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The Spanish Flu: Lessons

23:311,327 summary words · ~7 min readEnglishBy Then & NowTranscribed Jun 19, 2026
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Summary

The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic reveals that global health crises are not merely biological events, but deeply biopolitical, institutional, and spatial phenomena shaped by state ideology, wartime priorities, and historical amnesia.

By uncovering the hidden structures behind historical pandemic responses, we learn how institutional blind spots and class-based biases inevitably distort scientific policy, offering critical lessons on how systemic priorities threaten human survival during global crises.

Section summaries

0:00-2:00

The Mechanics of Transmission and the Petri Dish of Mobilization

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The video opens by describing the microscopic mechanics of viral replication and the sheer volume of viruses globally. It illustrates how easily pathogens spread through everyday conversation and saliva before shifting to the rapid, massive construction of military training camps across the United States for World War I. These camps acted as artificial petri dishes, concentrating diverse populations from both urban and rural backgrounds, the latter of whom lacked childhood immunity to common urban contagious diseases.

  • Viruses are highly evolved, dynamic entities that evade human immune systems through rapid shape-shifting.
  • Rapid wartime mobilization engineered unprecedented, high-density environments that compromised natural immunological barriers.

Provides the biological and environmental baseline for how human engineering and mobilization catalyzed the pandemic.

2:00-6:00

The Geopolitical Pivot and the Erasure of Memory

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This section outlines the staggering scale of the 1918 pandemic, which infected up to a billion people and killed up to 100 million, vastly overshadowing WWI combat deaths. It explains how the term 'Spanish Flu' arose due to Spain's lack of wartime press censorship rather than the virus's actual origin. Crucially, the flu dramatically altered the war's outcome by crippling the German spring offensive, yet despite this monumental impact, the pandemic was quickly forgotten and omitted from post-war literature, illustrating a collective historical amnesia.

  • The pandemic's name is an artifact of wartime press censorship and geopolitical neutrality rather than geographic origin.
  • Influenza acted as a decisive geopolitical force, halting the German advance on Paris and accelerating the Armistice.
  • Dominant historical narratives tend to treat public health catastrophes as minor footnotes to military conflicts, repressing collective trauma.

Explores the intersection of epidemiology, world history, and the sociology of collective memory.

6:00-10:00

The Lab Paradigm vs. Military Biopolitics

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This section investigates the dual institutional powers running the pandemic response: the military and the bacteriological laboratory. The military prioritized war maneuvers and state objectives over containment, while the scientific establishment, freshly dogmatized by the germ theory of disease, mistakenly focused all resources on a bacterium (Pfeiffer's Bacillus) instead of the actual, then-invisible influenza virus. This fixation on a secondary infection led to useless vaccines and massive wasted institutional effort, demonstrating how dogmatic paradigms can blind scientific progress.

  • Crisis response is fundamentally biopolitical, governed by hybrid agendas where military utility overrides public health.
  • Overreliance on dominant scientific paradigms (bacteriology) caused researchers to misidentify the pathogen, stalling effective vaccine development.
  • State and medical institutions are prone to systemic confirmation bias, scaling failures across entire populations.

Analyzes the institutional power structures, biopolitics, and scientific dogmas that caused the containment response to fail.

10:00-12:00

The Historiography of Institutional Silence

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The video addresses why the Spanish Flu lacks high visibility in popular history, arguing that history is curated by institutional victors who suppress the memory of their own failures. Because both military and scientific institutions failed catastrophically, they chose not to memorialize or write about this period, effectively silencing the dead and marginalized victims. The section stresses that a virus cannot be understood solely as a biological entity but must be analyzed within its historical and social environment.

  • Historical silence is an active coping mechanism used by failed institutions to preserve their authority.
  • The history of epidemics is deeply linked to social inequality, as the voices of the poor and marginalized victims are systematically left out of state memorials.

Explains the genealogy of historical gaps and how institutional power dictates what is remembered and what is forgotten.

12:00-16:00

Spatial Geographies and Material Transmission

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This part covers the material conditions that facilitated the virus's spread, contrasting the rapid, catastrophic explosion in cities like San Francisco with the slow, deliberate spread via ships to isolated Pacific islands. It introduces epidemiological concepts of hierarchical spread (through transport hubs and major cities) versus contagious spread (neighborhood and personal contact). The section critiques the failure of authorities to intervene at critical infrastructure nodes, like overcrowded railways, while simultaneously banning lower-risk public gatherings.

  • Epidemics propagate along the physical scaffolding of capital and empire, specifically transport networks and urban hubs.
  • Public health interventions are often structurally inconsistent, targeting low-risk social gatherings while leaving high-risk economic infrastructure unmitigated.

Offers key insights into systemic complexity and how physical networks govern biological phenomena.

16:00-19:00

Quarantine Fences and Ideological Biases

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This section contrasts the futility of hard physical quarantines (which viruses easily bypass) with the high efficacy of early social distancing measures, noting that cities utilizing early interventions recovered much faster economically. However, the enforcement of these public health measures was deeply compromised by classism, racism, and ideological biases. For instance, the British government restricted cinema hours not because of scientific evidence of transmission, but because of elitist, moralistic disdain for cinema as a 'lower evolutionary' amusement of the working class.

  • Hard physical boundaries are historically ineffective against pervasive microscopic threats, whereas local social mitigation is highly effective.
  • Early public health interventions preserve both human lives and long-term economic stability.
  • State emergency regulations are frequently co-opted by ruling-class ideologies to police working-class culture and enforce moral conformity.

Demonstrates how class struggle and state ideology contaminate scientific and public health policymaking.

19:00-23:00

Cultural Shocks, National Failures, and Conclusion

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The final section explores the profound cultural shifts triggered by the pandemic, such as communities in Africa turning away from colonial religions, or South African quarantine protocols accelerating the path toward apartheid. It reviews the British systemic failures cataloged by historian Niall Johnson, which included scientific hubris, imperialist arrogance, and a reluctance to implement state-level interventions. The video concludes by emphasizing that pandemics are fundamentally human, dynamic problems, and that we must memorialize historical failures as cautionary aphorisms to guide critiques of future institutional responses.

  • Epidemiological crises act as historical accelerants, consolidating oppressive political structures (like apartheid) or sparking anti-colonial cultural shifts.
  • National failures in pandemic containment are driven by a cocktail of cultural arrogance, overconfidence in clinical medicine over social prevention, and laissez-faire state hesitation.
  • We must preserve the memory of past policy failures as intellectual armor against the inevitable arrival of future pathogens.

Synthesizes the socio-political legacy of the flu and outlines the ultimate philosophical takeaways regarding systemic failure.

Key points

  • Disease as an Institutional Construct — Public health crises are fundamentally shaped by the institutions tasked with managing them. In 1918, the dominance of military logic over medical reason and the scientific establishment's rigid bacteriological paradigms led to catastrophic failures, such as misidentifying the virus as a bacterium and wasting resources on useless vaccines.
  • The Material and Spatial Geographies of Transmission — Viruses do not spread randomly but propagate along the physical scaffolding of human networks, such as troop movement pipelines, shipping routes, and railway systems. Epidemic containment requires understanding this structural blueprint to implement staggered, infrastructure-focused interventions.
  • Ideological Weaponization of Public Health — State emergency regulations are frequently co-opted by ruling-class ideologies to enforce social hierarchy, moral conformity, and racial division. During the 1918 pandemic, British authorities restricted cinemas based on class-biased moral panics, while quarantine measures in South Africa accelerated systemic segregation.
  • The Historiography of Institutional Amnesia — The Spanish Flu was largely written out of early 20th-century history and literature because the state and scientific establishments responsible for the response chose to bury the records of their absolute failures. Historical narratives are curated by the powerful to repress collective trauma and systemic incompetence.
A hybrid configuration of priorities guided hygienic interventions during the pandemic, in which not only medical reason but also unstable knowledge, military logic, and administrative practice were applied. Anne Rasmussen (quoted by narrator)
Well, we were just 100% wrong, and it's a chapter I wish I had never written. An anonymous scientist involved in the 1918 response (quoted by narrator)

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:03

a virus acid wrapped in protein a

0:07

hundredth of breath of a human hair

0:10

somewhere likely Kansas somehow through

0:15

the nose the mouth the cut latches onto

0:19

a healthy human cell and begins to

0:22

duplicate itself first between cells

0:27

then between surfaces then to another

0:30

person then another and another its

0:33

unseen exponential unpredictable scoop

0:40

up a bottle of seawater and you'll

0:42

collect more viruses than there are

0:44

people on the planet some are more

0:51

dangerous than others some are a help

0:53

they constantly evolve changing their

0:56

shape evading the immune system

0:59

spreading through people and affecting

1:02

themselves if by some magic the tiny

1:08

particles of saliva and mucus could be

1:10

made visible as a black smudge we

1:13

quickly would realize and how many other

1:15

ways we are apt to scatter bacteria and

1:18

viruses all around us yes even during an

1:21

ordinary conversation saliva and cos

1:24

particles escape our mouth and easily

1:27

reach others who inhale them as they

1:28

breathe

1:29

[Music]

1:41

next to the Nashua River and Lao County

1:44

in Massachusetts men from all over the

1:47

country lumber in ten weeks they build

1:50

1,400 huts 2,200 showers 60 miles of

1:55

heating pipes a bakery restaurants a

1:58

theater a post office the camp has his

2:02

30,000 men from every corner of the

2:05

United States 40 others are built across

2:08

the country any tables in northern

2:13

France similar camp is built for a

2:15

hundred thousand men the largest of its

2:18

type that's ever existed 1 million

2:21

people would pass through these camps

2:24

brought men together from different

2:26

communities rural and urban in denser

2:31

urban areas the likelihood of catching

2:33

contagious diseases is higher in

2:35

childhood thus giving immunity in rural

2:39

areas this is less likely to be the case

2:41

in camp Devens Massachusetts tables in

2:46

France and hundreds of other camps like

2:48

them viruses jumped around in a great

2:51

petri dish of an experiment first came

2:58

the measles one dots reported that not a

3:02

troop train came into camp wheeler in

3:05

the fall of 1917 without bringing 1 to 6

3:08

cases of measles already in the eruptive

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stage they quickly passed between those

3:14

with no immunity then came the flu

3:19

in 1918 the global population was 1.7

3:23

billion within a year up to a billion

3:27

would be infected

3:28

ten million had died in World War one up

3:32

to a hundred million would die from the

3:35

flu that's as many as 1 in 17 people

3:39

across the globe

3:40

the term Spanish flu was quickly adopted

3:43

because Spain being neutral in the war

3:45

and having less restrictions on the

3:47

press was the first to report the

3:49

disease The Times in Britain blindly and

3:53

erroneously reported that the dry windy

3:56

Spanish spring is an unpleasant and

3:58

unhealthy season at all times

4:01

a spell of wet weather or of moist winds

4:03

would probably check the progress of the

4:06

epidemic some argue that the pandemic

4:08

even changed the outcome of the war 80%

4:12

of all American war casualties were

4:15

caused by influenza when Russia withdrew

4:18

from the war Germany redirected a

4:20

million man to the Western Front giving

4:22

the Germans superiority they gained a

4:25

thousand square miles of French

4:27

territory and quickly reached the Marne

4:28

River just 30 miles from Paris a million

4:32

people fled the capital but then the flu

4:35

struck devastated the German army and

4:38

halted its advance the Allies

4:41

reorganized and pushed the Germans back

4:43

leading to the Armistice and the end of

4:46

the war despite the devastation that it

4:49

caused and the influence it had the

4:52

Spanish flu was considered an addendum

4:55

to World War one and was largely

4:57

forgotten little was written of the

4:59

pandemic in the novels of the era

5:01

ironically one of the greatest poets of

5:04

war remembrance John McCrae died not

5:07

from a bullet but from the virus he

5:11

wrote in Flanders Fields the poppies

5:13

blow between the crosses row on row that

5:16

mark our place and in the sky the larks

5:19

still bravely singing fly scarce heard

5:22

amid the guns below the pandemic and

5:25

like the war would not be commemorated

5:30

for Barbara looked for her the carefree

5:33

hours of happy play nor the busy hours

5:39

of work and study

5:45

what had happened to her that she lies

5:47

there so hot and feverish so weak and

5:49

busy not miserable with suffering and

5:52

pain like who historic memories

5:57

the cerebral impression of a virus can

6:00

be erased from neurons or lay dormant

6:03

the signifiers towards pathogens the

6:06

records of which lay idle in dust books

6:09

or in half forgotten subconscious

6:12

remembrances occasionally they're called

6:16

upon to answer questions about the past

6:18

to give assurances or warnings to the

6:22

present what happened why what have we

6:27

learnt the story of the Spanish flu has

6:33

been told instead I want to ask not what

6:37

happened not to reconstruct it

6:39

temporally automatically but instead ask

6:42

what its memory might teach us what can

6:46

we draw out and learn that might help us

6:48

today epidemics always call upon

6:51

memories of the past but always in new

6:54

ways always illuminated and shaped by

6:57

the problems of the present the virus

7:00

strikes have risky is it not too

7:04

dangerous look at historic false alarms

7:07

dangerous taken for granted ignored and

7:10

VOC the Spanish flu the historian

7:14

Patrick Silberman writes that historical

7:17

comparisons as in 1918 appear more as a

7:21

kind of seductive or intimidating trick

7:23

than as a way of hunting down a useful

7:26

analogy so historic comparisons are

7:29

often presented as choices a palette of

7:32

analogies to guide us memories drool now

7:35

it's called upon first the memories are

7:39

placed on trial

7:40

we are the jury where have you been why

7:44

have you not been here to warn us they

7:47

try and reply which ones of us whose

7:50

memories

7:53

there were two groups primarily

7:55

responsible for the response to the

7:57

Spanish flu the military and

8:00

bacteriologists the military denied the

8:03

links between war maneuvers and the

8:05

spread of disease in many countries war

8:08

departments were almost solely

8:10

responsible for dealing with influenza

8:12

so much so that in France for example

8:15

80% of the country's 22,000 doctors were

8:19

serving in the war historian and

8:22

Rasmussen writes that a hybrid

8:25

configuration of priorities guided

8:27

hygienic interventions during the

8:29

pandemic in which not only medical

8:32

reason but also unstaple knowledge

8:35

military logic and administrative

8:37

practice were applied responses were

8:40

guided by the need for military logic

8:42

winning the war was more important than

8:45

the flu but medical reason guided

8:48

choices - in medicine the laboratory had

8:52

recently become dominant this invading

9:00

army is so tiny that can be seen only

9:03

through a microscope

9:06

it soldiers are the germs of

9:08

communicable disease some of these

9:11

disease-causing organisms are so small

9:14

that they cannot be seen even with the

9:16

most powerful microscope they are

9:18

detected only because they can pass

9:20

through the tiny holes of this filter

9:23

after the discovery of bacteria through

9:26

the microscope and the confirmation of

9:29

the germ theory of disease the lab

9:31

across the West was where advances were

9:34

expected to be made scientists working

9:37

on influenza thought they'd found it

9:39

schools a bacteria called Pfeiffer's B

9:42

Kilis discovered at the end of the 19th

9:44

century what they didn't know was that

9:47

the bacteria was a secondary infection

9:49

the flu is caused by a virus

9:52

this wouldn't be confirmed until later

9:55

in the 1930s and the vaccines being

9:58

worked on at the time would be useless

10:01

in France in 1918 the Undersecretary of

10:05

State ordered all Health Service

10:07

directors in regions of France to make

10:09

bacteriological examinations as complete

10:12

as possible for all influenza cases by

10:16

war by experimentation in the wrong

10:18

directions time was wasted on a mass

10:22

scale and the waste was institutional

10:26

disease is shaped by us by our responses

10:30

to it disease then is institutional

10:34

lesson one who is guiding the response

10:37

what might their own institutional goals

10:40

be where are their blind spots how do

10:43

these institutions interact with each

10:45

other historian Ilan allowi suggests

10:48

that the Spanish flu some visibility in

10:50

history may be the result of the

10:52

difficulty in constructing a narrative

10:54

right of the failure to respond to it if

10:57

history is written by the victors or

11:00

rather accounting of historic moments in

11:03

visible history may be more important

11:05

than what is popularly or frequently

11:07

written about the poor the marginalized

11:09

the dead rarely have their voices

11:13

memorialized whether the military or the

11:17

bacteriologists how likely is it that

11:19

those

11:20

that failed recorded and discussed the

11:23

ways in which they failed one of the

11:25

scientists involved later recounted that

11:28

well we were just 100% wrong and it's a

11:32

chapter I wish I had never written

11:35

viruses tried to kill history silence

11:38

its victims shame those who fail into

11:41

not responding viruses aren't just a

11:44

scientific or a biological problem then

11:47

there are historical one as historian

11:50

Niall Johnson writes influenza or any

11:53

other virus cannot be studied in a

11:55

vacuum they must be considered in their

11:57

normal environment as it's the

11:59

environment that provides the

12:01

evolutionary pressure and stimulus that

12:03

drives evolution the stimulus that

12:06

provides the need for change and the

12:07

need for a survival advantage

12:09

George Hutchinson writes in 1965 that

12:13

evolutionary play must be studied in the

12:17

theater this is also the doctor and the

12:47

sanitary inspector leave at 6:00 in the

12:49

morning to examine the ships that have

12:51

arrived during the night the quarantine

12:54

stations are under the United States

12:55

Public Health Service in Washington and

12:57

the procedure is the same in all ports

13:00

officers know in advance which ships are

13:02

due to arrive before the inspection they

13:04

study the health record to be ships and

13:07

also health conditions and the porch the

13:09

ship's have visited since their last

13:10

American inspection these institutions

13:14

responded to the material conditions

13:16

through which the virus spread had

13:18

spread both quickly and slowly on

13:22

September the 23rd 1918 the first case

13:26

was reported in San Francisco one month

13:29

later 75% of the nurses were sick and

13:33

all of the hospital that's full a

13:35

British nurse later accounted that it

13:38

happened so suddenly in the morning we

13:40

received an order to open up a new unit

13:43

for flu and by night we'd moved into a

13:45

converted convent almost before the

13:47

desks arrived the stretchers were in

13:50

6080 to a classroom we could hardly

13:53

squeezed between the cots and oh they

13:55

were so sick the SS Tulum though was

13:59

later described as a death ship that

14:01

slowly delivered the pandemic to islands

14:04

in the South Pacific one by one

14:08

transports mostly ships and trains

14:10

delivered the flu both geographically

14:13

and hierarchically epidemiologist

14:16

suggests that viruses usually spread in

14:18

two ways hierarchically as the disease

14:22

spreads across a country in different

14:24

stages and contagiously as it spreads to

14:27

the right neighborhoods personally

14:29

between people you can hierarchies types

14:33

of spread urban areas will be quicker

14:37

because of density ports airports train

14:40

stations etc are also at the top of the

14:42

hierarchy in Britain a doctor wrote that

14:46

the spread of disease along the lines of

14:48

railway from London to scythe and Epping

14:51

Waltham Colchester and Cambridge to

14:53

overcrowding in railway carriages and

14:56

while this continues it's useless to ask

14:58

people not to attend churches cinemas

15:01

and meetings where they do not get half

15:03

so much crowded together as on the

15:05

railway The Times reported in Britain

15:07

that the ports were first involved next

15:10

the disease reached London to which no

15:13

diet was brought

15:14

by travelers in the three trains from

15:16

London radiated again visiting

15:18

Birmingham Nottingham and other centers

15:20

it's still raging full fury in the

15:24

smaller country districts which have now

15:26

become involved this suggests staggered

15:29

interventions based on predictable

15:31

patterns we know where it were at first

15:34

we know who it will hit first so lesson

15:38

two viruses interact with the material

15:41

world environmentally not just with

15:44

people

15:44

what can the distribution of transport

15:47

hubs global cities and different stages

15:50

of diffusion tell us about how a virus

15:53

will predictably spread can this help us

15:56

predict the future in pandemics we

16:00

resort to fences psychological and

16:03

physical quarantine is often being a

16:06

first resort at the Naval Base in San

16:08

Francisco they quarantine all 4,000 men

16:11

for nine weeks quote forbidding all

16:14

Liberty sterilizing drinking fountains

16:16

hourly with blow torches compelling new

16:19

trainees to exist 20 feet apart from one

16:21

another one village in New Zealand kept

16:24

people and the virus at bay with

16:26

vigilantes armed with shotguns

16:29

ultimately though quarantine was seen as

16:32

a poor strategy cordoning off entire

16:35

villages cities and countries might

16:37

slightly delay an outbreak but is

16:39

ineffective against viruses that number

16:42

in the billions somehow they'll creep in

16:46

one man remembered in 1988 that father

16:49

was selected as the health officer we

16:51

had never had a health officer in our

16:53

time before but we felt now that we

16:55

needed one so dad went high to the city

16:58

limit sign I went with him and we put a

17:00

sign that said this town is quarantined

17:03

do not stop so it purposely isolated

17:07

ourselves but it wasn't enough the

17:09

disease came anyway the mailman brought

17:12

it but while quarantine to keep the

17:15

virus out might be ineffective socially

17:18

distancing was not only effective but

17:20

one study found that those areas that

17:22

intervened earlier recovered faster

17:25

economically after

17:26

this is consistent with studies on

17:29

epidemics that show that early public

17:31

health interventions reduce overall

17:33

mortality rates local governments and

17:36

cities notably not at a federal or

17:39

national level banned mass gatherings

17:42

closed schools theaters and churches and

17:45

studies show that where this was done

17:46

lives were saved cities that enforced

17:50

social distancing policies sooner saw

17:52

their economies proving better after the

17:55

pandemic was over lesson three keeping

17:59

influenza out is difficult and costly

18:03

slowing it spread is more effective but

18:07

enforcing public health measures came

18:09

with risks to racism other ring and

18:13

blame of course were widespread

18:15

minorities the poor that marginalised

18:18

were hardest hit and often

18:20

disproportionately affected in sometimes

18:22

surprising ways in Britain the

18:25

government mostly left planning and

18:27

restrictions to local authorities there

18:30

was though one exception cinemas where

18:33

government restricted the length of

18:35

showings and imposed regulations for

18:37

ventilation

18:38

but this rather than being based on

18:40

science was a product of class bias over

18:43

the immorality of cinemas one

18:47

commentator at the time wrote that the

18:49

cinema was the greatest enemy of the

18:51

epoch too intellectual culture it being

18:54

a reflection of lower stages of

18:56

evolution the shiftiness of the monkey

18:58

the film star and the imbecile one local

19:01

council inexplicably declared that

19:04

although we're alive to the possibility

19:06

that the certain amount of infection is

19:08

spread through theatres music calls

19:10

churches and chapels we consider that a

19:12

great deal more of the risk of infection

19:15

is to be ascribed to the cinema so

19:18

ideology skewed official responses but

19:21

ideas and cultures were changed too as a

19:25

result of the pandemic across Africa for

19:28

example many saw the pandemic as being

19:30

God's punishment for turning to the

19:32

false religion of the white man many

19:34

communities turned back to their

19:36

traditional religions and some have

19:38

argued that this speeded up the colon

19:40

zatia later in south africa though the

19:43

case has been made that the restrictions

19:45

put in place sped up the path towards

19:47

apartheid lesson for cultural and

19:52

ideological beliefs both direct our

19:54

response often poorly and are changed by

19:57

pandemics today's children will grow up

20:04

in a world increasingly free of

20:06

infectious disease someday we may

20:09

completely be free of it

20:10

but that's not likely in your lifetime

20:12

or it there's ultimately though there is

20:21

a theme that runs through memories of

20:24

the Spanish flu failure the historian

20:27

Niall Johnson sums up Britain's failure

20:30

like this the perception of disease the

20:33

fact that it was only influenza the

20:35

relatively mild nature of the first wave

20:38

in the spring of nineteen imperialist or

20:41

racist views and the superiority of the

20:43

English the confidence in scientific

20:45

medicine to find a vaccine the quest for

20:48

professional status of the profession

20:50

the power of scientific medicine

20:52

prevailing over preventive and the

20:55

rejection of state intervention many of

20:58

these contributed to a delay in the

21:00

reaction and recognition of the

21:02

existence of a problem particularly when

21:04

the second wave arrived in the autumn of

21:06

1918 a lack of planning hesitancy a

21:10

hubris repressed memory and cultural

21:14

arrogance

21:18

[Music]

21:29

[Music]

21:31

so how might we summarize our lessons I

21:36

might be learned from viruses of the

21:39

past it is difficult to summarize these

21:43

lessons without being trite the central

21:46

one is that pandemics are a human

21:48

problem and humans change over time

21:51

there are no singular lesson is rather

21:54

aphorisms from past experiences of

21:57

pandemic should not be buried in the

21:59

historical record but memorialized

22:01

commemorates it ready to be accessed a

22:04

warning from the past a guide for

22:07

effective critique when the next virus

22:11

inevitably comes protect yourself

22:14

against infection keep pencils and other

22:18

things out of your mouth never take

22:22

bites of other people's food do not use

22:26

somebody else's drinking straw or glass

22:33

if you like these videos I need your

22:35

help and here's my request if you think

22:37

you get the same value from four of

22:39

these videos as you do from just one cup

22:41

of coffee then please consider pledging

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just $1 per video that's three to four

22:45

dollars per month to keep this channel

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going

22:48

you can even limit your pledge to one

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dollar a month and if you pledge $5 out

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add your name to the credits to those

22:53

that already support them and I thank

22:55

you so much this channel just wouldn't

22:57

exist without you you can also hit like

22:59

share follow me on Twitter and Facebook

23:00

etc all of these things really

23:02

contribute to helping Ben and I grow

23:04

thanks for watching and see you next

23:06

week

23:09

[Music]

23:15

[Music]

23:25

[Music]

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