0:00
The situation around Crimea right now is
0:02
absolutely mind-blowing. And in my
0:04
opinion, Crimea is quickly becoming once
0:06
again one of the most interesting
0:08
theaters of the entire war in Ukraine.
0:11
About a year ago, I started making
0:13
videos about Crimea, talking about how
0:15
Ukraine was systematically putting the
0:17
peninsula under siege and that in fact
0:20
Ukraine was executing a strategy that
0:22
would eventually, not immediately, but
0:24
eventually over time allow Ukraine to
0:28
potentially take Crimea back from
0:29
Russia. At the time I posted that, the
0:32
Russians absolutely mocked me. They
0:35
actually made several response videos to
0:37
my video, which is pretty rare even for
0:39
me. And they told me that the things I
0:41
was saying were impossible and that they
0:43
would never actually happen. So you can
0:46
imagine my satisfaction when over the
0:48
past couple of months, the things I
0:50
talked about a year ago are not only
0:52
starting to happen, but many of them
0:55
have actually already been completed.
0:58
And today we reached a big milestone
1:01
where in many ways Crimea has been
1:04
totally cut off. But this didn't just
1:06
start today. What I want to talk about
1:08
today is a systematic campaign that
1:11
Ukraine has been executing against
1:12
Crimea for the past several months. A
1:16
ramp up of the action that I was already
1:18
talking about over a year ago. And this
1:20
systematic action involves a couple of
1:22
different things. First, it involves the
1:25
air defense systems around Crimea. And
1:27
second, it involves the supply routes
1:30
going into Crimea. And thirdly, it
1:33
involves the actual storage facilities
1:36
in Crimea that allowed them in the past
1:40
to sustain disruptions in their supply
1:42
routes. Right now, Crimea has reached a
1:45
point where all of these different
1:47
systems are offline all at the same
1:49
time, and it is putting the peninsula in
1:51
the weakest position it has been in, in
1:53
my opinion, for this entire war. Now, if
1:58
you follow the channel regularly, you
1:59
can obviously see that I touch on a lot
2:01
of hot button issues. And naturally,
2:03
people are constantly disagreeing with
2:05
me. Because of that, I find it
2:08
incredibly important to base my analysis
2:10
on a factual foundation, not just for my
2:12
own integrity, but also for my own
2:15
sanity. I have a tool that I use that
2:17
helps me prepare for this, and that tool
2:19
is ground News, a longtime sponsor of
2:22
this channel. What Ground News does is
2:24
they bring together articles from across
2:26
the political spectrum for any given
2:28
topic all in one place. But they do a
2:30
whole lot more than that, too. For each
2:32
given article or source of an article,
2:34
they identify whether that source has a
2:36
political bias, how factual they're
2:38
known to be, and also who funds the
2:40
source, which can sometimes tell you the
2:42
reason for a potential bias. One thing I
2:44
really like in ground news is the bias
2:46
summary at the top of every subject,
2:48
which basically reads the articles for
2:49
you and identifies the competing
2:51
narratives, if there are any, before you
2:53
even dive in. This is super helpful
2:55
because it actually reads a lot more
2:57
articles than you can and identifies
2:59
things that you might miss on your own.
3:00
Before I record a video, I always try to
3:02
cross reference on ground news to make
3:04
sure I'm being fair to every side, even
3:07
if I disagree with them. And I
3:08
personally think the world would be a
3:10
much better place if more people took
3:12
that approach. If you want to check out
3:14
Ground News for yourself, because
3:15
they're a sponsor of the channel, you
3:17
can actually get a 40% discount on their
3:19
Vantage plan by subscribing using my
3:21
link or the QR code on screen. And that
3:23
Vantage plan is the same plan that I use
3:25
to get access to all of their best
3:27
features. So, go check it out. And now,
3:29
back to the video. So, to fully
3:31
appreciate the significance of what's
3:33
happening in Crimea right now, it helps
3:35
to just briefly recap Crimea's
3:37
geography. Crimea, of course, is a
3:40
peninsula jutting off the southern
3:41
portion of Ukraine. But I have long said
3:44
that for all intents and purposes,
3:46
Crimea may as well be an island. Because
3:48
as far as road and rail connections to
3:50
the outside world, there are only a
3:53
couple of road and rail connections in
3:54
the north across an incredibly narrow
3:58
land connection or a road and rail
4:01
connection in the east. And that is it.
4:03
That is all that Crimea has, at least as
4:05
far as land connections to connect it to
4:08
the outside world and to allow resources
4:10
to come in or to allow people to go out.
4:14
For a long time, people have looked at
4:16
this dynamic and they have said it would
4:18
be impossible for Ukraine to ever take
4:20
Crimea back from Russia, particularly
4:23
under combat circumstances because the
4:25
nature of the geography means that to do
4:27
that, Ukraine would have to send troops
4:29
across a very narrow choke point where
4:32
they would be eliminated very easily or
4:34
they would have to conduct an amphibious
4:36
landing which would also be very, very
4:39
difficult. Both of these are high
4:41
casualty events. casualty events that
4:43
Ukraine just frankly probably could not
4:45
sustain. And so again, people have said
4:48
Ukraine will never take Crimea back from
4:50
Russia. But these same people typically
4:53
missed the fact that this geographic
4:55
reality can work in both directions. And
4:59
these narrow choke points that can
5:01
prevent supplies or people from coming
5:03
in, those don't only prevent Ukrainian
5:06
soldiers from coming in if the Russian
5:07
military is opposing them, but they also
5:10
prevent Russian supplies from coming in
5:13
if the Ukrainian military is opposing
5:16
those supplies. That's the dynamic we're
5:18
looking at today, where Ukraine is
5:20
taking advantage of Crimea's geography
5:23
to very effectively put the entire
5:26
peninsula under siege by attacking the
5:30
limited roads that go into the
5:31
peninsula. And today, very recently,
5:35
they have just effectively cut off the
5:38
last of those supply routes. Now, have
5:41
they been completely cut off? No, that's
5:43
not what I'm claiming. But they have
5:45
been pressured to the point that Russia
5:48
can no longer confidently and
5:50
consistently get supplies onto the
5:53
Crimean Peninsula. Which means that if
5:55
Ukraine chose to, they could maintain
5:58
this pressure to the extent that the
5:59
military presence on Crimea is going to
6:02
begin decreasing over time. This is a
6:06
huge pivot point and we've been talking
6:08
about it for quite a while. We're now
6:11
potentially here. So, what's changed
6:13
recently, especially over just the past
6:15
couple of weeks, is that Ukraine has
6:17
really been ramping up their mid-range
6:19
drone strikes against Russia, where they
6:21
are attaching Starlink terminals to
6:23
relatively inexpensive drones, flying
6:26
them past the electronic warfare wall
6:28
that exists around the front lines, and
6:30
communicating with Starlink to allow
6:32
them to hit Russia's rear, hitting
6:34
targets within a range of approximately
6:36
100 to 300 km away from the front line.
6:40
something that they've always had tools
6:42
where they could do it, but they haven't
6:44
had the inexpensive tools like
6:46
inexpensive drones to be able to do it
6:48
at scale on a regular and a consistent
6:51
basis. And this change is massive just
6:54
in general. What it means is that
6:56
essentially all of Russian occupied
6:58
Ukraine is now a target and Russian
7:02
soldiers who traditionally felt like
7:04
they were safe in rear areas are now
7:07
essentially all on the front lines. But
7:10
even more specifically, it gives Ukraine
7:12
access to cut off Russian logistics like
7:15
they never have before. And one thing
7:18
we're seeing on a very regular basis on
7:20
a daily basis now is Ukraine striking
7:23
trucks and trains in Russian occupied
7:25
Ukraine preventing supplies from getting
7:28
just about anywhere. And one area of
7:32
particular focus here is Crimea. Because
7:35
what this newfound capability means,
7:37
what this newfound range means is that
7:40
Ukraine now has the capability to
7:42
completely cut off the last leg of the
7:45
transportation stool that allowed Russia
7:48
to consistently get supplies to Crimea.
7:51
Because now every truck and every train
7:54
going into Crimea can be destroyed not
7:57
by an expensive missile, but rather by a
8:00
relatively inexpensive Ukrainian drone.
8:04
And this gives Ukraine the opportunity
8:06
to dramatically change the dynamic on
8:09
Crimea at a time of their choosing. And
8:12
it seems like they have been preparing
8:14
to do exactly that. To really express
8:17
the magnitude of the current situation,
8:19
we have already seen Ukraine conducting
8:21
similar strikes on the supply routes
8:23
feeding Russia's front lines. They've
8:25
been doing that for well over a year
8:27
now, and the result of that has been
8:30
obvious. Ukraine has been so effective
8:32
that they have effectively stalled
8:34
Russia's advances because Russia just
8:37
cannot get large enough groups of men or
8:40
equipment or material or explosives or
8:42
weapons, anything to the front line to
8:45
actually coordinate assaults. That is
8:48
how effective Ukraine has been across
8:51
basically the entire front line. And now
8:55
what we're seeing is Ukraine can create
8:57
that same dynamic for the entire
9:00
peninsula of Crimea. And if that sounds
9:02
like a long shot, it would actually be
9:05
easier for Ukraine to take the leap and
9:07
do that than it has been for Ukraine to
9:10
stop supplies from reaching the entire
9:11
Russian front because the entire Russian
9:14
front is a huge amount of different
9:16
supply routes. Crimea again is just a
9:19
couple of roads. The main thing that has
9:22
stopped this from happening has been
9:23
again that electronic warfare wall and
9:26
the fact that Ukrainian fiber optic
9:28
drones that can get past that warfare
9:29
wall that sorry that electronic warfare
9:32
wall only have a limited range. Now that
9:35
Ukraine has overcome that hurdle, they
9:37
can do exactly what they've been doing
9:39
for years and have proven that they can
9:41
do for years to the entire peninsula of
9:45
Crimea by putting that same pressure on
9:48
just the couple of roads that go through
9:51
Crimea's northern entrance. This is a
9:55
big deal. It means that Ukraine can
9:57
effectively cut off Crimea from supplies
10:00
at a moment of their choosing. And I
10:02
have seen a lot of signals that make me
10:05
believe Ukraine may be planning to do
10:08
just that because this current
10:10
development does not exist in a vacuum.
10:12
It's actually just the latest in a
10:14
series of things that have been
10:15
happening on Crimea. The first has been
10:19
again Ukraine has been ramping up their
10:21
strikes on Crimea's air defenses.
10:23
They've taken out something like over a
10:25
100red different air defense systems on
10:27
Crimea since the start of 2026. And
10:31
that's been huge. Ukraine does this from
10:32
time to time. They clear out Russian air
10:34
defense systems. Russia replaces them.
10:37
Ukraine goes and just destroys them
10:39
again. But Russia feels like they have
10:41
to protect Crimea. So they replace the
10:42
air defense systems. This lets Ukraine
10:45
grind down Russia over time. Because
10:48
Russia is clearly terrified as Ukraine
10:50
destroys the Crimean air defense systems
10:52
that they're creating gaps that they
10:54
could actually exploit to make life hard
10:57
for the soldiers or the civilians living
10:59
there. And that would of course be a
11:01
crisis for Russia. Lately, however, the
11:04
situation on Crimea has been a lot more
11:06
than just the regular Ukrainian strikes
11:08
on Russian air defense systems because
11:11
Ukraine has been pursuing some targets
11:13
that they have never fully pursued
11:15
before. Certainly not all at the same
11:18
time. And this happened around the
11:20
beginning of April, setting the stage
11:22
for what we're seeing today, where at
11:24
the beginning of April, Ukraine struck
11:26
the largest oil terminal in Crimea,
11:30
destroying, I believe it was 23 out of
11:33
29 of the storage tanks at the facility.
11:37
This was a big deal because this
11:39
terminal and these storage tanks were
11:42
what made Crimea somewhat durable
11:44
against a siege. They allowed Crimea to
11:47
buy some time, if the transport routes
11:49
were cut off, to still supply oil to the
11:52
rest of the peninsula. That was a big
11:55
deal. It meant Russia could sustain and
11:57
it meant that they did not have to
11:59
continue supply routes when the pressure
12:02
was immense. But Russia no longer has
12:05
that luxury. Crimea is now in a state
12:07
where if Ukraine does put sustained
12:10
pressure on the supply routes, they're
12:11
going to run out of oil. really really
12:16
fast. So it does seem like some
12:18
intentional planning for UK from
12:19
Ukraine's part especially when you look
12:21
at the other thing that Ukraine recently
12:23
did which was again at the beginning of
12:25
April to strike the final ferry that is
12:30
servicing Crimea from mainland Russia.
12:33
So I have to explain this ferry
12:35
situation a little bit. On the eastern
12:37
side of Crimea there is a bridge the
12:39
Kurt Straight Bridge. the only bridge
12:41
that connects Crimea to mainland Russia
12:45
and a major supply artery for the entire
12:48
peninsula. Early in the war, Ukraine
12:51
actually struck this bridge. And they
12:53
struck it so badly that it compromised
12:56
the structural integrity of the bridge
12:58
to the point that Russia did not feel
13:00
safe sending military equipment across
13:02
the bridge, especially heavy military
13:04
equipment like air defense systems,
13:07
tanks, armored vehicles. They'll still
13:09
send civilians across but not military
13:12
equipment. In order to continue
13:15
supplying the Crimean Peninsula, Russia
13:17
then started relying on their fairies.
13:20
And they had a had a fleet of three
13:22
fairies. And very early on, Ukraine
13:26
struck all three of those fairies as
13:28
well. One of them was completely
13:29
destroyed. Two of them were disabled.
13:33
Russia has been working to repair these
13:36
fairies since 2024. And they recently
13:39
came back in commission in March, April
13:44
And as soon as they came back in
13:45
commission, Ukraine struck the fairies
13:48
again. They hit one of them in March and
13:50
they hit one of them again at the
13:52
beginning of April, the final one. And
13:55
it really looked like Ukraine was just
13:57
waiting for Russia to finish repairing
13:59
the fairies and then to take them
14:01
offline. So that, you know, it took them
14:03
two years to repair them the last time.
14:06
It'll probably take them even longer now
14:08
because attrition on Russia, skilled
14:10
workers, materials, that's all gotten so
14:12
much worse. So, Ukraine has effectively
14:15
bought themselves some time where Russia
14:18
can no longer use the fairies to supply
14:20
Crimea at the same time where they're
14:22
now putting pressure on the northern
14:25
supply route that comes into Crimea,
14:27
which is now putting Russia in a
14:28
situation where they are forced to rely
14:31
on the Kurt Straight Bridge again. the
14:34
bridge that they already decided earlier
14:36
on was not a safe bridge for them to
14:39
send military equipment across. And in
14:42
all of this context, we see that Ukraine
14:45
also did something else around the Kurt
14:47
Straight Bridge, which was at the end of
14:49
April, they targeted some ships that
14:52
were responsible for protecting the Kurt
14:54
Strait Bridge from sabotage attacks. So
14:58
it really looks like in the eastern
15:00
portion of Crimea, Ukraine is setting
15:03
the stage to stop all supplies into
15:06
Crimea from that route. What we're
15:09
seeing then right now is a setup of
15:11
conditions that could allow for a full
15:12
siege of Crimea for the very first time.
15:15
And this is something that could allow
15:16
Ukraine to take Crimea back without all
15:18
of the massive casualties that everybody
15:20
was predicting just a year ago. Just
15:24
think about it critically for a couple
15:25
of seconds. Ukraine has already
15:27
demonstrated that they can hit Russian
15:29
military equipment on Crimea. They have
15:31
taken out the air defense systems there.
15:33
I don't even know how many times. It's
15:35
been over and over and over again.
15:37
They've also taken out the Russian
15:38
military headquarters buildings there.
15:41
They've taken out factories that are
15:42
located there. They've taken out oil
15:44
facilities that are located there.
15:46
They've taken out military aircraft
15:48
located on Crimea. And they've also
15:49
taken out the Russian Navy stationed
15:52
around Crimea and forced them to flee to
15:54
other bases. Ukraine can definitely put
15:57
sustained pressure on Crimea. The only
16:00
thing preventing that from accumulating
16:03
is Russian supplies continuing to come
16:05
in to replenish those losses. So if
16:09
Crimea is fully cut off, Ukraine could
16:12
definitely wear down the peninsula over
16:14
time. And then when we combine this
16:16
logic with the new developments that
16:18
Ukraine has made over the past year when
16:20
it comes to ground robotics, things get
16:23
really interesting because Ukraine has
16:26
demonstrated now that they can use
16:28
robots, not humans, to capture Russian
16:32
infantry positions without any human
16:36
casualties. So this also changes the
16:39
nature of a potential invasion of
16:41
Crimea. Over time, what Ukraine has to
16:44
do is just grind down the defenses. Once
16:46
those defenses are sufficiently ground
16:48
down, use pressure from traditional
16:50
drone teams, traditional ground robotics
16:53
to ultimately take those positions back.
16:56
It doesn't have to happen overnight.
16:58
That's the nature of a siege. It just
17:00
has to have consistent pressure,
17:02
consistent progress until the victory is
17:05
attained. And they could definitely do
17:08
it. So, the question I'm definitely
17:10
going to get is if this is possible, why
17:13
didn't Ukraine do this years ago? And I
17:15
think that goes to something that I've
17:17
already said in this video, which is the
17:19
fact that Russia kept replenishing their
17:22
losses. And for Ukraine, that was not
17:25
necessarily a bad thing at all. For
17:28
Ukraine, Crimea has been this easy, soft
17:31
target where they can hit stuff with
17:33
abandon and destroy very high value
17:36
Russian military targets. Russian
17:38
military targets that typically for most
17:40
of the war have been out of reach on
17:42
Russian territory itself, especially
17:44
considering the fact that Ukraine didn't
17:47
have western weapons that they could use
17:49
to strike Russian territory proper. They
17:51
didn't have the permission to do that
17:53
for most of the war. Now Ukraine has
17:55
their own homegrown weapons and they can
17:57
do it. But the point is Crimea has been
18:00
a great source of attrition. Not just
18:03
wearing down the resources on Crimea
18:06
itself, but also wearing down the
18:08
resources for Russia as a whole because
18:10
every air defense system that has to
18:12
replace a broken one on Crimea is one
18:14
that you can't station around Moscow or
18:16
around a factory in Siberia. You get the
18:20
picture. It seems though that there is a
18:23
potential shift in Ukrainian logic now.
18:25
It seems that they have potentially
18:27
decided they have done enough attrition
18:29
to the Russian military and they can
18:32
start now setting up the next phase of
18:34
the strategy which isn't just grinding
18:36
down the Russian equipment, but it's
18:38
actually making some steps to start
18:41
pushing forward. The war has definitely
18:46
reached a new stage. Now, we've covered
18:47
a lot in today's video, but inevitably
18:49
there will be some questions that you
18:50
guys, my audience, have about things
18:53
that just did not make it into the
18:54
outline. while I was filming. So, to add
18:57
some additional depth to these videos,
18:58
I've decided to start doing a weekly
19:00
insider Q&A where I will respond to the
19:03
top questions from you guys, my
19:05
audience, on the topics from the videos
19:07
I posted that week. So, definitely leave
19:10
a comment below with your question if
19:12
there's something you want me to dive
19:13
deeper on. And to get access to that
19:15
Q&A, just click the join button below
19:18
this video next to my picture on screen.
19:21
I will look to post that Q&A on Friday.
19:24
And I look forward to these sessions
19:25
where we can go a little bit deeper
19:28
together. Thanks so much for watching
