Full Transcript

·YouTLDR

Why Did Hitler Arm China Against Japan?

44:075,807 words · ~29 min readEnglishTranscribed May 5, 2026
AI Summary

Adolf Hitler abandoned a deeply integrated and mutually beneficial military-industrial partnership with China in 1938 to pursue a strategic alliance with Japan. This pivot proved to be a major blunder, as Japan failed to engage the Soviet Union while China continued to pin down millions of Japanese troops using German-inspired doctrine.

The video illustrates how ideological shifts and internal power struggles can override rational geopolitical strategy, leading to the collapse of vital supply chains and the creation of avoidable multifront wars.

Section summaries

0:00-1:07

Introduction

watch

Lays out the central thesis: Hitler's choice of Japan over China was a massive strategic trade-off.

1:07-7:49

The Economics of Tungsten

watch

Essential for understanding the resource-based engineering needs of the German war machine.

7:49-15:38

The German Advisers

optional

Provides biographical detail on the generals; interesting but less critical than the tactical/political sections.

15:38-27:55

The Battle of Shanghai

watch

Shows the practical application of German tactics in the field and the destruction of the elite divisions.

27:55-36:51

The Political Betrayal

watch

Explains the internal Nazi power struggle (Ribbentrop vs. Neurath) that changed world history.

36:51-43:33

Strategic Aftermath & Conclusion

watch

Analyzes the failure of the Japan alliance and the long-term survival of German doctrine in China.

Key points

  • The HAPRO Barter System — Germany and China established HAPRO, a private-front company, to exchange German military hardware and training for Chinese tungsten (wolfram). Tungsten was critical for German rearmament as it is essential for armor-piercing shells and precision machine tools.
  • Alexander von Falkenhausen's Escape — General von Falkenhausen built the 'Generalissimo's Own' elite divisions in China as a personal escape from the Nazi regime, which had murdered his brother during the Night of the Long Knives.
  • Operation Iron Fist and Tactical Geometry — In the 1937 Battle of Shanghai, Chinese troops used German stormtrooper tactics but were hampered by the 'neutral' International Settlement, which Japanese forces used as a protected flank.
  • The Ribbentrop Pivot — Joachim von Ribbentrop sidelined professional diplomats to convince Hitler that Japan was the better partner, framing China as a Soviet/Bolshevik client after they signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin.
Every ton of ore China shipped to Hamburg in 1936 bought twice the German artillery it would have bought four years earlier. Narrator
If the officers refused, their families in Germany would be sent to concentration camps. Narrator

AI-generated from the transcript. May contain errors.

0:00

Hitler's largest military partner in

0:02

Asia wasn't Japan. It was [music] China.

0:07

For half a decade, the partnership ran

0:09

so deep that when Japanese troops

0:11

attacked Shanghai in 1937, they collided

0:15

with something they had never seen in

0:17

Asia, a Chinese army that fought [music]

0:20

like a European one.

0:23

Then in 1938, Hitler made his choice. He

0:27

recognized Manuko. He shut the program

0:30

down. He handed the future of Asia to

0:33

Tokyo.

0:35

It was one of the worst strategic

0:36

[music] trades of his career, a country

0:39

of 400 million people with a battlefield

0:42

that already pinned down the Imperial

0:44

Japanese Army swapped for an island

0:47

nation that would less than [music] 4

0:49

years later drag him into a war with the

0:52

United States.

0:54

So why [music] did Hitler get China so

0:56

wrong?

0:58

To answer that, I want to tell you four

1:00

things. Why Berlin and Nanjing found

1:04

each other in the first place. How that

1:06

partnership [music] changed the opening

1:08

months of the SinoJapanese War and gave

1:11

the Japanese Marines in Shanghai [music]

1:13

the worst surprise of the war's opening

1:15

months.

1:17

why Hitler tore it all up in February of

1:19

1938

1:21

and what [music] that decision actually

1:23

cost him four years later in a war he

1:26

was still pretending he could win.

1:29

Let's start at the beginning. Versailles

1:32

June 1919.

1:34

The treaty caps the German army at

1:37

100,000 men. No conscription, no tanks,

1:41

no air force, no general staff. The

1:44

largest army in Europe is now the

1:47

smallest professional [music] force on

1:49

the continent.

1:50

The human consequence is what matters

1:53

here. Tens of thousands of professional

1:56

officers, many of them veterans of the

1:58

Stormtrooper battalions of 1918, are out

2:01

of work. They sit in cafes in Munich and

2:04

Berlin, and they wait for someone to

2:07

need them again.

2:09

6,000 mi to the east, someone does.

2:13

Chiang Kaishek is the president [music]

2:15

of a country he does not actually

2:17

control. His rit runs across maybe a

2:20

fifth of his territory. Warlord armies

2:23

hold the west and the north. A communist

2:26

insurgency simmers [music] in the south.

2:29

From the northeast, the pressure of an

2:31

imperial Japan that has already taken

2:33

Manuria and is openly [music] planning

2:35

to take more. He needs a modern army. He

2:39

needs it fast. and he [music] does not

2:42

trust the British, the French or the

2:44

Americans to build it for him.

2:47

The Germans have [music] lost everything

2:49

in Europe. They have nothing to gain by

2:52

partitioning China and they have sitting

2:55

in those cafes the most experienced

2:58

infantry tacticians on earth.

3:01

Chang himself had studied at the

3:03

Imperial Military Academy [music] in

3:04

Tokyo before the First World War. He

3:07

spoke Japanese fluently. He admired

3:10

German efficiency and he was watching

3:13

with growing alarm the country whose

3:16

language he spoke begin preparing to

3:18

invade his own. The first German

3:20

officers arrived in 1927.

3:23

Quietly as private contractors in

3:26

unmarked civilian clothes. The problem

3:30

was that Chang [music] could not pay

3:31

them in cash. His treasury was empty.

3:34

Whatever the Germans were going to

3:36

provide, rifles, artillery, training,

3:39

the architecture of a modern army, China

3:42

would have to pay for it in something

3:44

other than money.

3:46

What China [music] had instead was

3:48

metal. Specifically, it had tungsten,

3:51

wolffrram in German, a gray black

3:54

mineral pulled out of the mountains of

3:56

Djang [music] Xi and Guangong. And in

3:58

the early 1930s, no other country on

4:01

Earth produced more of it. China [music]

4:04

was for all practical purposes the

4:06

world's tungsten mine.

4:09

Tungsten matters because of what it does

4:11

inside a modern arms industry. It is the

4:14

metal that makes armor-piercing [music]

4:16

shells punch through tank steel. It is

4:19

the metal in the drill bits [music] and

4:21

the lathe tools that machine the

4:23

precision parts of a rifle, an anti-tank

4:25

gun, a submarine propeller. Without

4:28

tungsten, your factories cannot

4:31

mass-roduce modern weapons.

4:33

With tungsten, they run.

4:37

In 1933, [music]

4:38

when Adolf Hitler took power and began

4:40

rearming Germany in violation of the

4:43

Versailles Treaty, [music] this fact was

4:45

on the desk of every economist in the

4:48

German war ministry. The Reich was

4:51

preparing for a war it knew was coming.

4:54

It needed tungsten by the ton. No

4:57

European source could supply it.

5:00

China had tungsten. China needed an

5:03

army. In January of 1934, an office in

5:08

Berlin registered [music] a new company.

5:10

Its name was the Handleskazel Shaft Fure

5:13

[music] Industrial Product, the trade

5:16

company for industrial products. The

5:19

acronym [music] was H A P R O. On paper,

5:24

a private firm. In practice, a creation

5:27

[music] of the German war ministry and a

5:29

consortium of German industrial giants,

5:32

Kroo Rin Metal, the Ottowolf Group,

5:35

designed to move weapons and machine

5:38

tools out of Germany and raw materials

5:40

in without anyone in Geneva noticing

5:43

that Hitler's still secret rearmament

5:45

had a foreign supplier.

5:48

The first formal agreement was signed on

5:50

the 23rd of August, 1934.

5:53

Tungsten and antimony out, weapons and

5:57

machinery in. No cash, no debt, pure

6:02

barter.

6:05

A revised and larger version, the

6:07

agreement history remembers as the hap

6:10

agreement was signed on the 8th of April

6:13

1936.

6:15

On top of the barter, the German war

6:18

ministry extended a credit line of 100

6:20

million rice marks, enough to buy China

6:23

the spine of a modern army.

6:26

The most important number in the entire

6:28

arrangement, though, [music] was a price

6:30

curve. Between 1932 and 1936,

6:35

the world [music] price of tungsten more

6:37

than doubled. Every ton of ore China

6:40

shipped to Hamburg in 1936

6:43

bought twice the German [music]

6:45

artillery it would have bought four

6:46

years earlier. The Germans got their

6:49

armor-piercing shells. The Chinese got

6:52

their elite divisions. And the longer

6:55

the deal ran, the better it looked from

6:58

Nanjing.

6:59

By 1936, the partnership had outgrown a

7:03

series of barter contracts. China and

7:06

Germany jointly launched a three-year

7:08

industrial plan, steel works in Hube,

7:12

machine tool plants in Hunan, chemical

7:14

factories in Sichuan, deep in the

7:17

Chinese interior behind the Yangze

7:19

gorges where no Japanese bomber could

7:22

reach. The infrastructure of a war

7:25

economy [music] was being built by

7:28

Germans with Chinese tungsten in a

7:31

country preparing for a war against

7:33

Germany's future ally.

7:37

But this was just paper. Trade

7:39

agreements do not win battles. Treaties

7:42

do not stop infantry.

7:45

By the time the first M35 Stalhelm was

7:48

lifted off a crate in Shanghai Harbor,

7:51

the question that mattered was not what

7:53

Berlin and Nanjing had signed. The

7:56

question was who on the ground in China

8:00

would actually take 80,000 peasant

8:03

conscripts and turn them into the army

8:06

that would shock the Japanese marines

8:07

[music] in Chape. 3 years later,

8:12

the five Germans who [music] built

8:14

Chiang Kai-shek's army arrived in this

8:17

order.

8:19

Colonel Max Bower came in 1927,

8:22

a former staff officer of Eric Ludenorf,

8:25

who had spent the 1920s as a freelance

8:28

military adviser for hire Argentina,

8:31

Spain, [music] Soviet Russia. Two years

8:34

after his arrival in Nanjing, Bower

8:37

caught smallox and died. He never went

8:40

home.

8:42

After Bower, Major General Hammon

8:45

Krebel, a Munich PCH veteran who in 1924

8:49

had served his prison sentence in the

8:51

cell next to a man named Adolf [music]

8:54

Hitler. Kel ran the mission for a year

8:57

and left almost no mark.

9:00

Lieutenant General Gayog [music] Vetszel

9:01

took over in 1930. Over the next four

9:05

years, he built the first demonstration

9:06

brigades, small Chinese [music]

9:09

formations, German trained, used to

9:11

convince Chang's other commanders that

9:13

the new methods actually worked.

9:16

And then in 1933

9:20

came the man whose name historians

9:22

remember.

9:24

Colonel General Hans Fonict was the

9:26

architect of the postwar Reichkes fair.

9:29

The general who had taken the 100,000man

9:32

army Versailles left Germany and built

9:35

it into a leadership cadre capable of

9:37

expanding tenfold the moment the limits

9:40

came off. He understood as few generals

9:44

on earth did how to build an army from

9:47

blueprints.

9:49

On his second visit to China in 1934,

9:53

see [music] brought with him the man who

9:54

would actually do the work. His name was

9:59

Alexander Fonfalenhausen.

10:02

He arrived at 55 and stayed for 4 years.

10:07

By the time Falenhausen reached Nanjing,

10:10

[music] he was already on his third tour

10:12

in Asia. He had fought in the Boxer

10:14

Rebellion [music] as a young lieutenant

10:16

in 1900. As a captain, he had served as

10:19

Imperial Germany's military ataché in

10:21

Tokyo. And there he had learned to speak

10:24

Japanese fluently. When he and [music]

10:26

Chiang Kaishek met for the first time in

10:28

Nanjing, the two men did not bother with

10:31

an interpreter. They spoke Japanese.

10:34

[music] Chang's language from his own

10:36

military academy years in Tokyo.

10:38

Falenhousen's from his years as a German

10:40

officer at the same court. Both knew the

10:43

language well. both knew the country it

10:46

belonged to was preparing to invade

10:49

China. [music]

10:51

Falenhausen had also fought a war. In

10:55

1917, he had served as chief of staff of

10:58

the Turkish 7th Army in Palestine,

11:00

fighting [music] Alanb's British advance

11:03

and earning the poor limmerit, the

11:05

highest military honor the German Empire

11:08

awarded.

11:10

He was by [music] any measure one of the

11:12

most experienced soldiers Hitler's

11:14

Germany still had.

11:17

And he wanted very badly to be somewhere

11:20

else.

11:22

On the 30th of June 1934, Falenhausen's

11:25

[music] first summer in China, the SS

11:29

murdered his brother.

11:31

Hans Yakim Fonfalenhausen [music] was an

11:35

SA officer, a member of Hitler's brown

11:38

shirt paramilitary, killed in his Berlin

11:41

apartment during the night of the long

11:42

knives. He was one of roughly 150

11:46

[music] victims of Hitler's purge of his

11:48

own movement. The news [music] reached

11:51

Alexander in Nanjing some weeks later.

11:55

He attended no funeral. He sent no

11:57

public [music] statement. He did however

12:00

quietly write to his superiors in Berlin

12:02

that he intended to extend his contract

12:05

with the Chinese government.

12:08

From that summer onward, the mission to

12:10

China was Alexander vonfalenhausen's

12:13

escape from Adolf [music] Hitler's

12:15

Germany. The longer he stayed in Asia,

12:18

the longer he did not have to return to

12:20

a country that had murdered his brother

12:23

and put a former Lance corporal in

12:25

charge of the army he had served for 35

12:28

years.

12:31

He fought to [music] make the mission

12:32

succeed. In December of 1934, the plan

12:36

was formalized.

12:38

60 new divisions, each one 10,000 men.

12:42

Each one trained from scratch by German

12:45

officers equipped with German [music]

12:47

weapons drilled in German tactics.

12:50

Behind them, 60 more, the reformed

12:53

divisions, Chinese armed with two German

12:56

advisers per division, working toward

12:59

the same standard.

13:01

On paper, an army of 600,000 elite

13:05

troops by 1942.

13:07

the spine of a force that could fight

13:09

Japan to a stalemate, hold the coast,

13:12

and force a negotiated peace.

13:16

It was precisely the war Falconhausen

13:20

knew was coming.

13:22

The reality, by July of 1937, [music]

13:26

was more modest.

13:28

20 divisions were partly ready. Eight

13:31

were fully trained, the so-called

13:33

General Lissimo's own. Roughly 80,000

13:36

men, three infantry regiments per

13:39

division, a 75 mm field artillery

13:42

battalion, a 37 mm anti-tank company,

13:46

anti-aircraft platoon, [music]

13:48

engineers, and signals. Stormtroop

13:51

infiltration tactics inherited directly

13:53

from the trenches of 1918. The same

13:56

methods that had nearly won Germany the

13:58

First World War, now drilled into

14:01

Chinese conscripts on the [music]

14:02

Yangzey. They wore M35 Stalhelms. They

14:07

carried [music] mouser pattern rifles,

14:09

most of them Chinese-built copies from

14:11

the Hanyang arsenal. They moved like

14:14

Reichkes [music] platoon.

14:17

Behind them, the rest of China's army,

14:19

about 2 million men in nominal uniform,

14:22

still drilled [music] like it was 1911.

14:26

Cotton tunics, bolt-action rifles older

14:29

than the men who carried them, officers

14:31

who could not read maps.

14:34

Falenhousen's plan was that the elite 8

14:37

would absorb the first Japanese blow.

14:39

The reformed 20 would slow the advance.

14:42

The obsolete 2 million would buy time,

14:46

years of attrition, while Japan's

14:48

economy broke under the weight of an

14:50

unwinable war.

14:53

It might have worked, but the cloud had

14:55

already formed in Berlin.

14:58

On the 25th of November 1936,

15:02

Germany and Japan signed the

15:03

anti-commonturn pact. On its face, a

15:07

defensive arrangement against the Soviet

15:09

Union. In practice, the first time

15:12

Hitler's Germany had publicly committed

15:14

itself in writing [music] to the country

15:16

Falenhausen's Chinese army was preparing

15:19

to fight. Falenhausen read the news in

15:22

his office in Nanjing. [music]

15:24

He said nothing publicly. The work

15:26

continued. The crates [music] kept

15:28

arriving from Hamorg.

15:31

But in a back office in Berlin, a former

15:34

champagne salesman who had become

15:35

Hitler's unofficial foreign affairs

15:37

adviser [music] was already pulling at

15:40

the threads of the whole arrangement.

15:42

His name was Yahim Fon Ribbentrop. We

15:45

come back to him in a little while.

15:48

The first shot was fired 600 m to the

15:51

north. On the night of the 7th of July

15:54

1937,

15:56

Japanese [music] troops on a training

15:57

exercise outside Beijing claimed they

16:00

had been fired upon by Chinese soldiers.

16:03

They demanded the right to search a

16:05

nearby town. The Chinese garrison

16:07

refused. Sometime before dawn, the

16:10

firing started in earnest. The skirmish

16:13

at the Marco Polo Bridge has been called

16:16

staged, accidental, and inevitable. By

16:20

daylight on the 8th of July, two of the

16:23

great armies of Asia were shooting at

16:25

each other and the SinoJapanese [music]

16:28

war had begun.

16:31

For 5 weeks, the fighting stayed in the

16:33

[music] north. Then on the 9th of August

16:36

in Shanghai, a Japanese sublutenant

16:39

named Isao [music] Oyama drove with a

16:42

single sailor to Hongcha Aerod Drrome,

16:45

Chinese controlled [music] territory off

16:47

limits to Japanese forces under the 1932

16:50

ceasefire. The Chinese Peace

16:53

Preservation Corps stopped him at the

16:54

gate. By the time the bodies were

16:57

recovered, [music] the lieutenant, his

16:59

driver, and a Chinese guard were all

17:01

dead. What had actually happened is

17:05

still disputed. [music]

17:06

What happened next was not.

17:10

On the 13th of August, 3,000 Japanese

17:13

Marines of the Special Naval Landing

17:15

Force took up positions [music] along

17:17

the perimeter of the International

17:19

Settlement. They were lightly armed.

17:22

They expected to hold ground until

17:24

reinforcements landed from the sea,

17:26

closing on them from the west and the

17:28

north with the Chinese [music] 87th and

17:31

88th divisions. The two best units in

17:34

Chiang Kai-shek's army, 80,000 men with

17:37

the General Eimo's mandate,

17:39

Falenhausen's tactics, [music]

17:41

and the equipment of a German infantry

17:43

division.

17:45

Falenhausen's plan was a [music] German

17:47

plan. Hit before the enemy can react.

17:51

concentrate. [music]

17:52

Strike a single decisive blow that ends

17:54

the campaign before it begins. The

17:58

Germans had a word for it. Enshungl,

18:02

the decisive battle. In 1914, the same

18:06

concept had carried the Imperial German

18:08

army to within 40 mi of Paris. [music]

18:11

In 1940, it would carry the Vermach to

18:15

the English Channel in 6 weeks. In 1937,

18:19

Falenhausen wanted Changang to push

18:22

3,000 Japanese Marines into the Hangpoo

18:24

River before [music] reinforcements

18:26

could land. He had 3 days. The first

18:31

Chinese assault on the 14th of August

18:33

[music] was a confused affair. Air

18:35

support arrived late. Ground attacks

18:38

were peacemeal [music]

18:39

and by sunset the Japanese marines had

18:42

pulled back into their fortified blocks

18:44

inside the settlement perimeter and

18:46

held.

18:48

Chang and his commanders met that

18:49

[music] night to plan a second blow.

18:53

2 days later on the 17th of August

18:55

[music] came Operation Iron Fist. It was

18:59

a perfect German stormtroop attack. The

19:02

87th and 88th divisions launched a heavy

19:05

artillery preparation at dawn. The

19:08

infantry moved while the dust was still

19:10

in the air before the Japanese marines

19:12

could [music] come up from cover. Three

19:15

rifle squads bounded forward in pairs,

19:18

leapfrogging through alleys and

19:19

warehouse yards, encircling Japanese

19:22

strong [music] points rather than

19:23

charging them headon. For 12 hours, it

19:27

worked.

19:29

Then the trap [music] closed, but not

19:31

the one the Chinese had planned. The

19:34

trap was geographic.

19:37

The northern boundary of the Chinese

19:38

attack ran along the southern edge of

19:40

the international settlement. [music]

19:42

The British and French and American extr

19:45

territorial zone where by treaty no

19:47

Chinese army was [music] permitted to

19:49

fight. The Japanese knew it. They used

19:52

the settlement as a sanctuary on their

19:54

own flank, free to fire from the line

19:57

and impossible to flank back through.

20:01

Every encirclement the Chinese drew on a

20:03

[music] map ran into the same reality. A

20:06

thousand yards of neutral territory

20:07

[music] they could not cross.

20:11

At the Bazi Bridge, the 88th Division

20:13

was caught by Japanese light tanks

20:15

flanking from three directions and lost

20:18

most of an infantry battalion in an

20:20

afternoon. By dawn on the 18th, [music]

20:23

the attack had been called off. The next

20:25

morning, the 36th Division, the third of

20:28

the elite German trained units newly

20:31

arrived, attacks the [music] docks at Hi

20:33

Shan with armor for the first time. They

20:37

had no doctrine for [music] tank

20:38

infantry coordination. The infantry

20:41

advanced too far ahead of the tanks. The

20:43

tanks lost [music] their infantry screen

20:46

and were knocked out one by one. In a

20:49

single morning, the 36th Division lost

20:51

[music] over 90 officers and a thousand

20:54

men.

20:56

3 days later, Chinese tanks finally

20:59

broke through to the last street before

21:01

the Hangpoo Warves. The river was 60

21:04

yard beyond. The Japanese marines were

21:07

on the seaw wall behind concrete 10 ft

21:10

thick. [music]

21:11

Chinese artillery could not breach it.

21:14

Chinese infantry could not approach it.

21:17

60 yard.

21:19

They could not cross 60 yards.

21:23

The window was closed.

21:26

The next day, [music] the first ships of

21:28

the Japanese reinforcement convoy

21:31

entered the Hangpoo.

21:33

After the 22nd of August, the calculus

21:35

of the battle changed completely.

21:38

Japanese reinforcements began arriving

21:40

in waves. 1,400 more Marines from

21:44

Manuria on the 18th. then divisions from

21:47

the home islands. By the end of October,

21:51

the Imperial Japanese Army would have

21:52

committed 300,000

21:55

soldiers to the city, supported by 700

21:58

artillery pieces [music] and 400

22:01

aircraft. Chiang Kaishek poured his army

22:04

into the same urban grinder.

22:07

He had a choice that fall. He could have

22:10

withdrawn to the line of fortifications

22:12

Falconhausen had built [music] between

22:14

Shanghai and Nanjing and fought the

22:16

Japanese on terrain of his own choosing.

22:19

He chose instead to commit everything to

22:22

Shanghai. The reason was not military.

22:26

It was diplomatic.

22:28

On the 6th of November, the signitories

22:31

of the nine power treaty were scheduled

22:33

to meet in Brussels to [music] discuss

22:34

the situation in China. Chang hoped to

22:37

walk into that conference with a clear

22:39

case. Japanese aggression had destroyed

22:42

Shanghai, violated the treaty, and

22:44

demanded a western response. For the

22:47

case to land, the West needed to see

22:50

China bleed. So Chang [music] fed his

22:53

army into Shanghai,

22:56

700,000 men in total. The 87th, the

23:00

88th, the 36th, [music]

23:03

the rest of the German trained corps.

23:06

the reformed divisions behind them, then

23:08

the warlord [music] units, then the

23:10

conscripts.

23:12

Three months of urban fighting.

23:15

Falconhausen was at the front the entire

23:18

time. The terms of the German military

23:21

mission [music] were clear, and Berlin

23:23

had reminded its officers of those terms

23:25

in writing more than once. They were

23:28

private contractors in foreign [music]

23:30

employee. They were to stay behind the

23:33

lines in headquarters providing tactical

23:36

guidance [music] to Chinese commanders.

23:38

Falconhausen ignored the order for weeks

23:42

at a time. He was at Luoden on the

23:45

northern flank of the Shanghai perimeter

23:47

where the Chinese line was thinnest and

23:49

the Japanese pressure heaviest. He wore

23:52

a Chinese army uniform. By his own later

23:55

account, he survived for days at a time

23:58

on hard-boiled eggs and cognac.

24:01

69 other German advisers of every rank

24:04

from second lieutenant to lieutenant

24:05

[music] general were with him on the

24:07

line.

24:09

They had been warned. They engaged

24:12

anyway.

24:14

When Japanese marines began [music]

24:16

calling the fight at Shanghai the German

24:19

war, they were not entirely wrong.

24:22

The Brussels conference opened on

24:24

schedule. It accomplished nothing. The

24:27

Western [music] powers could not agree

24:29

on a response, issued a statement of

24:31

concern, and adjourned. 2 days later,

24:35

the Chinese line at Da Chang collapsed

24:37

under the weight of Japanese armor and

24:39

air power. The retreat from Shanghai

24:42

began. By the 26th of October, Chinese

24:46

resistance in the northern district of

24:48

Ja was [music] finished. Chang had

24:51

ordered a general withdrawal across Sujo

24:53

Creek into [music] the western suburbs.

24:56

He kept one battalion behind.

24:58

420 men of the 88th Division's [music]

25:01

524th regiment took up positions inside

25:05

a six-story concrete warehouse on

25:07

[music] the north bank of the creek. The

25:10

warehouse had been the 88th Division's

25:12

headquarters until the previous week. It

25:14

still held food, medical supplies, and

25:17

ammunition. Each man was issued a mouser

25:20

rifle, 300 rounds of ammunition,

25:22

grenades, a gas mask, and an M-35

25:25

Stallhelm. The defenders had 27 light

25:29

machine guns and four Maxims. No

25:32

artillery, no support.

25:35

Across 60 ft of dirty water [music] on

25:38

the south bank of Sujo Creek, the

25:41

western journalists, the foreign

25:42

businessmen, and the soldiers of the

25:44

British Army garrison of the

25:46

international settlement watched.

25:49

The siege of the Seihong Warehouse

25:52

lasted from the 26th of October to the

25:54

1st of November, 1937.

25:58

6 days. The Japanese committed two

26:01

infantry regiments, light tanks, and

26:03

field artillery against 420 Chinese

26:07

soldiers in a concrete [music] box.

26:10

35 of the defenders were killed. The

26:13

rest withdrew on Chang's [music] order

26:16

across a bridge into the British

26:17

concession on the night of the 1st of

26:19

November.

26:21

The Chinese nationalist propaganda

26:23

machine called them the 800 heroes.

26:28

The real number was 420.

26:30

The propaganda did not really matter.

26:33

What mattered was the funnel.

26:37

In August of 1937, Falconhausen's elite

26:40

German trained Chinese army numbered

26:42

80,000 men. By the end of October, 420

26:47

of them were in a concrete warehouse on

26:50

the Sujo Creek.

26:52

6 days later, 35 of those 420 were dead.

26:59

That was the path of the Battle of

27:00

Shanghai.

27:02

From 80,000 [music] to 420

27:06

to 35

27:08

in 10 weeks.

27:10

The retreat from Shanghai bled into the

27:13

retreat from Nanjing. By the time the

27:15

German trained divisions reached the new

27:17

Chinese capital at Wuhan, the 87th, the

27:20

88th, and the training division of the

27:23

Central Military Academy, the three best

27:26

units in Chang's army at the start of

27:28

the year, had fewer than 2,500 men

27:31

between them.

27:33

Estimates of total Chinese casualties at

27:35

Shanghai begin at 187,000.

27:40

They run as [music] high as 270,000.

27:43

The Japanese themselves lost between

27:46

40,000 and 90,000 men, depending on

27:49

whose numbers [music] you trust.

27:52

The Imperial General Staff had expected

27:54

to capture Shanghai in 3 days. Among the

27:57

Chinese dead were 10,000 of the 25,000

28:01

graduates of the Wampoa Military

28:03

Academy, the Junior Officer Corps that

28:06

had been the backbone of every German

28:08

trained [music] division.

28:10

They were not replaceable. The men who

28:12

had spent 5 years learning German

28:15

tactics [music] from German officers

28:17

were gone.

28:19

The army Hans Fon and Alexander

28:22

Fonfalenhausen had spent 5 years

28:24

building was in the space of 3 months

28:28

almost completely destroyed.

28:31

And in Berlin, a man none of them had

28:34

met yet was about to [music] make sure

28:36

none of it would ever be rebuilt.

28:41

Berlin in 1937 [music]

28:43

did not have one foreign policy.

28:47

It had two.

28:49

The official one ran out of the

28:50

Vilamstrasa, the German foreign ministry

28:53

under Baron Constantine [music] Fonoat,

28:56

a career diplomat from before Hitler.

28:59

Noat was pro-China. [music] So was his

29:02

deputy Hans Gayorg Fonmakinson.

29:05

So were the [music] economic ministries

29:07

under Halmar Shakt and the war ministry

29:10

under Vienna Fon Blumbberg.

29:13

The unofficial [music]

29:14

foreign policy ran out of a townhouse in

29:17

the Berlin suburb of Dalum. It [music]

29:20

was called the Deceella Ribbentrop, the

29:23

Ribbonrop Bureau. A private operation

29:26

funded by Hitler personally, staffed by

29:29

Nazi loyalists, dedicated to one idea.

29:34

Germany's future lay with Japan, not

29:37

with China. Yoke von Riventrop, former

29:41

Champagne salesman, current ambassador

29:44

to London, future foreign minister, had

29:47

been pulling at the threads of the China

29:49

Alliance since [music] 1935.

29:52

In 1937, he was preparing to pull

29:55

harder.

29:56

In June of 1937, [music] 5 weeks before

30:00

Marco Polo Bridge, Chiang Kai-shek's

30:03

finance [music] minister, HHkung,

30:05

arrived in Berlin to ask whether Germany

30:08

was about to abandon them. He met with

30:11

shocked. He met with Bloomberg's deputy.

30:14

He met with Mackinson at the foreign

30:16

ministry. The [music] answer in every

30:19

meeting was the same. The

30:21

anti-commonturn pact was a defensive

30:24

arrangement against the Soviet Union. It

30:27

was not and would not become an

30:29

instrument aimed at China. As long as

30:32

Mackinson and Noat ran the foreign

30:35

ministry, SinoGerman relations would

30:38

continue. Kung left Berlin on the 14th

30:41

of June. He returned briefly in August,

30:44

one month after the SinoJapanese War had

30:47

begun. By then, the asurances were

30:50

already worth less than the paper they

30:52

had not been written on.

30:55

On the 21st of August, 1937,

30:58

8 days into the Battle of Shanghai,

31:01

China signed a non-aggression pact with

31:04

the Soviet Union. Within weeks, Soviet

31:07

aid began to flow. Soviet aircraft,

31:11

Soviet pilots flying combat missions

31:13

over Honu.

31:15

$250 million American dollars in credit

31:18

and weapons.

31:20

Militarily, [music]

31:22

China was fighting for its life. It

31:24

could no longer be choosy about its

31:26

sources of help. Politically in Berlin,

31:30

the Soviet aid changed [music] the

31:32

framing of the relationship.

31:34

Hitler, particularly the Hitler [music]

31:37

whose ear ribbon now had, could now look

31:40

at China and see [music]

31:42

instead of an Asian partner against

31:44

Japan, a client of Joseph Stalin.

31:48

Defending Chiang Kaishek had become in

31:50

the mental geography of national

31:52

socialism, defending Bolsheism.

31:56

That was a fight Noirat and Shakt and

31:59

Blombberg could not win.

32:02

The 4th of February 1938 was the day the

32:06

China policy died. It died at two

32:09

ministries [music] simultaneously.

32:12

At the war ministry, Vera von Bloomberg,

32:15

the field marshal who had signed off on

32:17

the Hapro agreement, who had personally

32:19

backed the German military mission to

32:21

China, was forced out [music] over a

32:24

manufactured scandal involving his

32:26

second wife. His associate Vera von Frri

32:30

the army's [music] commander-in-chief

32:32

was forced out the same week on a

32:34

fabricated charge. Hitler took direct

32:37

command of [music] the armed forces.

32:40

At the foreign ministry on the same day,

32:42

Constantine vonat [music] was dismissed.

32:46

His replacement was Yohim von Ribentrop.

32:49

In a single morning, the two ministries

32:51

that had defended the China relationship

32:53

[music]

32:54

for 5 years were beheaded.

32:57

The men who [music] took their places

32:59

agreed on one thing. Germany's future

33:03

was with Tokyo.

33:05

16 days later, on the 20th of [music]

33:07

February, Adolf Hitler addressed the

33:10

Reichto.

33:11

Most of the speech was about Austria.

33:14

The Anelus was 3 weeks away, but buried

33:17

in it was a sentence the Chinese

33:19

government had been dreading [music]

33:21

since November of 1936.

33:24

Germany formally recognized the Empire

33:28

of Manuko.

33:30

The Japanese controlled puppet state on

33:32

what had been Chinese sovereign

33:34

territory was now in the eyes of the

33:36

Reich a legitimate nation.

33:40

In the same speech, on the same subject,

33:42

[music] Hitler said this. Even the

33:45

greatest victory gained by Japan would

33:48

be infinitely less [music] dangerous for

33:50

civilization and world peace than any

33:53

success achieved by bolsheism.

33:56

The Chinese ambassador in Berlin wired

33:59

Nanjing. The German military mission in

34:02

his estimation had less than 90 days. He

34:06

was almost exactly right.

34:09

In April of 1938, Yakim Fon Ribbentrop

34:13

ended all German armed shipments to

34:15

China. He sent telegrams to every German

34:18

officer attached to the Chinese army.

34:21

The wording was direct. They were to

34:24

return to Germany immediately. Their

34:26

contracts with the Chinese government

34:28

were terminated.

34:30

There was a sentence at the end that did

34:32

not appear in the formal order. It was

34:35

communicated separately, sometimes in

34:37

person by German diplomats, [music]

34:39

sometimes in a quiet conversation in a

34:41

hotel room in Hong Kong. If the officers

34:45

refused, their families in Germany would

34:48

be sent to concentration camps.

34:51

This was the ground [music] these men

34:53

had thought they had fled.

34:55

Alexander Fonfalenhausen, four years

34:57

[music] deep in his escape from the

34:59

Reich that had murdered his brother, was

35:01

now told that the decision was no longer

35:04

his.

35:06

The mission had stopped being a

35:08

contract.

35:09

It had become a hostage exchange.

35:12

The advisers began going home.

35:15

Falenhausen was the last to leave. In

35:19

the first week of July 1938, he had

35:22

dinner with Chang Kaishek and [music]

35:24

Madame Chang at the family home. The

35:27

conversation was by all accounts calm.

35:30

Chang did not blame him. Before he

35:32

boarded the train out of China,

35:34

Falenhausen made Chang one promise.

35:38

He had spent four [music] years

35:39

designing China's war plan against

35:42

Japan. Attrition. Retreat into the

35:44

interior. Hold the Yellow River line.

35:47

bleed the Japanese economy over years.

35:51

That strategy was now in his head in

35:53

considerable detail.

35:55

He promised Chang Kaishek that he would

35:58

never under any circumstance share it

36:01

with the Japanese.

36:03

He kept the promise for the rest of his

36:06

life.

36:08

Chiang Kai-shek, for his part,

36:10

considered Falconhausen a friend until

36:12

the day Chang himself died. In 1953, on

36:16

Falenhausen's 75th birthday, [music] a

36:19

personal check arrived from Taipei for

36:22

12,000 American dollars.

36:25

By then, Alexander vonfalenhausen had

36:27

survived a Belgian war crimes trial

36:30

[music] and Nazi concentration camps,

36:33

but that is another episode.

36:37

What Hitler had bought in his vault foss

36:40

of February 1938 was a partnership with

36:43

Imperial Japan.

36:45

What he had given up in the same breath

36:48

was the only continental ally he had in

36:51

Asia, the strongest source of tungsten

36:53

for his rearmament and a Chinese army

36:56

that was already pinning down hundreds

36:58

of thousands of Japanese [music]

36:59

soldiers.

37:01

It was by any measure a strategic

37:04

miscalculation.

37:07

But how badly [music] miscalculated was

37:09

it exactly?

37:11

What did Germany actually get?

37:14

Japan refused to allow any new German

37:16

businesses into the parts of China it

37:19

occupied. Existing German firms, the

37:22

ones that had built the relationship

37:23

under Hapro, were squeezed out, their

37:26

factories nationalized, their assets

37:29

transferred to Japanese conglomerates.

37:32

The tungsten pipeline that had supplied

37:34

German rearmament collapsed almost

37:36

overnight.

37:38

Berlin began importing tungsten from

37:40

Spain and Portugal at higher prices on

37:44

shipping routes the Royal Navy could

37:46

blockade. Hitler had ended one Asian raw

37:49

materials relationship and got nothing

37:52

comparable in return.

37:55

But the larger problem was geopolitical.

37:58

Hitler's bet was that Japan would press

38:01

north against the Soviet [music] Union,

38:03

tying down Stalin's far eastern

38:05

divisions when Germany invaded the USSR.

38:09

In 1939, Japan made the attempt at a

38:13

place called Kkin Gaul. The Imperial

38:15

Japanese Army met the [music] Soviet Far

38:18

East under a general named Gueorgi

38:20

Zhukov and was destroyed. Tokyo

38:23

abandoned the northern strategy. [music]

38:26

By 1941, Japan was turning south toward

38:30

British Malaya.

38:32

Dutch oil, American Pacific bases.

38:37

The whole point of Hitler's pivot

38:38

[music]

38:39

evaporated.

38:42

By that same year, the Imperial Japanese

38:45

Army was tying down somewhere between

38:48

600,000

38:49

and a million men in [music] China,

38:52

pinning them in the same theater Hitler

38:54

had helped to create [music]

38:56

before he gave the Chinese soldiers up

38:58

to make Japan happy.

39:01

Imagine instead that Hitler had let

39:03

Falenhousen [music]

39:04

finish the work. In a Germany still

39:08

arming China in 1941, [music]

39:11

the Reich would have had a working

39:12

tungsten pipeline, an industrial partner

39:15

in the Chinese interior, and a Chinese

39:18

army still [music] pinning down Japan's

39:21

continental forces, exactly as it had

39:24

pinned them in 1937.

39:27

Tokyo's already deep caution about war

39:29

with the United States would [music]

39:31

have been deeper. The Pacific War

39:34

Franklin Roosevelt feared in late 1941

39:37

might have looked very different. It

39:40

might never have come at the same time

39:42

as Operation Barbar Roa. Hitler did not

39:45

lose the Second World War because he

39:47

picked the wrong Asian partner. He lost

39:50

it for many reasons. But the partner he

39:53

picked [music] was on balance almost

39:55

useless to him. and the one he abandoned

39:58

would four years later be tying down a

40:01

quarter of the Imperial Japanese Army.

40:04

This was not [music] a tactical error.

40:07

It was a strategic one.

40:09

Did the German aid help China? The army

40:13

Falenhausen built [music] was destroyed

40:15

at Shanghai. The eight elite divisions,

40:18

the Woa Officer Corps, [music] the

40:20

Stormtroop tactics, all of it ground to

40:23

powder in 3 months on the Yanked [music]

40:25

Sea.

40:27

But the doctrine survived.

40:29

The men who had learned German tactics

40:31

in 1936

40:33

commanded Chinese armies through 1945.

40:37

The industrial base built under HAPRO,

40:40

steel works in Hube, machine tool plants

40:43

in Hunan, chemical factories in Sichuan

40:46

became the spine of China's wartime

40:48

production deep in the interior beyond

40:51

the reach of Japanese bombers.

40:53

Falenhausen's strategy of attrition,

40:56

hold the Yellow River, retreat into the

40:58

interior, bleed Japan slowly, became

41:02

official Chinese national strategy

41:04

[music] after 1938.

41:06

He lost his army. He left behind [music]

41:09

a doctrine that won the war.

41:13

Hitler thought he was trading a paper

41:15

partner for a useful one. He was

41:18

actually trading a useful partner for a

41:20

paper one. And the war he would lose

41:23

four years later began in part in a

41:26

Reichdog speech in February of 1938.

41:30

We know how the Second World War turned

41:32

out. Germany and Japan and Italy on one

41:36

side, the United [music] States,

41:38

Britain, the Soviet Union, France and

41:40

China on the other. The sides are clean.

41:44

[music] The story is settled.

41:47

But that clarity is a trick of

41:48

hindsight. [music] It only became true

41:51

around 1941.

41:53

For the entire decade before that,

41:56

everything we have just [music] walked

41:57

through was the rule, not the exception.

42:01

Germany armed China against Japan. The

42:04

Soviet Union backed Chinese [music]

42:06

communists and Chinese nationalists by

42:09

turn. Britain and France sold weapons to

42:12

anyone with hard currency. Italy [music]

42:15

sent military advisers to the same

42:17

Chinese army the Germans were training.

42:20

Even the United States, officially

42:22

neutral, had retired American pilots

42:25

flying for Chiang Kaishek.

42:28

There was no axis. There were no allies.

42:32

There were only governments running

42:34

every direction at once.

42:37

For us looking at this [music] from the

42:39

other side of the 20th century, that

42:42

decade is dry history.

42:45

But it is worth remembering what it

42:46

[music] actually felt like to live

42:48

through. A world where the partnerships

42:51

of one year became the enemies of the

42:54

next. A world where every government's

42:57

first instinct was to demand something

43:00

from another instead of build something

43:02

with one. A world that was by the time

43:06

it ended on fire.

43:10

That is how the Second World War [music]

43:13

began. It is more or less how the First

43:17

World War began.

43:21

I'll keep telling these stories.

43:24

the familiar [music] shape of the Second

43:26

World War. The campaigns, the

43:28

commanders, the weapons, but also the

43:31

part most histories [music] skip over.

43:33

The decade before, the years when the

43:36

road to that war was [music] still being

43:38

paved, one trade agreement and one

43:41

broken promise at a time. The years we

43:45

just walked through together.

43:48

Because if there is one thing worth

43:49

taking away from a story like this, it

43:52

is that the war that ends with clean

43:54

sides [music]

43:55

almost never began that way. Someone has

43:58

to look at how it actually started.

44:02

If you want to keep doing that with me,

44:04

subscribe.

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