh and Donald Davidson in

40:58

particular you don't find so strong

41:01

influence of Fraga except perhaps in

41:03

Davidson's case indirectly through the

41:07

work of the Polish tradition Dusky on

41:11

Truth which says links up with vegan as

41:13

much as frega linked himself linked

41:15

meaning and Truth are you confident that

41:17

the influence of Russell will last

41:20

uh yes do i why why so because I think

41:24

because that because that is who I take

41:26

a philosophy I think that that the

41:28

questions he asked are the important

41:30

philosophical questions and I think that

41:32

his answers to them whether uh right or

41:36

wrong will always need to be taken into

41:37

consideration and if I'm right about you

41:40

too you also think that he's approached

41:42

his conception of what philosophy is is

41:44

the right conception yes that it

41:46

consists of clarification therefore

41:49

analysis and justification therefore

41:52

argument of our important beliefs

41:54

written in straightforward English prose

41:57

oh well obviously English was written in

42:00

in straightforward prayer and

42:02

straightforward prayers yes thank you

42:04

very much professor

Continue with YouTLDR

Analyze another video with Pro

Process a new video, search every timestamp, compare sources, and keep the result in your library.

Get Pro — $12/month30-day money-back guarantee

More transcripts

Explore other videos transcribed with YouTLDR.