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·YouTLDR

Why the AI Boom Is Just Getting Started

1:20:08902 summary words · ~5 min readEnglishBy Invest Like The BestTranscribed Jun 11, 2026
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Summary

The AI transition is exhibiting a vertical 'L-curve' adoption profile driven by agentic coding breakthroughs and severe compute shortages. This shifts value capture from legacy enterprise SaaS to a consolidated foundation model oligopoly and a highly specialized, 'decommoditized' physical hardware supply chain.

This video outlines a battle-tested investment framework mapping how physical constraints, specialized semiconductor packaging, and autonomous software workflows are fundamentally restructuring global technology markets.

Section summaries

0:00-0:53

Introduction & The AI L-Curve

watch

Alex introduces the core framework of technology S-curves and how tech earnings grow exponentially. He claims that enterprise AI is currently less than 1% penetrated and is exhibiting an unprecedented vertical 'L-curve' trajectory.

Provides the foundational thesis of the entire interview regarding exponential technological adoption and market dynamics.

0:53-14:16

The Anthropic Thesis & Agentic Coding Unlocks

watch

Alex tells the story of investing in Anthropic, describing how the frontier model space consolidated into a three-horse oligopoly. He highlights how autonomous coding tools (Claude Code) are acting as the primary enterprise labor-replacement unlock.

Offers an in-depth strategic analysis of developer ecosystems, token economics, and model-level competitive moats.

14:16-19:26

Private Markets & Institutional Underwriting

optional

Explores how Whale Rock transitioned from public market investing to bidding on private blocks. Alex explains how a comprehensive 90-page research deck secured their Anthropic allocation and details historical private placements in Stripe and NuBank.

Highly valuable for growth equity and venture managers, but less relevant to pure technology or systematic public market traders.

19:26-26:39

Masterclass on S-Curves and Underappreciated Earnings

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A deep dive into technology adoption life cycles. Alex details how markets systematically fail to model exponential unit growth, allowing disciplined investors to acquire world-class companies like Nvidia, Tesla, and Apple at extremely low forward multiples.

Explains the central quantitative error made by public markets when pricing strategic technological inflections.

26:39-32:02

Spotting Inflection Points: Consumer vs. B2B

watch

Explains how to identify inflection points using scuttlebutt, intuition, and historical precedents. Alex contrasts rapid consumer adoptions (radio) with slower B2B curves that require legacy integration (dishwashers), arguing that AI bypasses traditional integration frictions.

Provides an excellent framework for comparing the adoption velocities of consumer internet vs. enterprise-integrated systems.

32:02-40:04

Oligopolistic Moats and the AI Leaderboard

watch

An analysis of digital business models. Sacerdote maps out why leading foundation model providers can sustain their positions through scale, recursive self-improvement loops, proprietary API software harnesses, and sheer capital access.

Synthesizes competitive advantage theories (network effects, scale, brand) specifically for the frontier AI stack.

40:04-48:07

The Structural Short on Enterprise Software (SaaS)

watch

Alex details why Whale Rock liquidated its software positions and went net short on the application layer. He outlines the shift in CIO priority lists, pricing power erosion, and how agentic systems of record could relegate SaaS platforms to headless databases.

A critical strategic warning of impending software disruption that directly impacts portfolio allocation.

48:07-56:59

Decommoditizing the Data Center Supply Chain

watch

A granular deep dive into physical constraints. Sacerdote explains how 10x annual workload growth is transforming low-margin suppliers of copper laminate, high-layer count PCBs, liquid cooling components (Celestica), and fiber cabling (Corning) into high-margin infrastructure bottlenecks.

Essential mapping of the highly technical and physical hardware bottleneck layer of the AI economy.

56:59-1:03:05

Hardware Rule of 40 & AI Structural Risks

watch

Alex introduces Whale Rock's modified Rule of 40 for hardware, and addresses potential tail risks. These include geopolitical constraints, government regulations, model performance plateaus, and potential compute over-ordering.

Presents specific metrics for hardware stock selection paired with necessary risk management frameworks.

1:03:05-1:20:04

The Future of Research & Organizational Compounding

optional

Explores how AI integrates into institutional research without replacing human analysts. Alex details Whale Rock's internal structure, the design of their Mega Cap Tech Fund, and concludes with a personal story about his father's career and mentorship.

Focuses on fund management strategy, organizational design, and personal history; useful but less technical.

Key points

  • The Decommoditization of the Hardware Layer — While the cloud computing era commoditized data center hardware over decades of stable x86 architectures, the 10x annual growth in AI workloads is pushing physical limits. This forces extreme hardware customization across high-layer count PCBs, liquid cooling systems, and specialized fiber optics, creating high-margin proprietary moats for specialized component manufacturers.
  • The Evaporation of Traditional SaaS Moats — Legacy enterprise application software is facing a structural crisis as CIO budgets shift directly to foundation model tokens with faster ROIs. Additionally, autonomous agents are beginning to operate directly on headless systems of record, bypassing complex legacy software user interfaces entirely.
  • The Agentic Unlocking of Foundation Models — The transition of AI tools from mere autocomplete assistants to fully autonomous, agentic coding systems (like Claude Code) expands the addressable market from search engines to a multi-trillion-dollar labor-replacement paradigm. This creates recursive feedback loops where superior code generation accelerates the development of the next generation of models.
  • A New Rule of 40 for AI Hardware Investing — Traditional software valuation uses the Rule of 40 (revenue growth plus operating margin), but AI hardware investing requires a modified metric: the sum of the percentage of a company's sales derived from AI plus its market share in that specific AI hardware category.
the enterprise AI or enterprise application AI market is less than 1% penetrated and we've never seen, you know, we talk about S-curves, we call this an L curve, just straight up. Alex Sacerdote
in this stack, you know, it's now Jensen talks a lot about it, but it's power at the bottom, chips at the bottom, the clouds, and then the foundational models, and then the applications on top. Alex Sacerdote

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:00

When you get the right part of the

0:01

S-curve, you get exponential unit

0:03

growth. If you have a very strong

0:05

business model, your earnings don't grow

0:07

linearly, they grow exponentially. You

0:09

know, the world doesn't think

0:11

exponentially. Very few people believe

0:15

you can accurately predict 2 3 4 years

0:18

out. But if you follow and understand

0:20

the Scurve and you you know the moes and

0:23

you know how to model, you really can uh

0:26

predict these these great things. the

0:28

enterprise AI or enterprise application

0:31

AI market is less than 1% penetrated and

0:35

we've never seen, you know, we talk

0:37

about S-curves, we call this an L curve,

0:38

just straight up.

0:53

Alex, you were saying that your highest

0:54

conviction position is anthropic right

0:56

now. Can you tell the story of

0:58

discovering it, making the investment,

1:00

using this anecdote as an excuse to talk

1:02

about all the things that I think you

1:04

and I are mutually interested right now,

1:06

investors like you, investing in private

1:07

markets, anthropic, the business, AI,

1:09

everything. It's a great great way to

1:10

zoom in. Why is it your highest

1:12

conviction? And how did you get started?

1:13

>> Yeah. Well, when when the gun went off

1:16

with OpenAI chat GPT in November 2022,

1:21

we immediately took the firm and did a

1:23

massive deep dive with our 10 person

1:26

team. And we anytime you have a new

1:29

compute paradigm, there's a new stack

1:32

and on the and and that creates new

1:34

winners and losers on the old stack. And

1:36

in this stack, you know, it's now Jensen

1:39

talks a lot about it, but it's power at

1:40

the bottom, chips at the bottom, the

1:43

clouds, and then the foundational

1:45

models, and then the applications on

1:48

top. And at that time, this was 2023

1:52

early, we said, we want to be in the

1:55

chips and the infrastructure first. And

1:58

not only do they get the uh demand

2:01

first, but we know who the winners are.

2:03

And no matter who wins above, which we

2:06

weren't sure at the time, we know we're

2:08

going to need tremendous amounts of

2:10

compute. And we did a deep dive into

2:11

that, which we can talk about later, but

2:14

over the next 2 or 3 years, we started

2:17

to get more clarity on how the

2:20

foundational model, the layer would

2:23

evolve. And at the time, two or three

2:25

years ago, there were 60 different

2:28

companies going after it. OpenAI was

2:30

kind of in the lead. And we did a

2:32

webinar in April 2023. We said, look,

2:36

this might be a winner take all. It

2:38

might be a total commodity because

2:40

there's open-source players. It might be

2:42

a race to zero or it might be an

2:45

oligopoly where there's three or four

2:48

leading players. And what we saw over

2:51

the following, you know, 3 years was

2:54

that almost all the startups

2:57

fell away and died. And then some of the

3:00

largest companies in the world including

3:02

Amazon and and Meta. Amazon really never

3:05

really showed up. We'll see what happens

3:07

with Meta, but they were they came in

3:10

strong and then basically their effort

3:13

faltered and they had to do a total

3:14

reboot. In the meantime, Anthropic kind

3:18

of was this dark horse candidate, the

3:20

startup and um they focused uh really

3:26

purely on the enterprise and OpenAI had

3:30

kind of won the consumer and then Gemini

3:32

can never be counted out. We we love

3:34

Google as well. It's one of our largest

3:37

positions. So it really started to look

3:40

like a three-horse race and somewhat of

3:42

an oligopoly

3:44

very similar to how the uh cloud market

3:49

evolved where three companies underpin

3:53

the entire SAS cloud world and and have

3:57

really excellent businesses and then we

4:00

also were aware of the open- source risk

4:03

um from China and we started to get

4:06

comfortable that the quality of the

4:08

tokens from the leading edge were

4:11

superior because if you're 80%

4:15

close to the top of the benchmarks going

4:18

from 80 to 85 is a huge unlock and the

4:22

um the open- source guys they don't have

4:24

as much compute so they can come close

4:26

to the leading edge but they can't

4:28

leapfrog it and then they kind of

4:30

falter. Meanwhile, the scaling laws and

4:33

other

4:35

means of improving the models, the

4:37

feedback loops, etc. Uh we saw that

4:40

there was a very strong runway and

4:42

everyone we talked to close to the

4:44

industry saw that the scaling laws would

4:46

continue. So we developed this thesis

4:49

that it would be a three-horse race. And

4:51

then the big kicker was code. And this

4:55

is the true unlock of AI. In the first

4:59

few years, we knew AI would would be

5:01

big, but we were skeptical. Also, we

5:04

made large investments because we knew

5:05

the training was would be there, but we

5:07

weren't sure how much revenue might come

5:10

and if it could truly replace labor

5:12

because if you remember the early

5:14

versions of the models were good, but it

5:17

there was a lot of uh some negative

5:19

feedback from corporates and could they

5:22

be truly agentic? We realized in 2025,

5:27

the first cloud code and and the coding

5:30

tools really began to explode and you

5:34

saw

5:36

the first gen was like Microsoft C-Pilot

5:38

which is like $20 a month and then and

5:42

then it started and that could sort of

5:44

improve your grammar of coding, maybe

5:47

find a bug, maybe make a block of code

5:49

like a paragraph and then Anthropic came

5:53

out sometime in in the middle of the

5:54

year and it could do so much more. Um,

5:58

and it started to get to this point

6:00

where it could run agentically and we

6:02

kind of saw that happening and the

6:03

coding market just exploded and then we

6:06

started hearing that people who could

6:09

use it unfettered. We heard we heard

6:11

that you know even within Anthropic at

6:14

that time people were spending $100 a

6:17

day on tokens which if you do the math

6:19

comes out to 20 or $30,000 a year. And

6:22

if you think about how many coders there

6:24

are in the world, 20 million, you've got

6:25

a half a trillion dollar market just

6:28

from coding alone. And mind you, that

6:31

was on 7 8 9 month old technology. We

6:34

could see just on the coding market

6:36

alone that Anthropic had a tremendous

6:40

opportunity ahead of it. So I think at

6:43

the time, this is pretty funny, we wrote

6:44

in our letter, you know, we made the

6:47

investment um at the 180 valuation. And

6:50

we said, and I think they were

6:54

hoping to get to a nine billion

6:57

>> one to nine. Yeah. And and then the

6:58

numbers were like nothing we'd ever seen

7:00

before. 100 to a billion on the way to

7:04

9. But when we did it in August of 2025,

7:07

we nobody had any idea what 2026

7:12

could be. the the the second big unlock

7:14

lately which is that you know claude

7:17

code has gone to almost completely

7:20

agentic um where you had Andre Carpathy

7:24

and Lionus Torvalds last year saying two

7:27

of the smartest people in coding and

7:30

they completely flip-fpped and Karpathy

7:33

said you know last year's code tools

7:36

could write 20%

7:38

and 80% would be handwritten that

7:41

flipped when the the latest model came

7:43

out and now he hasn't written a line of

7:45

code not except in English and not to

7:48

mention the pure unlocked that we're

7:51

going to get for the people that never

7:53

knew how to code. So just coding alone

7:57

has completely taken off. Anthropic has

8:00

been able to stay ahead in coding. And

8:04

so one difference between the cloud,

8:08

GCP, AWS, and the AI companies is the

8:13

cloud's generally it's commodity.

8:15

They're they're selling you servers and

8:17

storage. You know, they have a lot of

8:19

software on top and there is stickiness

8:21

to it. But in the AI models, everyone

8:24

thought it would be pure commodity. But

8:26

there's tremendous differentiation with

8:29

within. There's different training

8:31

methods and different skills that

8:33

they're good at. And a lot of people

8:34

have routers that switch in between,

8:37

which sort of makes it sound like

8:39

they're commodity, but anthropic,

8:40

they're very good for anything that has

8:42

to do with private equity and finance.

8:45

Google's very good for ingesting PDF.

8:48

And so there's a lot of like

8:49

differentiation critical IP, which is a

8:53

great competitive advantage.

8:55

and companies many companies have come

8:58

after the coding franchise and Anthropic

9:01

has been able to keep ahead.

9:04

The other thing that's good about the

9:06

foundational models and anthropic is

9:08

it's not just the API or the model.

9:11

They're building a whole monopoly or

9:14

whole ecosystem of products around the

9:17

API. So we've got the SDK claude for

9:20

co-work uh orchestration layer and and

9:24

all the tools and and they call it sort

9:26

of a harness which is the software

9:30

around the API that gets the most out of

9:33

the model. This was one of the things we

9:35

saw with AWS really early on in 2013 was

9:38

oh people thought it was a commodity

9:40

server up in a warehouse big deal and

9:43

what they they saw this was a new way of

9:46

do doing computing. So they had they

9:48

invented all these products that they

9:51

could see before everybody else that

9:53

slowly built lock in. The other way we

9:56

think about this is where are we on this

9:58

scurve and we have this infrastructure

10:02

layer scurve which we think is somewhat

10:05

like 10% penetrated. And by the way we

10:08

think it's still uh one of the best ways

10:10

to play AI and we'll talk about how that

10:12

feeds back through. Um but if you think

10:16

about it, um even though you know 200 or

10:20

I don't know how many 800 million people

10:22

are using AI, they're just using AI 1.0

10:25

which is like a a search engine on

10:27

steroids. But now with these new

10:29

primitives where you have claw on your

10:31

computer linking it in, then you build

10:33

skills. Companies are going to build

10:35

people and companies are going to start

10:36

building skills and then they're going

10:38

to build true AI bots and then big

10:41

corporations are going to build much

10:43

larger but where are we in terms of the

10:45

amount of people doing that? I mean

10:47

Sunder said it's 10 bips of the uh

10:51

knowledge workers the world. So

10:53

Anthropic has something like 14 or 15

10:56

million DAUs. Probably a small portion

10:58

of those are truly doing AI the way you

11:01

can do it. So that 10 bips, it's classic

11:05

Scurve where these are the tinkerers and

11:08

then it's going to go to the early

11:09

adopters, then it's going to go to the

11:10

early mainstream. But you're going to go

11:12

from 10 bips to one to two or 3% to 5%

11:17

to 15% in the next four years. And kind

11:20

of a light switch this year went off in

11:23

the enterprise where everybody realizes

11:26

they need to do this now and do it fast.

11:29

It's still

11:30

>> like internet 1.0 I know when it's like

11:32

you knew you needed a website in 1998

11:36

but it's like hard to build that website

11:39

but this is coming together fast and so

11:42

you know we think the I don't the

11:45

enterprise AI or enterprise application

11:48

AI market is is like less than 1%

11:51

penetrated and we've never seen you know

11:54

we talk about S-curves we call this an L

11:56

curve just straight up and then we'll

12:00

take this to the infrastructure

12:02

which is even we're at 10 basis points

12:05

of people really using AI and we're

12:08

already sold out of all the there's not

12:10

enough compute in the world. So

12:12

Anthropic has half of what they need

12:13

right now and that's before this huge

12:17

takeup. So Mark Andre said in the next

12:20

four years one thing he's sure of is

12:22

there's not going to be enough compute.

12:24

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12:49

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12:56

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14:16

I'm so curious when an investor like you

14:18

who historically was a public markets

14:20

investor, you could hit buy and buy

14:22

whatever you want, is now operating in

14:24

lots of the most important private

14:26

market companies. We can talk about

14:27

Stripe or Data Bricks or OpenAI or

14:29

Anthropic. How do you get the positions

14:32

at the size that you want coming from

14:35

the legacy of been being able to just

14:37

buy? How much of it is um creativity

14:40

just directly with the company? If it is

14:42

directly with the company, so they have

14:43

it's a double opt-in. they have to

14:45

decide to let you in too. How do you do

14:47

that? Like what what have you learned

14:48

about getting the allocation you want or

14:51

the amount of equity you want in a

14:53

private company given that you know that

14:55

wasn't your original background?

14:57

>> In that case, you know, we we got to

14:59

know the company. One of our analysts

15:01

knew people in in the finance group

15:05

there and we actually we had a look at

15:08

the at the $60 billion round and we we

15:10

didn't do it. we didn't know the company

15:12

as well and we um the gross margins were

15:16

negative and and and frankly we hadn't

15:19

seen coding explode the way it had and

15:22

and one thing about public markets is

15:24

you get to know companies

15:26

over a long period of time and you can

15:28

kind of invest on your own schedule. I

15:30

got a chance to spend some time with

15:32

Daario. I obviously listen to on

15:35

podcasts and it I started to realize

15:37

these guys their management team is

15:39

excellent. the focus, the dedication,

15:41

they had almost no turnover, the quality

15:43

of code, and then the business plan was

15:45

really starting to play out. And uh it's

15:48

one thing to grow from, you know, 100 to

15:51

a billion, but it's another to do nine.

15:54

And then so we reached out to the

15:56

company as much as we could. They took a

15:58

meeting with us. We did a 90page

16:01

PowerPoint deck where we used Claude

16:03

Code to scour the internet for all the

16:06

feedback we could about the coding

16:08

market. and their and what their

16:10

products were good at, where they might

16:12

need to improve and we also did our

16:14

whole overview of what the coding market

16:16

would be. They welcomed us into this

16:19

round and then we stayed close with the

16:21

CFO and uh it's it's been great to build

16:24

a relationship with them and I think we

16:26

p punched above our weight in terms of

16:29

the allocation. So that one was a total

16:31

home run. In the rest of the the world,

16:34

we are in this period where the unicorn

16:36

market is bigger than most stock markets

16:39

in Europe, maybe even combined. It's

16:41

definitely bigger than Germany. It's

16:43

definitely bigger than the UK. And we

16:47

even before we invested in privates, the

16:49

first one was 2020. We meet with these,

16:51

we have to know these companies and you

16:52

really have to know them now because

16:55

sometimes they're the biggest companies

16:57

in the space and and have huge impact.

16:59

So we, you know, we do two to 3,000

17:02

face-to-face meetings with management

17:03

teams a year and about 10 or 15% of

17:06

those are with privates and then we kind

17:09

of focus in on the companies that we

17:12

really want to learn about and find ways

17:15

to meet with them and uh get involved in

17:18

their rounds. And our first one was

17:21

Stripe.

17:23

And we had a large investment at the

17:25

time. This is 20 2018 2017 1819 we and

17:30

2020 we own Audion which is a fantastic

17:33

payments company and they're a next-gen

17:35

cloud payments company taking from world

17:37

pay and you know the cloud the cloud

17:40

modern payments was 5% of total you know

17:43

$80 trillion market or what have you but

17:46

you can't invest in aud unless you know

17:48

Stripe like the back of your hand so we

17:50

did tremendous amounts of due diligence

17:52

talked to 200 customers in Audon but

17:54

when we asked about audio and we asked

17:56

about Stripe and we realized this is

17:58

Coke and Pepsi and um we said we got to

18:01

find a way to invest and I finally got

18:03

to meet the Coulson brothers in 2019 and

18:06

so that was our first one. We weren't

18:07

really known for privates. I've got a

18:10

friend um who's who has a involved with

18:14

a a venture firm that has tremendous

18:16

amounts and I talked to him about it and

18:18

I said let me know if you ever want to

18:20

sell some and then I get a call from him

18:23

during co in April

18:26

of 2020. We knew a lot about Stripe. We

18:30

didn't have the full financials, but we

18:31

knew enough that at that valuation, I

18:34

think it was 35 billion. We knew they

18:37

had they disclosed we had over half a

18:39

trillion of TPV. And we knew that

18:42

Audience's take rate was 25 or 30 bips

18:44

and we knew Stripes was 40 or 50. And we

18:48

knew how many employees they had. So, we

18:50

could kind of get at the profitability.

18:52

It turned out the take rate was higher.

18:54

It turned out they were being modest

18:56

about their TPV. It was much higher than

18:58

the 550. It was closer to the one 1

19:00

trillion. And you know, we underwrote

19:04

the thing under our assumptions and it

19:05

was much better. And then we were able

19:07

to upsize that from the seller to a $100

19:10

million block. Sometime they like it

19:13

that you know the VCs are going to own

19:15

and then most of them are going to sell.

19:17

They like it that we'll own and own in

19:20

the public market which we did with new

19:22

bank uh as well. all owned it for a long

19:24

period of time in the public market as

19:26

well.

19:26

>> Maybe now's the right time to lay out

19:28

everything you've ever learned about

19:30

S-curves. Obviously, your firm is sort

19:32

of predicated on this idea of technology

19:35

adoption life cycles

19:37

>> and investing in companies at the right

19:39

time amidst a certain platform change or

19:42

S-curve change.

19:43

>> And I think everyone knows the basic

19:45

idea of an S-curve and and the sort of

19:47

uh the stages you mentioned, tinkerers

19:49

and and early adopters and early

19:51

majority. But I'd love you to go into

19:53

the the super deep detail of what you've

19:55

learned since this is the lens through

19:57

which you've viewed markets and stocks

19:59

for a long time. Bring us into like the

20:01

nitty-gritty fine grading nuance detail

20:03

of why S-curves can be so useful for

20:05

investing. We have an investment

20:07

framework. It's

20:08

>> S-curve

20:10

and we'll dive into each one.

20:13

Competitive advantage and then

20:15

underappreciated earnings power. And

20:17

when you get the right part of the

20:18

S-curve, you get exponential unit

20:20

growth. If you have a very strong

20:22

business model, which in tech there's so

20:24

many of those for so many different

20:26

types of modes, uh your earnings don't

20:29

grow linearly, they grow exponentially.

20:31

And that's the last piece. Invest when

20:34

there's underappreciated long-term

20:36

earnings power. And very often the

20:38

earnings can grow from $1 to $10.50 to

20:42

20. And it happens way more than you

20:44

think. And it allows you to buy some of

20:47

the best companies in the world for

20:49

extremely low pees. When we were buying

20:52

Nvidia in 2023,

20:55

we were paying four times earnings. When

20:57

we bought Tesla in 2019 for the car

21:00

scurb, we were paying five times

21:03

earnings. When we were owning Apple, we

21:05

were paying four times earnings. When we

21:07

bought Amazon for AWS, we we were

21:09

getting it for free. And you know, the

21:11

world doesn't think exponentially.

21:14

and they're so focused on the next year,

21:16

the next quarter. Very few people

21:19

believe you can accurately predict two,

21:22

three, four years out. But if you follow

21:24

and understand the S-curve and you you

21:27

know the modes and you know how to

21:28

model, you really can uh predict these

21:32

these great things. So let's go to the

21:34

scurve. So the S-curve is crucial

21:36

because every technology follows this

21:39

pattern where it comes out,

21:43

you know, the I the smartphones were out

21:46

10 years before the iPhone. The internet

21:48

was out 20 years before Netscape. AI has

21:52

been out hidden inside of these

21:54

companies, but it wasn't until Chachi PT

21:57

took it public uh and ignited what it

22:01

was. So electric vehicles, Tesla went

22:04

public 15 years before 2019 when it went

22:06

vertical

22:08

it because there were so many barriers

22:10

to adoption. The first smartphones, you

22:12

know, they were clunky, they didn't have

22:14

touchscreen, not Apple, there wasn't a

22:17

wireless data system. And then uh and

22:20

they were too expensive. They were $500

22:21

or $600. Steve Jobs got the price to

22:24

200.

22:26

There was AT&T had a 3G network. It was

22:28

touchscreen. It was so easy your

22:30

grandmother could do it. So Annie built

22:33

an ecosystem and made it simple. So all

22:35

the barriers to adoption were eliminated

22:38

and then you rocket when those barriers

22:40

are removed. That's the tornado of

22:43

demand that everybody in the world knows

22:46

they need this right away. And so that's

22:48

the flip that happens. It happened with

22:50

electric vehicles. The price was too

22:53

high. Elon got the price to 40,000.

22:55

Range anxiety was there. he got the the

22:58

range to 300 miles. The supply chain was

23:01

was finally in place so he could churn

23:03

out millions of these things. So that

23:06

triggers the inflection. Now the other

23:08

nuance, it's not just, oh, it's taken

23:10

off now. It's how tall, how big is this

23:13

S-curve, how tall it is, so you know

23:15

when to sell, how long to hold on, cuz

23:19

we're underwriting out 2 or 3 years. We

23:20

have to know what the growth looks like

23:22

thereafter. And these S-curves can be

23:25

dynamic. So when Amazon had AWS and it

23:29

was a hidden line item inside of Amazon

23:33

covered by retail internet analysts, not

23:37

hardware chip, it was a new business

23:40

model, what have you. But we realized

23:42

the TAM for this, it was the largest TAM

23:45

in enterprise IT ever because previously

23:47

the TAM was routers, memory, storage,

23:50

Dell, EMC, but they were doing it all.

23:54

And so we figured out, you want to know

23:57

how tall the S-curve is. So we figured

23:58

out they were addressing 600 billion of

24:02

IT systems directly addressing that. And

24:06

then we said it's probably going to be

24:08

50% deflationary. Therefore, we're 1 or

24:11

2% penetrated. But then over time, we

24:14

realized it it actually wasn't

24:16

deflationary. If you talk to anybody

24:18

now, they say if you build it yourself,

24:19

it's about the same price. So that means

24:21

the TAM was so much bigger. So there's

24:25

mega S-curves and there's subass curves.

24:28

You know, we've been lucky that we've

24:29

had, you know, internet 1.0,

24:32

uh, mobile, cloud, e-commerce,

24:36

and now AI, which we can confidently say

24:40

is the biggest and all these things

24:41

build upon one another. So, you know,

24:44

with with the electric vehicle S-curve,

24:47

you you you have to pay attention too

24:49

because, you know, at the time we we

24:51

thought probably maybe 40 to 50% of the

24:54

cars would go electric, but it did hit a

24:55

big wall at 10 or 15%.

24:58

Usually the S-curves go kind of all the

25:02

way. Um, but in this case, for a variety

25:04

of reasons, it didn't. So, you have to

25:06

adjust and you have to stay on top of

25:08

it. And generally you want to um when

25:12

something gets to sort of 30 40%

25:15

penetrated then you stop having

25:17

exponential growth which means the sell

25:20

side catches up and there's no longer

25:22

big beats

25:23

>> and is that when you sell typically

25:25

>> generally we like we like the high

25:27

growth and it was a mistake with Apple

25:29

because in the first five or six years

25:31

of Apple um it was awesome. I mean it

25:34

was our largest position. and it would

25:35

go up 50 70% a year um except for '08

25:39

and then we sold in 20 2012 when it got

25:42

to sort of 50% of the US had a

25:45

smartphone and with Apple you know they

25:48

maintained their leadership position it

25:51

had a couple years of underperformance

25:53

and then the multiple got low and they

25:55

added several ancillary things and then

25:59

they al also got to play in the uh the

26:02

application because they get 30% % of

26:04

the app. So they were able to compound

26:07

very nicely, say 20%, but the the big

26:09

years were in the 50, you know, the the

26:12

0 to 50% part of the curve.

26:14

>> I'm so fascinated by this uh you know,

26:17

sometimes decade plus long flatline at

26:19

the beginning of one of these curves,

26:21

which makes me wonder what you've

26:23

learned about the right moment to buy or

26:25

even start paying attention before you

26:27

buy.

26:28

>> How do you measure that? Is it always

26:30

different? What are the pitfalls that

26:32

you've fallen into? How do you know when

26:34

when to we talked about when to sell,

26:35

but how do you know kind of when to

26:37

start thinking about buying in one of

26:38

these things?

26:39

>> Yeah. And you know, Andy Grove says sort

26:42

of when you have strategic inflection

26:43

points, you can't trust the data. And

26:47

and strategic inflection points are

26:49

about intuition, anecdotal evidence. I

26:53

love this book called The Towel Jones

26:55

Averages, a guide to whole investing,

26:58

which is rightrain and leftrain. And the

26:59

best investors have the right the

27:01

creative side where they it's visual.

27:03

It's connecting the dots. Um you know we

27:06

invested in the mobile video game

27:09

S-curve for so long. Mobile video games

27:11

were just the screens were small on the

27:14

phones and the processing power wasn't

27:16

good. So you had all these uh casual

27:18

games. But then I was in China and I saw

27:20

this little 12-year-old boy with a huge

27:23

phone and he was like playing a awesome

27:25

video game. I'm like oh my god it's now

27:27

coming to the phone. So, it's visual.

27:30

Um, enterprise is hard cuz you can't see

27:32

it. We go to the Gartner IT Symposium.

27:35

30,000

27:37

American CIOS go there and like we saw

27:40

this happen with Splunk where that used

27:43

to be an amazing database company and

27:46

like their their room where they were

27:49

explaining was like standing room only

27:51

or we saw that with VMware you know I'm

27:54

talking like 30 years ago where they

27:56

virtualized the server and like there

27:57

was standing room only and you could

27:59

just see the corporate demand just

28:01

beginning and with AWS

28:04

We went there and the grand ballroom was

28:08

completely packed and that was at nine

28:11

o'clock and at 10 o'clock the grand

28:13

ballroom was completely packed 11:00. So

28:16

you could you could actually see the

28:18

demand exploding before it happened. So

28:22

um we look for for all kinds of clues

28:24

and there's a whole pattern recognition

28:27

that happens. And by the way it's okay

28:30

to be late. It's okay to miss the first

28:32

one, two, three years in a lot of cases

28:35

because if the top of the S-curve is

28:38

half a trillion, um the growth can go on

28:42

for a long time. So, you don't always

28:43

have to be right there. It's okay to

28:46

miss the first 100%. Peter Lynch, I

28:49

started at Fidelity and he loved to

28:51

mentor the young kids. So, I got some

28:52

time with him. He said, "Wite out the

28:55

chart.

28:56

It's all about the future." Um, and so

28:59

it's okay to miss, but but what helps

29:01

about the S-curve is is sort of how long

29:03

it goes for. Then there's sort of the

29:05

the slope of the Scurve, which is

29:07

important. And a lot of people think cuz

29:10

we're in a modern world, everything's so

29:12

fast, but there's a lot of factors that

29:15

determine the pace of the adoption. And

29:18

we we um commissioned this gentleman,

29:22

Horus Du used to work with Clayton

29:24

Christensen, to go look in history. And

29:27

we have the big S-curves on our wall

29:28

over the last 100 years. And the radio

29:32

Scurve is one of the fastest ever. It

29:35

took 7 years to reach like 100%

29:38

penetration. But the dishwasher Scurve

29:41

is like that because it needs to be

29:43

plugged into the back end.

29:46

>> What are some Yeah. What else did you

29:47

learn? That's fascinating. What else did

29:48

you learn?

29:49

>> So like the B2B stuff can take a long

29:52

time because it needs to be plugged into

29:54

the existing systems. It's like it's got

29:56

to be put

29:56

>> the dishwasher

29:57

>> inside the house and then um and

30:00

consumers generally tend to go a lot

30:03

faster. Um

30:05

>> I love that the radio and the

30:06

dishwasher, the two models for adoption.

30:08

>> Yeah. And and I I covered internet of

30:10

fidelity. I c, you know, my first stock

30:13

was Amazon. That's a whole other story

30:15

which is a lot of fun. But I also did

30:17

B2B internet and you know there was a

30:20

whole huge bullcase on that. But the

30:23

basically the underlying infrastructure

30:25

wasn't in place for B2B to happen.

30:28

Ultimately happened 20 years later with

30:30

SAS. And so that is a risk with AI in

30:34

that you know these big companies are

30:38

very security conscious. Uh they're can

30:41

be slow to move. There's a lot of

30:43

cultural issues with a with AI where you

30:46

know you really need a few evangelists

30:50

to push it through and the top

30:53

management needs to push it through but

30:54

then the IT's saying this is this is

30:57

risky and that happened with cloud too

30:59

that was one of the big things with

31:00

cloud where it was too it was everybody

31:03

was afraid it's unsecure to have your

31:05

data in the cloud and then we saw the

31:07

CIA do it and we saw Capital One and we

31:10

talked to the Capital One CIO we that

31:12

it's more secure in the cloud and then

31:14

it really started to take off. But but

31:18

those takeoffs

31:20

maybe because SAS is like the dishwasher

31:22

and because cloud is like the dish it's

31:24

got to be plugged in

31:27

it it meant that yeah it was growing but

31:29

it was sort of a 30 to 40 maybe a 50%

31:32

growth rate but what's amazing about AI

31:34

is you just at least with consumers or

31:37

even business you just open up

31:40

>> the browser and it's there

31:42

>> and so that's why we're getting this

31:43

straight up

31:44

>> and I think there's enough runway in the

31:46

me in the near term going from 10 bits

31:49

of people really using it to two to five

31:52

or whatever which is going to cause it

31:54

to keep on going straight up. So this we

31:56

this we call it a backwards L curve. Um

32:00

so it's really pretty exciting.

32:02

>> What have you learned about uh when the

32:04

group that ends up being the leaders

32:06

separates itself from one of these

32:08

competitive packs? So you're talking

32:10

there mostly about overall growth of the

32:13

S-curve and demand. There's always

32:16

multiple players fighting for it. You

32:18

know, you've invested, it seems like you

32:19

kind of invest after someone has

32:21

separated themselves from the pack, not

32:22

try to pick the winners from the pack.

32:24

Is that is that like roughly?

32:26

>> Well,

32:26

>> correct?

32:27

>> Well, we're definitely So, you look for

32:28

the S-curve, then we do an exhaustive

32:32

study of everybody with exposure in that

32:35

area and try and find the one with a

32:38

very powerful competitive advantage. And

32:41

a lot of people didn't like tech. Warren

32:43

Buffett didn't like tech because he

32:45

couldn't predict the future too fast.

32:47

Yeah. And so the Scurve is our map for

32:49

looking in the future. Now a lot of

32:51

people were worried about tech because

32:53

they thought there was so much

32:54

disruption you could never trust a

32:56

company to be a longived asset. And what

33:00

we've found over the years is some of

33:02

the competitive advantages

33:04

within the digital world are more

33:07

powerful, if not equally or more

33:09

powerful than than in the offline world.

33:13

You've got the network effect that was

33:15

so powerful for LinkedIn, Facebook,

33:17

Alibaba, you name it. Then you can

33:21

become an industry standard. Oracle and

33:24

Bloomberg are the industry standard.

33:26

Oracle, you know, they charge a lot and,

33:29

you know, there's free versions, there's

33:31

open- source Oracle, but they had all

33:34

the database administrators. They they

33:36

had all the software that was tuned to

33:38

work with them. So, they they basically

33:40

had a chokeold on the relational

33:42

database market forever.

33:44

um you can get to scale very quickly

33:47

because these scurves grow and all of a

33:50

sudden Anthropic is doing 90 30 billion

33:53

in sales or Amazon you know had so much

33:56

scale and they got it quickly. So they

33:58

got a Walmart size scale advantage in 5

34:02

years versus 40 years for Walmart. So

34:05

you can have network effects scale you

34:07

can become industry standard. You can be

34:11

a platform that people build on top of.

34:13

You can have critical intellectual

34:15

property, which was what Qualcomm had.

34:18

You couldn't make a phone without paying

34:19

them, or ASML has critical intellectual

34:23

property. You can't make a chip without

34:25

their lithography. And I think what's

34:27

interesting is maybe these AI

34:29

foundational companies, you know,

34:31

they've got scale. Oh, you can also have

34:32

brand. And brand's very important

34:35

because Google, Amazon, they got to

34:37

grow. They never had to advertise.

34:39

Elon's never had to advertise for

34:41

anything. and cost to acquire versus

34:43

lifetime. It's the whole business model.

34:46

And so almost all the companies I

34:48

mentioned have Apple, they have all of

34:51

these rolled into one. Um, so we can

34:55

sometimes we can notice these things

34:58

before the rest of the world. And one of

35:01

our high points was we pitched Amazon

35:03

for AWS at 2013 at the Robin Hood

35:07

investors conference and we said the

35:10

bulls have no idea what they're sitting

35:11

on. Amazon's won the war but before it

35:14

even started and at that time we said

35:16

there's Coke and there's no Pepsi. Did

35:18

turn out there was Pepsi but it was big

35:20

enough to last. And we could see they

35:22

had a seven-year lead. So first mover is

35:24

important. Then they became a whole

35:27

ecosystem and a platform. Then they got

35:30

scale. So they were 10 times the size of

35:32

everybody else. Nobody could invest in

35:33

the R&D to to catch them. So um but

35:38

you're right that if you don't have a

35:40

competitive advantage, you can be in the

35:42

best S-curve of all time

35:44

>> and still lose out.

35:44

>> But if your name was Rim, Palm, Nokia,

35:47

HC, LG, Motorola, I can go on forever. 0

35:51

negative negative negative negative. And

35:53

that's what we saw at the foundational

35:55

model layer where there's like 50

35:57

companies trying to do that and they all

36:00

have fallen away and two or three have

36:04

emerged at the top and there's a lot of

36:07

reasons to think they will continue to

36:09

hold their position.

36:10

>> So to take Google's a little trickier

36:12

because they have this other huge

36:14

massive complex business attached to the

36:16

Gemini business. But if you take

36:18

anthropic and open AI as pure plays and

36:20

you dig through those and you reason

36:22

through their competitive advantages,

36:24

why aren't they susceptible to erosion

36:25

of those things in the fullness of time?

36:28

>> Yeah. Of all the S-curves we've we've

36:30

done, AI is by far the most complex and

36:34

the fastest changing. So it can be we

36:38

have to keep in mind that there are

36:40

risks

36:42

but also the rewards are the highest cuz

36:46

we're talking about a market in the

36:48

trillions. You know we we just said

36:50

cloud you know maybe cloud's 800

36:52

billion. This might be you know we now

36:55

think 3 to five but there's higher risk

36:57

higher reward. But let's just say with

37:00

anthropic now they have it looks like

37:03

they have critical intellectual property

37:06

generally they've been able to maintain

37:08

their their high market share and code.

37:10

Number two is uh they've built a a

37:14

strong brand for enterprise to where go

37:17

talk to any CIO and they'll just the

37:19

first thing they'll say is claude.

37:20

They're going to have escape velocity

37:22

and scale. And what was scary for OpenAI

37:25

and Anthropic fighting these big

37:27

companies like Google was they had these

37:29

huge cash cows. And to both of the

37:32

management teams credited Open and

37:34

Anthropic, they were able to

37:37

work in these super capital intensive

37:38

industries and find ways to raise

37:40

capital. And certainly with Anthropic,

37:43

with their 10x sales growth, it looks

37:46

like and their fundraising ability, it

37:47

looks like they've reached escape

37:49

velocity. So now they have scale.

37:52

And the other thing that Anthropic and

37:55

OpenAI could have is Anthropic now that

37:59

they're leading in code, they set that

38:01

code back onto their model and it's this

38:03

concept of the recursive improvement.

38:06

And if you look at the pace of their

38:08

innovation, it's accelerating.

38:11

>> Um, and so maybe they can have this

38:13

liftoff stage. you know, Open AI has,

38:16

you know, they they were focused on so

38:20

many different other sectors, but

38:23

they're starting to do better in

38:25

enterprise and their coding tools good

38:27

and they're starting to see accelerating

38:30

growth on that side. And then look, the

38:33

consumer franchise,

38:35

it it looks like enterprise right now is

38:38

much better because you're, you know,

38:39

you and I, we're willing to pay a lot

38:41

because it's replacing human beings. you

38:43

know, consumer, maybe you can get

38:46

advertising, but maybe they would pay

38:48

for a a clawbot type assistant if you

38:51

could make that perfectly well for them.

38:54

Um, but they have gazillion eyeballs

38:56

there. But you're right, things do

38:59

shift, but it usually on the we have

39:01

this

39:03

charts that we almost do for all of our

39:05

pitches. On the internet, the leader

39:07

goes bigger, faster, and wins. And it's

39:09

it's it's happened you know most of the

39:12

time the leader gets it. Shopify becomes

39:13

the leader. It just keeps on going.

39:15

Amazon the leader keeps on going. SAS

39:17

company XYZ just you get the lead. It

39:20

compounds on internet company compounds

39:22

on itself. And and another thing is you

39:24

need to be big. Another is scale. You

39:26

need the compute and you got to pay for

39:28

the compute because so there's only so

39:30

many people that can do that. So that

39:32

those are some of the modes that we

39:33

think are now showing up. Now there are

39:36

some exceptions to that rule. usually

39:38

with the paradigm shifts AOL and then

39:41

dialup went to broadband and and they

39:44

didn't make make the change. You know,

39:46

Netscape came out early and it wasn't as

39:49

strong of a business model. But I think

39:51

if you talk to anyone in the valley or

39:54

any startups, you know, they'll tell you

39:56

that they're building on top of these

39:58

three and the world's a huge place and

40:01

the economy is a huge place that that

40:02

they'll be able to differentiate within

40:04

those. I'm so curious then what you

40:06

think all of this means for software. Um

40:08

when I look through your portfolio, I

40:09

don't see a ton of uh big software

40:12

companies, enterprise software

40:13

companies. I I don't know if you once

40:15

had them and sold them or or how you

40:17

thought about it, but it's hard to have

40:19

the experience of building really

40:21

useful, cool little tools, even if

40:23

they're still toys, and not have the

40:25

thought of, wow, you know, like if I

40:28

spend enough time on this, even if I'm

40:29

not technical, maybe I could build a,

40:32

you know, an ERP equivalent replacement

40:35

or something for my company. There

40:37

doesn't seem to be a fundamental reason

40:38

why that's not possible and and then

40:40

those companies could be in lots of

40:42

trouble. Seems like everyone has a a

40:44

strong view on this one way or the

40:45

other. I'm curious how you've approached

40:47

those sorts of companies given that you

40:49

don't seem to own a ton of them.

40:50

>> We were at certain points maybe 5 years

40:53

ago, we might have had 40 or 50% of our

40:55

portfolio in software. And early on in

40:58

in our April 2023

41:01

seminar, we said definitely invest in

41:03

chips first and and we said but at the

41:06

application layer initially we thought

41:10

these companies are huge. They have huge

41:12

sales forces. They can take these AI

41:14

APIs and and build products and they

41:17

have the data. This is going to be

41:18

amazing for software.

41:21

And pretty quickly we realized their AI

41:25

products were not very good. They

41:29

weren't moving the needle. Nobody could

41:31

charge for them. We basically sold

41:33

almost all of our software, almost all

41:36

of our application software. We still

41:38

have one or two small ones, but entering

41:42

this year, we were actually net net

41:44

short. And uh it really helped us in the

41:48

first quarter. There's so many layers.

41:50

The old way of software is like using a

41:53

pen and paper or it's like a horse and

41:56

buggy. The new way of software is like a

41:59

jet engine or frankly like the

42:01

transporter from Star Trek. It's so

42:06

revolutionary changing that it feels

42:09

like it has to be disruptive

42:12

now.

42:14

even if it's not disruptive now or right

42:17

away. Uh so the software companies have

42:20

another problem which is

42:23

their list on the to-do list or priority

42:26

list of any CIO has fallen a lot. So

42:29

even if AI is not going to be

42:32

disruptive, they're spending it on

42:35

anthropic tokens because there's faster

42:38

ROI there. Um, second,

42:42

um, if they're spending all that money

42:44

over there, it pushes on the budget, so

42:47

that hurts them. Third, a lot of

42:50

software companies were able to raise

42:52

price every year. Um, and now they're

42:56

probably nervous about doing that. Then

43:00

fourth, we'll see what happens with jobs

43:02

cuz I don't, you know, there's smart

43:04

people on both sides of that, but we are

43:07

seeing some companies really gut their

43:10

jobs or whatever,

43:12

>> freeze hiring and so that hurts on

43:13

seats. Maybe in terms of them building

43:17

their own apps, maybe it just um

43:21

>> you know, if you want to be optimistic,

43:22

it's it's taken them a while to do that.

43:24

We talked about how early the primitives

43:26

of AR are. So maybe they have just taken

43:29

a while to get to something they can

43:31

commercialize, but

43:34

you know, they might not have the right

43:35

people. They might not know it's a

43:37

different selling motion from selling a

43:40

fixed system versus, you know, if you're

43:42

installing something that does human

43:44

work, you got to be right at the side to

43:46

make sure it's really getting done. So

43:48

you need the FDE

43:50

for deployed engineers and they might

43:53

not have the right people internally to

43:56

do that. Then of course there's the the

43:58

risk of you can build it yourself. The

44:00

bulls will say, well, they're never

44:02

going to build their own ERP system. And

44:05

that's probably right. And it is true

44:06

that technology, old tech is very

44:09

sticky. Like mobile video games didn't

44:12

hurt console games and uh the tablet

44:16

didn't hurt the PC and the smartphone

44:18

didn't hurt the PC and uh there's a lot

44:21

of integrations and work that goes into

44:23

these software. So that's all true and

44:27

companies do like to buy from they don't

44:30

like to build themselves that much. So

44:34

that's all true but you can't imagine a

44:37

world where in 1 2 3 4 5 years um you

44:42

could have a brand new AI native company

44:45

going after each one of these very

44:48

strong incumbents and it might their

44:49

data advantage could get obiated. it

44:51

might be easy to take it out and put the

44:54

new one in with AI and such. So, what's

44:57

good if you like so is the valuations

45:00

are very high and everybody knows

45:02

they're under pressure. Some people are

45:04

tempted to buy these, but the AI um

45:07

coding tools are just getting better and

45:09

better. So, we'll we'll have to wait and

45:11

see. And we're we're watching these

45:12

software companies very closely to see

45:15

if they're getting any revenue that can

45:17

change that trajectory. But it's hard

45:20

because if you're a company like

45:22

Salesforce, you've got 40 billion in

45:24

sales

45:26

and now you you might have 500 of ARR

45:29

700 of AR of AI. So you've got this huge

45:32

base. Now maybe this starts to work but

45:35

it takes a while. And in software

45:38

there's the rule of 40 which is your

45:41

growth rate plus your operating margin.

45:44

And if you've got a 20% growth rate and

45:46

20% that's good. For AI, we have a new

45:50

kind of rule of 40. We call it well,

45:52

it's really for chip investing. But if

45:55

what percent of your sales are AI, say

45:59

30%, and what's your market share in

46:01

that category? Say 30%. You'd be 60.

46:04

That's a great place to look because

46:06

you've got exposure and you've got a

46:08

strong market position. Problem with

46:10

software is their AI is 1 or 2% at this

46:13

stage and it's a long way to go. Um, one

46:17

thing we are picking up though now

46:19

lately and this is halfbaked, but AI

46:22

could make some of these software

46:24

platforms more important because what's

46:26

the first thing you do with claude? You

46:27

plug it into Slack. If that can become a

46:31

key repository, that will make Slack a

46:34

permanent fixture within the

46:36

organization. And so maybe these agents,

46:38

maybe the next wave of AI will be these

46:40

agents that use tools and they might

46:43

operate inside of the existing incumbent

46:46

software tools to use them like a human

46:48

being would.

46:49

>> Just to pull in that thread, uh it seems

46:51

like the commonality of the tools they

46:52

might use that are the most sticky would

46:54

be network-based tools. Uh so Slack is a

46:56

great obviously a great example of the

46:58

software in Slack itself is I don't know

47:00

leaves something to be desired. It's not

47:02

the software is not the special part.

47:03

It's that everyone is there,

47:05

>> right? But I'm curious yeah what kinds

47:07

of things you would want. Is it just

47:10

network you know the presence of a

47:11

network effect? Is that the only thing

47:13

that really matters?

47:14

>> It's still early in our thinking here

47:16

but I don't know even even even maybe

47:19

you know workday or the HR systems or um

47:25

the big systems of record

47:27

you know the agents may be running on

47:30

top of on top of them. CRM is going

47:33

headless or they're making a headless

47:35

version and that's sort of the bare case

47:37

too that you get relegated to just being

47:39

a database but you know there's a human

47:43

interface to it then they need to make

47:45

the AI interface which is no interface

47:47

it's just them going right into the data

47:50

and so you know you lose that customer

47:54

interaction but if if the

47:57

agents are going right to right to CRM

47:59

and doing the work inside of CRM M that

48:03

that will solidify CRM so you won't have

48:06

to think it's going away.

48:07

>> Can we talk about chips? You've

48:08

referenced them a few times.

48:10

>> Inf infrastructure chips, you know,

48:12

everything around the data center maybe.

48:13

I don't know how you conceive of it.

48:15

>> Why is this so interesting to you? I

48:17

love the the modified rule of 40 for

48:19

percentage that's AI and percentage

48:21

market share in the category. That's an

48:22

interesting stat.

48:23

>> What companies shine on that today? What

48:25

are what are lagards, you know, that are

48:27

surprising? For the past 40 years,

48:30

nothing has changed in the data center.

48:33

Even with cloud, we're basically Intel

48:36

x86.

48:38

It became the data center chip sometime

48:40

in the '9s. And um and compute grew in

48:44

the cloud era and it grew compute

48:47

workloads grow you know 25 to 40% every

48:53

year but Moore's law is improving at

48:55

that rate.

48:57

So it didn't require tremendous

48:59

innovation

49:01

and there really was almost no growth in

49:03

hardware for years and years and years

49:07

and the whole industry basically

49:10

commoditized every part every chip every

49:13

part of the server the printed circuit

49:15

board to the memory to the enclosures to

49:19

the networking

49:21

you know there was no innovation

49:24

you would go from one gig to 10 gig

49:27

That would take 7 years. And when you do

49:30

switch in the first year, it does take

49:32

some innovation to get to 10 gig and

49:34

would create a little cycle, but then it

49:35

would commoditize.

49:38

And now you go to AI and

49:43

the workloads are growing 10x every year

49:47

and they're pushing every single aspect

49:51

of this hardware to the physical limits

49:53

of what it can do. And so, not only are

49:57

you creating tremendous unit growth, but

50:02

the industry, we call it the

50:03

decommoditization of the hardware

50:05

industry. And I I met with Shawn Maguire

50:08

like 3 years ago, and he said, "I wish I

50:10

could come back and be a a hardware

50:12

hedge fund because all the companies are

50:14

public and they all have powerful IP."

50:17

And Sequoia made some of their best

50:18

investments back in the hardware day

50:20

with Apple and Cisco and others. And

50:23

we're in this renaissance of chips. So

50:26

not only do you have tremendous unit

50:30

growth,

50:31

but you it's requiring tremendous

50:34

innovation and what that means, you

50:37

know, at every aspect of the server. And

50:40

so you know memory which used to be a

50:43

pure commodity, this high bandwidth

50:46

memory is stacked 10 chips on top. you

50:50

know the input outputs are 10x what they

50:52

were before like took Samsung for years

50:55

to do it and it's a critical critical

50:58

piece and then that is constantly

51:00

upgrading so they're on the same you

51:03

know they've got to be working with

51:05

Nvidia for three or four generations in

51:07

advance we we had this with Celestica

51:11

Celestica

51:13

was a contract manufacturer and this has

51:16

been a disaster industry since 1999. It

51:21

went all offshore to China. It was

51:23

commodity, but they hung on and they

51:26

they kind of kept

51:28

Celestica's heritage was IBM

51:30

supercomputing and they kept all that

51:33

talent and skill. And then we noticed

51:36

they were the sole supplier of the

51:37

Google TPU server. We're like, "Oh my

51:40

god, this was like three years ago. The

51:42

stock was trading at eight times

51:44

earnings." And they had this whole and

51:46

then they also had this whole business

51:48

of selling Ethernet white box which is

51:51

code word for commodity white box

51:54

Ethernet switches into the clouds.

51:58

It it turns out that these are excellent

52:02

businesses. Not only do they have

52:03

tremendous growth, but to do an AI uh

52:08

server computer, it's it's liquid

52:11

cooled. It's running so much hotter and

52:14

you know it's two or $300,000

52:17

piece of machinery whereas an old server

52:20

was $5,000. If it breaks you just throw

52:22

it away. If this thing breaks the whole

52:24

thing goes down. So you become like

52:27

critical infrastructure like selling a

52:29

critical part on a plane. You'll never

52:32

get swapped out. And then they they it

52:34

turned out they were quite good at

52:36

liquid cooling and you know a lot of

52:39

other people tried to do it and failed

52:41

and so they've retained that position.

52:42

Then it also turned out that the

52:44

Ethernet market was because you were in

52:48

the old days you would go from 100 gig

52:51

to 400 to 800. It would be a 7-year

52:56

cycle to upgrade. Now they're upgrading

52:58

every year and that's really hard to do.

53:02

Then there's a whole software layer, the

53:04

open source sonic layer. The the guys at

53:06

at Celestica invented were some of the

53:08

people that wrote that open- source

53:10

software. They work very closely with

53:12

Broadcom. So what we thought was just a

53:15

great growth driver turned out to be

53:17

great competitive advantages and they

53:19

have like 50 60% share of the cloud

53:22

Ethernet switch market which is a

53:24

crucial market for um AI because AI is

53:28

incredibly network intensive. And then

53:30

even something like the printed circuit

53:32

board. I mean a regular server you need

53:34

10 layers. These AI servers you need a

53:36

40 layer and there's very few PCB

53:40

suppliers that can make this. And um

53:43

there's all kinds of complexities in

53:45

there. And we also own Elite Materials

53:47

which makes the leading ingredient which

53:49

is copper clad laminate which goes into

53:52

these boards. And so the PCB

53:56

uh units are growing, the layer counts

53:59

are rising. So you've got like a

54:02

50 to 60% keer just in the units and

54:06

then the ASPs are rising and then the

54:09

gross profits are rising and your

54:12

visibility which used to be hey we'll

54:14

call you next week if we need you to

54:16

like hey we need you for the next four

54:18

years to be like designing this road map

54:20

with us. So you've you've gone from a 5%

54:24

grow or low margin to you know a 35% 40

54:29

50 topline kager for the next four years

54:32

with rising margins

54:34

and then on top of that there's

54:36

shortages of everything. So even if it

54:38

is a commodity it's going to be a great

54:41

cycle. So we see that up and down the

54:44

supply chain. You find these companies

54:46

like Corning like they make the fiber.

54:49

Um they've got some ridiculously high

54:52

share of the fiber. I was reading this

54:55

uh Microsoft

54:57

data center they just built. There's

54:59

enough fiber to circle the world four

55:01

and a half times in that one thing.

55:04

And their fiber is thinner and more

55:07

bendable and can be specially

55:10

manufactured to the exact specs. and

55:12

it's higher margin and it's the fastest

55:14

growing part of their business. And then

55:17

they're doing, you know, in networking

55:19

there's scale out which is kind of

55:21

connecting all the server racks

55:24

together. Then there's scale across

55:26

which is connecting the data centers

55:28

together. And when you want to build one

55:30

of these huge clusters and you can't get

55:34

all the power in one place for training,

55:36

you want to wire them together. But the

55:39

wires you need like 10x the wire has to

55:41

be so much thicker. So that's creating

55:43

huge growth. And where the real kicker

55:46

comes in is when you do scale up. That's

55:49

connecting every GPU in the rack to the

55:52

other ones. That's done over copper.

55:54

Eventually that'll be done over fiber.

55:57

when that happens that two to three X's

56:00

Corning's opportunity. So you just have

56:04

at every layer of of the rack,

56:07

>> everyone's overwhelmed.

56:09

>> Everyone's overwhelmed. But the story

56:10

like in the power supplies, every Nvidia

56:13

chip or rack uses

56:17

n 50 to 125% more power. And like

56:20

literally that drives the ASPs of Delta

56:24

and Advanced Energy. I just I think it's

56:27

it's I can't believe these stories when

56:29

I hear I'm like wait so your ASPs are

56:32

going to like go up 40% for the next

56:36

four years in a row and it's higher

56:39

margin. The broader picture is like

56:41

we're going to be the AI demand if we're

56:44

right with this L curve. We're already

56:47

short, you know, the DRAM market, the

56:50

NAN market, the PCB. We're already like

56:54

30, we're 30% short all these things as

56:58

we are now.

56:59

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58:04

>> The measure of percent AI, percent

58:06

market share. Do you care more about the

58:08

absolute or the rate of change of those

58:10

metrics?

58:11

>> It's good because I took we did this

58:13

presentation in two 2024 where we

58:16

actually listed everybody's market share

58:19

and everybody's and then I I asked

58:21

Claude to plot plot it to a thing and it

58:24

actually didn't get it right because

58:26

what it didn't get is the rate of

58:27

change. So the rate of change is

58:29

important and that's incredible too

58:31

because you go from 10% to 30% and your

58:35

growth rate accelerates and your margins

58:36

accelerate. So rate of change is very

58:39

important.

58:39

>> Why don't more people get this right in

58:41

public markets? Like if your whole

58:42

framework is S-curve, competitive

58:44

advantage, underappreciated earnings

58:46

power. It feels like the movie's been

58:48

played out a lot over the last 25, 30

58:51

years.

58:52

>> My mom said, "Why do you tell everyone

58:54

your secret? It's like it's why does the

58:57

casino teach people how to play

58:59

blackjack? It it's harder. It's really

59:01

hard to do. It's it's you have to have a

59:03

a deep you have to be comfortable

59:05

investing. You know, we've been doing

59:07

I've been doing tech for 20 years at

59:09

Whale Rock. We've got a team that's been

59:12

doing this, covered many cycles. We know

59:14

the different. So, very few people, no

59:16

one's paid attention to hardware and

59:19

chips at all. So, you've got all these

59:21

newbies coming into it.

59:23

>> You and Gavin, that's it. and Gavin's

59:24

done a great job. people weren't

59:26

comfortable with it and it's it's harder

59:28

to do than it seems and the chart you

59:30

know a lot of these companies their

59:31

charts are up so it's scary can I buy

59:33

and then you also have to have the

59:35

holistic view because if you don't have

59:37

conviction so every you know every time

59:40

with Nvidia over the last four years

59:42

it's like oh they had a great year oh my

59:45

god it's got to be a bubble and then

59:48

they had another great year and it's

59:50

like 6 months of marking time it's got

59:52

to be a bubble this is like getting out

59:54

of hand this is pretty scary like and

59:57

the the bare cases are not like totally

1:00:02

without merit but if you can see the

1:00:04

whole picture and understand how these

1:00:06

things are unfolding and gain conviction

1:00:08

in that frankly if you're just a semi-

1:00:10

analyst so many semi analysts missed it

1:00:13

because they didn't see what was really

1:00:15

happening at the foundational model

1:00:18

layer so it helps to have have the big

1:00:20

picture it helps to have you know

1:00:22

decades and scores of scurves that

1:00:25

you're looking at and and where it plays

1:00:27

in different things.

1:00:28

>> What what in this whole picture, you

1:00:30

know, I would describe your your stance

1:00:31

so far in the first hour discussion as

1:00:33

like very bullish on on the impact that

1:00:36

AI is going to have and the returns

1:00:37

available as a result. What makes you

1:00:39

the most concerned or uncertain or is it

1:00:42

just the rate at which all this stuff

1:00:44

changes and like what keeps you worried

1:00:47

amidst what seems like pretty extreme

1:00:49

bullishness? I mean, one thing that

1:00:51

bothers me is there's a lot of

1:00:53

negativity in the general population

1:00:56

about AI and there's a lot of negativity

1:00:59

in some aspects of the government. You

1:01:01

know, I think Maine just banned data

1:01:03

centers and

1:01:05

80 only 20% of the people are optimistic

1:01:08

about AI and potential for negative

1:01:11

regulation. But I do think kind of the

1:01:13

genie is out of the bottle. Another risk

1:01:16

is that if AI sort of slows down in its

1:01:21

improvements, I think there's a whole

1:01:23

lot of AI adoption to happen even if the

1:01:26

models didn't improve. But Jensen said

1:01:29

this, you know, years ago when he was

1:01:31

talking about his GP crap, just the

1:01:33

graphics chips. If good enough is good

1:01:36

enough, I won't have a business. Now

1:01:40

every year he made the graphics a little

1:01:42

bit better and people always wanted the

1:01:45

best in AI. If anthropics sort of hits a

1:01:49

wall and stops improving or open AI then

1:01:52

the open source models will catch up and

1:01:56

um and then it might be a race to the

1:01:58

bottom and it might be you know it won't

1:02:01

be good for the stocks probably. It

1:02:03

could be good for the chip companies.

1:02:05

chip companies don't care

1:02:07

>> who's winning tokens, right?

1:02:08

>> Who wins.

1:02:09

>> So, that's another positive and they'll

1:02:11

benefit if if open source, you know,

1:02:14

Jensen really wants open source to like

1:02:16

take off. It's all he kept on mentioning

1:02:18

at at his last GTC. So, that could be a

1:02:21

risk. Another thing is if one or two of

1:02:24

the players falters and loses its

1:02:26

position and can't compete, that could

1:02:29

be like a lot of compute that they don't

1:02:32

need in the future. Now, if AI is so

1:02:34

big, somebody else will suck that up.

1:02:36

And we saw that with, you know, Oracle

1:02:38

cancelled a big deal and then Meta went

1:02:40

right in. But let's just say Meta

1:02:43

decided not to be involved

1:02:46

with AI. Hey, we can't keep up. It's

1:02:48

just going to be a waste of our

1:02:49

resources. So, we we watch that very

1:02:51

carefully and um in general, we see

1:02:55

more, you know, more more companies

1:02:58

truly going after this and even

1:03:00

Microsoft going trying to build their

1:03:02

own. So I think those are those are some

1:03:04

of the key risks.

1:03:05

>> Seems like you really have done very

1:03:07

little in the application layer of AI.

1:03:10

Historically the apps ended up being

1:03:11

most of the market cap you know not not

1:03:13

the infrastructure and there wasn't

1:03:15

really a model layer in the past. I

1:03:16

guess you could say it was the clouds or

1:03:17

something.

1:03:17

>> Yeah.

1:03:18

>> Why focus so much on the bottom layers

1:03:21

of Jensen's five layer cake versus

1:03:23

things in the application layer that are

1:03:25

actually getting used by consumers?

1:03:27

Well, we do, you know, part of OpenAI is

1:03:29

they have chatbt which which is an

1:03:31

application, but we think the

1:03:33

application layer well a it always comes

1:03:36

later. So, you know, the first three or

1:03:38

four years of the iPhone and then the

1:03:41

applications really took time. So, maybe

1:03:44

it's just starting. Um but to date um we

1:03:48

found that area to be pretty risky

1:03:50

because where does the where does the

1:03:53

foundational model end and where does

1:03:55

the application begin and can can the

1:03:58

applications build enough of a moat um

1:04:02

where they can fend off and um and build

1:04:06

and build businesses in that. and um and

1:04:10

we we thought we would see it in some of

1:04:12

the incumbents like a a CRM and they're

1:04:15

starting and maybe just a matter of time

1:04:17

but we really haven't seen it in the

1:04:19

enterprise world and there there are

1:04:21

some you know very good

1:04:25

startup application companies out there

1:04:27

but the ecosystem is not clear you know

1:04:30

like when we started the ecosystem and

1:04:32

chips was clear when we started the

1:04:34

foundational model ecosystem wasn't

1:04:36

clear now it's clearer to us and at the

1:04:39

application layer it's still kind of

1:04:41

unclear and a little bit dangerous

1:04:44

because um but there will be great

1:04:46

application companies built you know we

1:04:49

really were watching Brett Taylor at

1:04:50

Sierra Brett was CEO of CRM he wrote

1:04:54

Google Maps he was CIO of Facebook and

1:04:58

uh he he's building this fantastic

1:05:00

company called Sierra we're not involved

1:05:02

but that's where the rubber hits the

1:05:04

road will he be able to turn this into a

1:05:06

huge company and he's doing quite well.

1:05:09

We'll see. It's a matter of timing when

1:05:12

these things really start to to to come

1:05:15

in into their own and prove they're

1:05:17

sustainable. It usually doesn't start in

1:05:19

the first 3 or 4 years. It comes a

1:05:21

little bit later.

1:05:22

>> At your office, you have this this giant

1:05:24

uh award wall for the research. I can't

1:05:26

remember what it's exactly. It's for the

1:05:28

best research job or project of the year

1:05:30

given to an analyst. And I think you won

1:05:32

it. you gave it self awarded in their

1:05:34

own when you're by yourself, but you've

1:05:37

got this now long 20 year history of a

1:05:39

year one or one or more people, you

1:05:41

know, put their name on this wall for

1:05:43

having done the best job on a research

1:05:45

project that year. I'm so curious about

1:05:47

the nature of that research and how it's

1:05:49

changing as a result of all of this.

1:05:51

Say, you know, the person that's going

1:05:53

to win the award this year and the sort

1:05:55

of work that that requires a human to do

1:05:58

when so much of the work that probably

1:05:59

would have won you the award in, I don't

1:06:01

know, 2009 or something could probably

1:06:03

be fully automated or done in an hour

1:06:05

with cloud code or something today. How

1:06:07

is the nature of research and what gets

1:06:09

you on that whale rock award wall

1:06:11

changing in real time? I would like to

1:06:14

say that we're so advanced in our AI

1:06:16

systems that it's a huge change so far.

1:06:20

I mean, it's it's helping us get up to

1:06:21

speed and we have a handful of of great

1:06:23

apps, but it's not yet it's not

1:06:27

supplanting the job of the analysts. And

1:06:29

so much of what we're doing is we're

1:06:31

meeting with as many companies as

1:06:32

humanly possible. We're developing

1:06:35

relationships with with the management

1:06:37

teams that we cover. We're talking to

1:06:39

the competitors. The system we use is

1:06:42

right out of common stocks and uncommon

1:06:44

profits which was written by Philip Fish

1:06:47

Fischer in the 1950s. And it's the

1:06:49

scuttlebutt approach. It's growth

1:06:51

investing. It's it's get out there and

1:06:54

talk to suppliers, uh, customers,

1:06:57

competitors, looking for the key

1:06:59

characteristics of these leading

1:07:00

companies and really developing

1:07:02

conviction in them. Now, if it's a new

1:07:04

complicated area like ABF substrates or

1:07:08

PCBs, we're able to get up to speed on

1:07:11

those things quickly, but it can't pick

1:07:14

stocks for you in any kind of a way. I

1:07:17

will say that, you know, if you're an

1:07:19

analyst who's good at the blocking and

1:07:22

tackling and there's a role for that,

1:07:24

but that role is you need to have

1:07:28

obviously the insight on top. So, we're

1:07:30

now like using AI to write notes uh or

1:07:34

you know review the quarter or and those

1:07:37

notes are much better but there better

1:07:39

be a really good paragraph on top which

1:07:43

is the wisdom. What does this mean? How

1:07:45

does this deal with our thesis? Um what

1:07:48

changed? You know, don't just be a

1:07:50

reporter. Um so the AI can be a great

1:07:52

reporter. It can't it can't quite pick

1:07:55

into the future. And like the job that

1:07:57

the guys did on app 111 two years ago. I

1:08:00

mean I think we got two of the best adte

1:08:02

guys around and they you know they

1:08:05

convinced me to buy I knew adte I

1:08:08

started actually nearby here in New York

1:08:10

at at that internet advertising startup

1:08:13

and after I did banking.

1:08:16

So I knew internet advertising and ad

1:08:18

tech which is historically a terrible

1:08:21

industry. Um, but Michael and Sam really

1:08:26

figured out the Apploven story like

1:08:28

before anybody and they followed it when

1:08:30

it was private. They know all the

1:08:31

competitors. They know all the

1:08:33

intricacies of, you know, there's all

1:08:35

this terminology and um they, you know,

1:08:39

Sam went to the Las Vegas app

1:08:42

advertising conference and we went to

1:08:44

con and, you know, we talked to scores

1:08:46

and scores of of people. So um and they

1:08:50

did the work on the model and developed

1:08:52

a great relationship with Adam Ferogi.

1:08:54

He's one of the best managers out there.

1:08:56

And um I don't see AI doing that.

1:08:59

>> What role does talking to other

1:09:01

investors outside of your firm play in

1:09:03

your life? Like

1:09:05

>> I one of the great things is just the

1:09:07

friendships I've built with so many

1:09:10

smart investors

1:09:12

and and frankly Philip Fischer said part

1:09:15

of his process was like get to know a

1:09:17

good 10 or 15 like-minded people around

1:09:20

the country and share ideas and um

1:09:25

and a you know they're great great

1:09:27

friends to make a lot of them have been

1:09:29

on your podcasts and uh and and you

1:09:32

develop good friendships and and you you

1:09:35

share ideas, talk ideas. It's important

1:09:37

that it's a two-way street. Um, I call

1:09:40

it the tripod. When I like something

1:09:44

and then my analyst likes it and then

1:09:47

somebody who I really respect also likes

1:09:49

it. That's three legs of the stool can

1:09:52

really help the conviction.

1:09:54

>> What have you learned about shaping the

1:09:56

products that you offer your investors

1:09:59

across the history of the firm? It's not

1:10:01

just one monolithic structure anymore.

1:10:04

>> There's there's several things that if

1:10:05

I'm an investor and I want to give you

1:10:06

money, I can there's a couple ways I can

1:10:08

do that.

1:10:09

>> How did you arrive at those things? And

1:10:10

and how do you how could you turn that

1:10:12

experience into um advice for other

1:10:15

investors that are trying to provide

1:10:17

their LPs with the right set of options?

1:10:20

>> For the first 15 years, it was a long

1:10:22

short fund and we you know, you want to

1:10:24

be focused and if you defocus that can

1:10:26

be hard. So we we grew that and we got

1:10:29

that to the scale that we wanted to.

1:10:32

We're 20 years old, maybe 10 years in,

1:10:34

people started to ask for a long only

1:10:36

product. And so in 2020, we we launched

1:10:42

uh the long only fund. So we're 6 years

1:10:45

on that. And um that's now larger than

1:10:50

the long short. The bulk of the assets

1:10:52

are in these two. In maybe 2015, we we

1:10:56

formalized that we might be doing

1:10:57

privates. And so we gave investors the

1:11:01

option to opt in or opt out and you

1:11:03

could do 15% or 25%. So, but we didn't

1:11:07

break the seal on the privates until

1:11:08

2020. In 2021,

1:11:11

we offered um a hybrid fund that could

1:11:14

be 80%

1:11:17

uh into privates. sort of similar

1:11:19

approach but if you wanted more exposure

1:11:21

to privates. Um and then very recently

1:11:25

we launched the whale rock meggaap tech

1:11:28

fund and we just think there's a huge

1:11:32

structural underweight of the largest

1:11:35

tech companies in the world because a we

1:11:38

also realize that a a lot of our

1:11:40

performance over the years was from some

1:11:42

of the largest companies whether it be

1:11:45

Apple or Amazon or Tesla and and people

1:11:50

just it's hard to overweight these to

1:11:52

the to the amount. And so a lot of our

1:11:54

largest pools of capital endowments or

1:11:57

what have you, they realize they they

1:11:59

have been massively underweight, the

1:12:01

largest tech companies in the world for

1:12:03

the last because they only have, you

1:12:06

know, they have a lot of privates. They

1:12:09

don't have a ton of public and then

1:12:12

maybe half the public is international.

1:12:14

And then of their public bucket, they

1:12:18

don't want to they there's a belief that

1:12:20

there's no alpha in large cap. So they

1:12:22

underweight large cap and they have a

1:12:23

lot of small and mid managers that are

1:12:25

stock pickers because it's intuitive

1:12:27

that large cap can't have alpha. Um and

1:12:31

then in their hedge fund portfolio, even

1:12:33

if it's long bias, they're not going to

1:12:34

have 15% and Nvidia and all these other

1:12:37

things. And we realize that there's a

1:12:41

huge that this people are worried that

1:12:43

there's these big companies. This is

1:12:44

just a product of the digital economy in

1:12:46

that, you know, in tech, the leader

1:12:48

usually grows bigger and wins and

1:12:50

develops very high market share quickly

1:12:53

and and there's great competitive

1:12:55

advantages and and they're also selling

1:12:57

around the globe. So, this is going to

1:12:58

lead to massive profit pools and massive

1:13:01

market caps and it's just going to

1:13:03

happen into the future. And so, most

1:13:06

endowments are betting against this.

1:13:08

They're they're because they're

1:13:10

completely underweight this. And finally

1:13:13

somebody came to us and said you know

1:13:15

what should we do which index we got to

1:13:17

and I'm on the board of Hamilton College

1:13:19

and they were trying on their investment

1:13:22

committee they were trying to figure out

1:13:23

this and so we kept on hearing it and

1:13:25

finally uh one of our clients was like

1:13:28

we said we'll we'll do this for you

1:13:31

because there's a lot of alpha to be had

1:13:32

and the mag 7 or the fang or whatever

1:13:35

it's going to be different and you know

1:13:37

in 2022 they all rallied but like last

1:13:40

year they were very divergent and this

1:13:43

year they're down and so we created the

1:13:46

the Whale Rock Mega Cap Tech Fund which

1:13:48

is the top 30 the universe is the top 30

1:13:51

market caps globally and then we pick

1:13:54

you know the 12 or 13 that are the best

1:13:57

and I think there's tremendous alpha in

1:14:00

the largest cap because if you think

1:14:02

about it a small cap it just takes one

1:14:05

person to to figure out it's good and

1:14:07

move it up but it takes a hundred

1:14:10

people, 100 diversified PMs to realize

1:14:14

Google's not a loser, it's a winner. And

1:14:17

can we figure that out before

1:14:21

95% of those generalist PMs

1:14:25

do it? And you know, we've been able to

1:14:27

do it.

1:14:27

>> We like your odds in that.

1:14:28

>> Yeah, we like your odds in that. And so

1:14:30

there is alpha to be had there. And then

1:14:32

as an asset category, it's great because

1:14:35

these companies by definition have

1:14:36

wonderful modes and maybe they're not

1:14:39

the super S-curve, but sometimes they

1:14:42

are. I mean, Nvidia sure is, and TSM is

1:14:46

really levered to it, and Heinix is

1:14:49

extremely levered to it, and ASML is

1:14:51

levered to it. So, it's a great um so

1:14:54

that's a new we're four months into that

1:14:57

one. And so the right way maybe to think

1:14:58

about it, it it it sort of sounds like

1:15:00

really what you've built is a research

1:15:02

machine to understand the world through

1:15:05

the lens of companies and that the thing

1:15:08

you're constantly trying to improve is

1:15:10

that research machine and then the way

1:15:11

that you would then express that through

1:15:13

products is multiplied. But if I was to

1:15:15

try to understand Whale Rock, it would

1:15:16

be to investigate the research machine

1:15:18

first and foremost. We call it the whale

1:15:20

rock learning machine and it's a group

1:15:22

of 10 highly experienced individuals

1:15:25

that you know Warren Buffett reads books

1:15:28

and we read books and we read blogs and

1:15:30

we but we're also in tech you got to go

1:15:33

out and talk to people. So we do 2500

1:15:36

3,000 facetoface meetings with

1:15:37

management teams and you know Mer and

1:15:40

Buffett talk about compounding

1:15:41

knowledge. We've been compounding that

1:15:43

knowledge for 20 years. you know,

1:15:46

there's changes to the team, but broadly

1:15:49

there's a lot of um consistency to it.

1:15:53

Um Andrew and Michael have been with me

1:15:55

for 19 and 18 years and the average

1:16:00

experience level on the team is 10 or so

1:16:02

years and that includes some of the new

1:16:04

newer people. And uh yeah, that research

1:16:07

engine can support all these all these

1:16:10

products and it's the same people that

1:16:12

do publiclix and the private. So, we're

1:16:14

not going to scour the world and turn

1:16:16

over every A B. But when we see

1:16:19

something that fits into our system,

1:16:21

we're able to act on it.

1:16:23

>> It's so much fun to do this with you.

1:16:24

When I do this, I ask the same

1:16:25

traditional closing question of

1:16:26

everybody. What is the kindest thing

1:16:28

that anyone's ever done for you?

1:16:30

>> Well, I got to say it's definitely my

1:16:32

father who, you know, I was super lucky.

1:16:36

My father um graduated Cornell a double

1:16:40

e electrical engineering, pivoted to

1:16:43

Wall Street and um uh had a great career

1:16:46

at Goldman Sachs and he was um he ran

1:16:51

corporate finance in the 80s and then

1:16:53

ran private equity as chairman in the

1:16:56

90s and uh he was just whips smart but

1:17:00

he he had such humility and was such a

1:17:03

great gentleman and uh when I started

1:17:07

Whale Rock, you know, friends and

1:17:08

family, he was the first call, but he

1:17:10

said, you know, I've been at Goldman for

1:17:12

for 41 years. How about I come and join

1:17:16

you? I'll be the gray hair. I'll be the

1:17:18

oversight. I'll be the chairman. You do

1:17:19

what you do. You build the firm in uh

1:17:22

Boston. Build the team, run the money,

1:17:25

I'll help raise some money. And we got

1:17:27

to work together for 6 years until he

1:17:30

passed away in 2011. But I just feel so

1:17:33

lucky to have worked with him. You know,

1:17:35

it's not easy running a fund. We never

1:17:37

raised our voice. And he was just an

1:17:40

amazing mentor to so many people. And

1:17:43

when he passed away,

1:17:46

um I got so many letters from people who

1:17:48

said, "Your father was just such an

1:17:52

influence on me. He was such a

1:17:53

gentleman. He was such a great mentor to

1:17:55

me." And so I just feel so lucky uh to

1:17:58

have worked with him. And if I could be

1:18:00

half the person that he is, I'd be

1:18:03

completely winning. And

1:18:04

>> how did he do that? How did he What was

1:18:06

his method? Why did so many people say

1:18:08

that?

1:18:09

>> Um

1:18:11

I don't know. He He just He was He was

1:18:13

modest. He was whipsmart. He was wise.

1:18:17

He was also known as a um a great

1:18:22

investor, which isn't the most common

1:18:23

thing at a lot of investment banks. He

1:18:25

also was on their commitments committee

1:18:27

and kept him out of a lot of tougher

1:18:29

situations and yeah he was very warm and

1:18:32

he people would could go into his office

1:18:35

with with with problems and he handled

1:18:38

it handled it with grace and um whether

1:18:41

it's a personal problem or a work issue

1:18:43

or what have you and he just had this

1:18:45

soft way and he also had a great sense

1:18:47

of humor.

1:18:48

>> Lucky.

1:18:48

>> Yeah. I'm so lucky. So Alex, thanks so

1:18:51

much for your time.

1:18:52

>> Thanks so much.

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